The Sankhya Darshana

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Chapter One

The Author's Exposition

अथ त्रिविधदुःखात्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थः। न दृष्टात्तत्सिद्धिर्निवृत्तेऽप्यनुवृत्तिदर्श-
नात्। प्रात्याहिकक्षुत्प्रतीकरवत्तत्प्रतीकरचेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम्। सर्वासम्भवात्सम्भवेऽपि
सत्तासम्भवाद्धेयः प्रमाणकुषलैः। उत्कर्षादपि मोक्षस्य सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेः। अविशेषश्चो-
भयोः। न स्वभावतो बद्धस्य मोक्षसाधनोपदेशविधिः। स्वभावस्यानपायित्वादननुष्ठान-
लक्षणमप्रामाण्यम्। नाशक्योपदेशविधिरुपदिष्टेऽप्यनुपदेशः ।

1.1 atha now **trividha-duḥkha-atyanta-nivṛttiḥ** threefold – suffering – ultimate – turning back, cessation **atyanta-puruṣa-arthaḥ** ultimate – human being, person – aim, purpose, desire, interest, meaning **1.2 na** not **dṛṣṭāt** (abl. through) that which is seen, taught, known, learned, learned knowledge **tat-siddhiḥ** that – accomplishing **nivṛtte** (loc. upon, after) turned back **api** even **anuvṛtti-darśanāt** (abl. known from) returning – observing, seeing

1.3 prātyāhika-kṣut-pratīkāra-vat (vati like) daily – hunger – counteracting **tat-pratīkāra-ceṣṭanāt** (abl. accomplished or realized through) of that – counteracting – making an effort, doing **puruṣa-artha-tvam** person – purpose – state of being **1.4 sarva-asambhavāt** (abl. since) for everyone – not possible **sambhave api** (loc. with api; even though) possible **sattā-asambhavāt** (abl. because) its being true, that it is true – impossible **heyaḥ** rejected **pramāṇa-kuśalaiḥ** (m. inst. pl. by) logic, assessing truth – experts

1.5 utkarṣāt (abl. out of) the best **api** even **mokṣasya** (gen.) of liberation **sarva-utkarṣa-śruteḥ** (abl. known from) (over) all – superiority – scripture **1.6 aviśeṣaḥ** undistinguished, common **ca** indeed **ubhayoḥ** in both cases **1.7 na** not **svabhāvataḥ** from natural disposition **baddhasya** (gen. of) bound **mokṣa-sādhanā-upadeśa-vidhiḥ** liberation – bringing about – teaching – instruction

1.8 svabhāvasya (gen. of) one's natural state **anapāyitvāt** (abl. because) not-going-away-ness, persistence **ananuṣṭhāna-lakṣaṇam** non-observance, neglect – characterized by **aprāmāṇyam** lack of having proof, not credible

1.9 na no **a-śakya-upadeśa-vidhiḥ** not – able to be done – teaching – Vedic instruction **upadiṣṭe** (loc. if) taught **api** even **an-upadeśaḥ** not – teaching

(The author says:) **1.1 Now, the ultimate purpose** (see VD 1.1) **of a human being (puruṣa) is the ultimate cessation of threefold suffering. 1.2 That it cannot be accomplished through what is <u>learned</u> (dṛṣṭa), is known from seeing it return even after it is turned back.**

(The opponent says:) **1.3 The state that is the purpose of a human being is realized through what is <u>done</u>** (meaning karmas, agnis, etc.) **to counteract that (suffering), like counteracting daily hunger, 1.4 (so) it (your thesis) is rejected by (us) authorities, because of the impossibility of its being true; since, though possible, it is not possible for everyone.**

(The author:) **1.5 It is known from the scripture on the superiority of liberation over all, even out of the best of those (efforts), 1.6 that indeed in both cases (what is learned and what is done) it is just a common thing. 1.7 There is Vedic instruction** (see VD 1.2, 9.18) **teaching the bringing about of that liberation, which does not arise from the natural state of the bound.**

(The opponent:) **1.8 Something characterized by non-observance (of karmas) is not credible, because there would be persistence of that natural state (of bondage).**

(The author:) **1.9 Well, that Vedic instruction does not teach something that can't be done. Even if such a thing were taught, it would not be that (Vedic) teaching.**

This work, known as the Sankhya Pravachana Sutra, is not a treatise like the other Darshanas, but rather a dialog between the author and a dialectical opponent of his own invention, which he uses as a vehicle for the presentation of the liberating view and the living view in opposition to each other. (So be sure to note which point of view you are reading!) Now, it cannot be over-emphasized that both views are correct in their own way and that a living liberated person accepts both, but it will seem to the reader that the author's teaching is favored as right and the opponent's as somehow wrong. That is because the opponent, established in a way of thinking that is traditional and undisputed, will not even consider the author's radical way of seeing. He is "wrong" because his view is only half right. The author's thesis, like that of the other Darshanas is a dualism consisting of the living view and the liberating view together. The opponent quibbles in sutra 4.8 that such a dualism has no meaning, and it doesn't, until you see it for yourself, and then it is the quibbling that loses all meaning.

The word "puruṣa" here denotes a human being, not an object or a non-human elemental force or a god or a great external cosmic spirit, but the internal human soul or spirit. It will be explained in this chapter that the word does not refer to the limited individual known by name, time, place, and occupation. It is taught throughout this work, as it is in Vaisheshika and Yoga, that there is only one human spirit, which means that the word "puruṣa" refers wholly to the solipsist yogin in the present moment.

It is natural to want to have comfort or even pleasure in life, to be accepted if not loved, to enjoy security if not prosperity, but the author says that the ultimate aim, at the root of all these desires, is the need for freedom from suffering. He refers to three kinds of suffering, which can be easily distinguished and recognized even though they are not named here. There is a physical suffering involving afflictions of the body, a social suffering involving afflictions of the personal identity, and a loss of the ability to focus, such as shock, grief, or confusion, which is an affliction involving self-reflection. All three of these will be dealt with later on in the work. This differs somewhat from the threefold division, imposed by other commentators, into "ādhibhautika (external or having to do with the elemental world), ādhyātmika (internal or having to do with the individual), and ādhidaivika" (having to do with the divine, supernatural), even though some correlation with those may be seen.

The ultimate cessation of this suffering is not a permanent state but rather a perpetual opportunity. There may be no hurt or doubt of any kind right now in the present moment, but the hope of achieving a permanent state of bliss over time does not fit with the teaching of liberation here. Living liberation is an ongoing interplay between the binding effect of the diversity of life experience and the awakening of unity, so the freedom is always available but not always present. It's like being in a locked cell to which you will always hold the key. The habit of putting off liberation to a later date is self-perpetuating, and hoping for a future of permanent bliss keeps one bound in a world of hope, because the notion of a state of permanent cessation is based merely on testimony, and on the ability to imagine that there might be a negation of your experience. Practicing some method aimed at achieving over time a state of permanent enlightenment, one may construct a memory of previous times where the gap between the torpor and the clarity was greater than it is now, and an anticipation of diminishing that gap even further, but the reality is always right now. A sense of progress is an important and inevitable thing, but it is rather a sense of increasing ease and frequency in the ability to

immediately abandon the suffering and embrace the unity. Like the claim to progress, any claim to permanence would be based on nothing more than a memory construct.

The word "dṛṣṭa" (literally "seen") refers to knowledge that is learned, things that are well known and commonly acknowledged. The opponent says that a person's ultimate goal is accomplished through such traditional knowledge and through proper actions, and he does not agree that cessation of suffering is even possible except in the case of a few advanced yogis who have completed their cycle of incarnations and eliminated all their karma. The author replies that neither traditional knowledge nor traditionally mandated action makes any difference, but that there is something called "liberation", which is superior to both. It is the ability (1.11) of self-deliverance from the sense of struggle that seems to be a person's natural state in life. He says that guidance for that liberation is found in the Vedas, which were the religious and philosophical works of the time.

शुक्लपटवद्बीजवच्चेत्। शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां नाशक्त्युपदेशः। न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्यस्य सर्वसम्बन्धात्। न देशयोगतोऽप्यस्मात्। नावस्थातो देहधर्मत्वात्तस्याः। असङ्गोऽयं पुरुष इति। न कर्मणान्यधर्मत्वादतिप्रसक्तेश्च। विचित्रभोगानुपपत्तिरन्य-धर्मत्वे। प्रकृतिनिबन्धनाच्चेन्न तस्या अपि पारतन्त्र्यम् ।

1.10 śukla-paṭavat (like the) white – cloth **bījavat** (like the) seed **cet** if (you say, you think) then

1.11 śakti-udbhava-anudbhavābhyām (abl. because, for) power, ability – manifest – unmanifest **na** not **aśakya-upadeśaḥ** impracticable, incapable of being done – teaching **1.12 na** no **kāla-yogatas** (tasil) a time period – through connection with **vyāpinaḥ** (abl. since) all-pervading **nityasya** (gen. point of view; for) the eternal **sarva-sambandhāt** (abl. because) all – (with sarva) "common to" **1.13 na** no **deśa-yogatas** (tasil through) connection with place **api asmāt** (abl.) for the same reason **1.14 na** no **avasthātas** (tasil through) life circumstance (fem.) **deha-dharma-tvāt** (abl. since) body – role – being **tasyāḥ** (abl. known from; fem. referring to avasthā) that **1.15 asaṅgaḥ** unattached, unconnected **ayam** this **puruṣaḥ** human being, person **iti** "called", used to frame a quote or definition **1.16 na** not **karmaṇā** (inst. through) action **anya-dharmatvāt** (abl. because) the other – role – being **ati-prasakteḥ** (abl. by) excessive – attachment, clinging **ca** even **1.17 vicitra-bhoga-anupapattiḥ** (f.) manifold, diverse – enjoyment –

inapplicability **anya-dharmatve** (loc. where) other – role **1.18 prakṛti-nibandhanāt** (abl. through) nature (fem.) – dependence on (ifc) – **cet** even if (you think) **na** not **tasyāḥ** (abl. from; fem. referring to prakṛti) that **api** indeed **pāra-tantryam** something else – dependence

(The author continues:) **1.10 Even if you think it is like a white cloth, (or) like a seed, then (the reply is this:)**

1.11 It is not a teaching of something that can't be done, for there is manifestation <u>and</u> non-manifestation of the ability (in a person). 1.12 For an eternal being, it (the bondage 1.8**) is not through connection with any time period because, since he is all-pervading, he is common to all (times), 1.13 nor is it through connection with any place, for the same reason. 1.14 It (bondage) is not through life circumstance, since (only) the role of the <u>body</u> is known from that. 1.15 The one called "the human being"** (in 1.1) **<u>is</u> this unattached one. 1.16 Not through karma (is he attached), even by excessive clinging, because of its being the role of the other thing (the body). 1.17 Enjoyment (or not) of the diverse (world), where it concerns the role of the other thing, would (also) be inapplicable. 1.18 Even if you think it (his attachment) is through dependence on nature, it is not, (since) from that (nature) there would (also) be dependence on something other than him.**

The author says that unlike a seed that has been sprouted (or burnt) or a white cloth that has been dyed, both being without the possibility of returning to their original condition (both referring to the opponent's idea of the karmic body), the human being is eternal. He lays the groundwork for his thesis that for the purpose of realizing freedom there must be the comprehension that there is only one possible puruṣa, not the many, supposedly connected with their various times, places, and life circumstances. Again, the point is that there is only one thing that is present at any time, or in any place in the objective life experience, including learned beliefs, and that is the subject, the individual personal identity of the yogin and the consciousness behind it. Sutra 1.11 states the dualism of living liberation, that freedom is always at hand but not always present.

Chapter Two

The Connection

न नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावस्य तद्योगस्तद्योगादृते ॥displaced text॥ नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तकोऽप्यस्य। न बाह्याभ्यन्तरयोरुपरज्योपरञ्जकभावोऽपि देशव्यवधानाच्छ्रुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुत्रस्थयोरिव। द्वयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागान्न व्यवस्था। अदृष्टवशाच्चेत्। न द्वयोरेककालायोगादुपकार्योपकारकभावः ॥displaced text॥ युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः।पूर्वापाय उत्तरायोगात्। तद्भावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपि न ।

2.1 (1.19) **na** no, no more **nitya-śuddha-buddha – mukta-svabhāvasya** (gen. on the part of) forever – pure – consciousness – freed – natural state *(This compound, which is the opponent's response to "nityasya" in sutra 1.12, is tat-puruṣa, not itaretara dvandva. The term "mukta-svabhāvasya", referring back to "svabhāvasya" in 1.8, is similar to words like "muktabandhana" and "muktaroṣa". MW)* **tat-yogaḥ** for that, for such a thing – connection, relevance **tat-yogāt_ṛte** (abl. w/ṛte) to that – relation, connection – without (*Sutras 1.20-26 have been restored to their original place in Chapter Four.)*

2.2 (1.27) **na** not **anādi-viṣaya-uparāga-nimittakaḥ** preexisting (having no beginning) – sphere (objects of the senses and mind) – influencing – caused by **api** yet **asya** (gen. point of view) for him *(This word in the genitive corresponds to the genitive compound in 2.1 that qualifies the word "yoga", so the complement word, "connection" is supplied.)* **2.3** (1.28) **na** no **bāhya-abhyantarayoḥ** (loc. dual; "between the two") outer – inner **uparajya-uparañjaka-bhāvaḥ** influenced – influencer – state of being, relationship **api** indeed, in fact **deśa-vyavadhānāt** (abl. because) place – separateness **śrugna-stha-pāṭaliputra-sthayoḥ** (loc. dual) living in Śrughna (Srughna MW) – living in Pāṭaliputra **iva** like **2.4** (1.29) **dvayoḥ** (gen/loc. dual) between two things **eka-deśa-labdha-uparāgāt** (abl. inferred from) same – place – found – influence **na** no such **vyavasthā** respective difference. **2.5** (1.30) **adṛṣṭa-vaśāt** (abl. through) unknown – authority, will **cet** if (you think) … well then **2.6** (1.31) **na** no **dvayoḥ** (gen/loc. dual) between the two **eka – kāla-ayogāt** (abl. because) a unique or singular thing, a certain thing – time period – disjunction **upakārya-upakāraka-bhāvaḥ** receiving help – bestowing help – relationship *(Sutras 1.32-37 on the ceremony for a son, etc. have been moved to their original place in Chapter Fifteen.)* **2.7** (1.38) **yugapad-**

jāyamānayoḥ (loc. dual; of two things) linked by time (not "simultaneous") – coming into existence **na** there cannot be **kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ** effect – cause – relationship **2.8** (1.39) **pūrva-apāye** (loc. when, upon the) former – passing away **uttara-ayogāt** (abl. from) latter – disjunction *(The words "former" and "latter" here refer to the word order in 2.7 and not to the relative priority and posteriority of cause and effect.)* **2.9** (1.40) **tat-bhāve** (loc. upon) that – coming into existence **tat-ayogāt** (abl. from) that – disjunction **ubhaya-vyabhicārāt** (abl. because) in both cases – false reasoning **api** (or) even **na** there is no (none)

(The opponent:) **2.1 On the part of one who is freed from his natural state (of bondage), his consciousness pure forever, without any more connection to that (karma** 1.16, **nature** 1.18**), there would be no more connection to (all) that (diverse world** 1.17**).**

(The author:) **2.2 Yet the connection on his part is <u>not</u> caused by that (karma) influencing him in the sphere of the preexisting (world). 2.3 In fact, there is no relationship of influenced and influencer between that outer thing (life circumstance** 1.14**) and that inner thing (karma** 1.16**), because of the separateness of <u>place</u>, like that between someone living in Śrughna and someone living in Pāṭaliputra, 2.4 (i.e.,) there is no such respective difference (of influenced vs. influencer) because any such influence between two things would be found in the same place. 2.5 If you think that it (the connection) is through an unknown authority (a bestower); 2.6 well, there is no relationship of receiving and bestowing between the two (the human being and nature), because of a certain disjunction in <u>time</u>: 2.7 that there cannot be a relationship of effect and cause where there are two things coming into existence linked by time, 2.8 whether from the disjunction of the latter (the cause) upon the passing away of the former (the effect), 2.9 or even from the disjunction of that (latter, cause) upon the coming into existence of that (former, effect); because of false reasoning in both cases, there is none (no relation of effect and cause).**

The opponent's view holds that nature is the principal cause of the world, creating the life circumstances of the bound soul according to the law of karma. He says that upon completion of karma after many lifetimes, the individual has no more connection with nature, but the author says that there is still a connection and he begins to explain by refuting some commonly held beliefs about bondage.

Continuing the pattern of the previous chapter, sutras 2.2-4 relate to place, and 2.5-7 relate to time. These six sutras examine the possible causal relation between

nature and the human being within the context of an already-created world. The word used to describe the already-created world is "anādi" meaning "without beginning", and it is translated here as "preexisting", rather than something like "from all eternity", in order to avoid the impression of profundity and give it a more correct mundane sense. This word expresses an important concept in the opponent's view and it is found throughout the work.

In sutra 2.3 the words "outer" and "inner" refer to two different non-physical realms or "places". In the opposing view, nature and the unseen causal workings of karma are considered to be primary or inner, and the life circumstance of an individual person is secondary or outer, but in the author's view the human being is primary, and the domain of cause and effect (he says "effect and cause") is secondary and separate. The connection between the human being and nature is not like that of the body and the environment where influencing through laws of cause and effect is seen. The body and the environment, representing an individual and the karmic circumstances and events that influence his life, must share the same place, but the human spirit does not share the same place with nature because he has no connection with any particular place (see 1.13).

Similarly, in sutra 2.5 the word "unknown" refers to the idea of a person's destiny through the unknown workings of karma (in the opponent's view), something that is beyond the commonly acknowledged worldly scheme of cause and effect. The idea is that perhaps nature, through the agency of her personified elemental forms (Agni, Vayu, Pṛthivī, etc.) plays the role of an unknown will or a bestower of benefits in response to proper worship and prayer, but the author says that this cannot be. Prayers, their results, and the periods in between would all occur across the time frame of a person's life but the human being is eternal and has no connection with any particular time (see 1.12). So, now he has rejected both a static life condition due to past karma incurred in a different place, and a dynamic relation due to present karmas and their consequences.

Sutras 2.8 and 2.9 treat two more ways of looking at cause and effect. The first is that the two are dynamically linked. In this arrangement, if a cause continues to exist then its effect also continues to exist, and if the effect (the "former" in 2.8) ceases to exist, then the cause (the "latter" in 2.8) is inferred to have ceased functioning as a cause. This is the so-called "material" or "substantial" cause. Using an ancient example, when a clay pot breaks, it stops being a pot and the clay stops being its material cause. The clay itself does not cease to exist but the cause as represented by the clay ceases, as the broken shards go on to become the

material cause of a heap of shards. Similarly in terms of karma, if the gross elements arising from nature are the material cause of the body, both the body and the causal role of its constituent elements would pass out of existence upon death. This theme relates to the thread on the influencer and the influenced in a preexisting world (see 2.2-4) and to the absence of relation to place (see 1.13).

The second way of seeing cause and effect is that where the cause ceases to exist when the effect is accomplished. This is the so-called "instrumental" cause, where for example the motive, will, and action of the potter stops when the making of the pot is finished. At the moment when the pot actually comes into being, the potter's role as the one creating the pot comes to an end. Similarly in terms of karma, if any debt resulting from past action were repaid or atoned for in the present, that particular liability and its shaping influence would come to an end. This theme relates to the thread on bestower and receiver (see 2.5-7) and to the absence of relation to time (see 1.12).

These two beliefs (2.8-9) about the relationship of nature to an individual soul represent the opponent's view but not the author's. According to the author, even though nature is the potential material of creation, she is neither the material cause nor the instrumental cause of the human being.

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियमः। न विज्ञानमात्रं बाह्यप्रतीतेः ॥ displaced text ॥ न गतिविशेषात्। निष्क्रियस्य तदसम्भवात्। मूर्त्तत्वाद्घटादिवत्समानधर्मापत्तावपसिद्धान्तः। गतिश्रुतिरप्युपाधियोगादाकाशवत्। न कर्मणाप्यतद्धर्मत्वात्। अतिप्रसक्तिरन्यधर्मत्वे। निर्गुणादिश्रुतिविरोधश्चेति ।

2.10 (1.41) **pūrva-bhāva-mātre** (loc. regarding) former – existing – alone **na** no **niyamaḥ** rule **2.11** (1.42) **na** no **vijñāna-mātram** knowing – on its own **bāhya-pratīteḥ** (abl. because) from the external – following as a necessary result *(1.43-47 on emptiness has been restored to its original place in Chapter Sixteen.)*

2.12 (1.48) **na** not **gati-viśeṣāt** (abl. through) going, migration – a certain kind **2.13** (1.49) **niṣkriyasya** (gen. on the part of) the actionless **tat-asambhavāt** (abl. because) that – incompatible **2.14** (1.50) **mūrt(t)atvāt** (abl. because) in material form – being, would be **ghaṭa-ādivat** (vati like) pot – etc. **samāna-dharma-āpattau** (loc. where) same, like – role – becoming, taking on **apasiddhāntaḥ** contrary to what is established **2.15** (1.51) **gati-śrutiḥ** motion – scripture **api**

rather **upādhi-yogāt** (abl. coming from) representation – relation to **ākāśavat** (vati "it (he) is like") the ether **2.16** (1.52) **na** not **karmaṇā** (inst. through) action **api** either **a-tat-dharmatvāt** (abl. because of) not – his (puruṣa's) – being the inherent nature, role **2.17** (1.53) **atiprasaktiḥ** excessive attachment **anya-dharmatve** (loc. lies in) other – role – being **2.18** (1.54) **nirguṇa-ādi-śruti-virodhaḥ** without qualities – etc. – scripture – inconsistent with **ca** and **iti** said

(The opponent:) **2.10 There is no rule regarding the former (the effect, the human being) existing on his own. 2.11 There is no knowing on its own, because it follows from the external.**

(The author:) **2.12 It (the connection** 2.1**) is not through a certain (trans)migration (re-incarnation) 2.13 on the part of the actionless one (the human being), because he is incompatible with that. 2.14 It is contrary to what is established, because he would be in material form, where he would take on the same role (dharma) (as the material), like a pot, etc. 2.15 He is like the ether (not a pot), the scripture on migration coming rather from his relation to a representation** (see 7.13-14)**. 2.16 It is not through karma either, because of its not being his role. 2.17 Excessive attachment lies in being the role of the other (the body** 1.16-17, 3.3), **2.18 and it is inconsistent with the scripture on the one who is without qualities, etc. Thus it is said.**

The opponent in sutra 2.10 responds to the author's statement in 1.18 that the human spirit is not dependent on anything else. Sutras 2.10-11 presage a great dispute to come, between these two adversaries, as to whether or not the human consciousness with its potential of creating and knowing exists independently of the objects of its creation and knowledge. The opponent assigns the creative function to nature, an indifferent force building one's world according to one's karma, but the author argues against the doctrines of karma and transmigration of souls. He is not saying that there is no right and wrong with fitting consequences for each, but only that this does not constitute the connection between a human spirit and his conscious life as represented by his personal circumstances.

Chapter Three

The Principles

तद्योगोऽप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम् ॥ विपर्ययाद्बन्धः ॥ नियतकारणात्तदुच्छित्तिर्ध्वान्तवत्। प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्धाने हानम्। वाङ्मात्रं न तु तत्त्वं चित्तस्थितेः। युक्तितोऽपि न बाध्यते दिङ्मूढवदपरोक्षादृते। अचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वह्नेः। सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था प्रकृतिः प्रकृतेर्महान्महतोऽहंकारोऽहंकारात्पञ्च तन्मात्राण्युभयमिन्द्रियं तन्मात्रेभ्यः स्थूलभूतानि पुरुष इति ॥ पञ्चविंशतिर्गणः ॥ स्थूलात्पञ्चतन्मात्रस्य। बाह्याभ्यन्तराभ्यां तैश्चाहंकारस्य। तेनान्तःकरणस्य ततः प्रकृतेः।

3.1 (1.55) **tat-yogaḥ** his – connection (of bondage) **api** rather **avivekāt** non-distinguishing (abl. from) **na** not **samānatvam** the same **3.2** (1.56) ***[viparyayāt bandhaḥ;** For it is the opposite. It is bondage.**]*** **niyata-kāraṇāt** (abl. through) checked – cause **tat-ucchittiḥ** of it – cutting apart, dispelling **dhvāntavat** (vati "like") darkness **3.3** (1.57) **pradhāna-avivekāt** (abl. arising from) principal – not distinguishing **anya-avivekasya** (gen. for) other *(this still refers to the body; see 1.14-16, 2.17)* – non-distinguishing **tat-hāne** (loc. when) that – rid of **hānam** riddance **3.4** (1.58) **vāṅ-mātram** speech (vāc) – merely **na** not **tu** but **tattvam** reality **citta-sthiteḥ** (abl. because) thought – abides in, is in the domain of **3.5** (1.59) **yuktitaḥ** by reasoning **api** even though **na** not **bādhyate** to be conquered **diṅ-mūḍhavat** (vati like) directions (diś) – confusion **aparokṣāt ṛte** (abl. w/ṛte; "without") direct seeing or awareness *(an interesting quadruple negation "not without non-invisibility")* **3.6** (1.60) **acākṣuṣāṇām** (gen. of) things not physically seen **anumānena** (inst. by means of) inference **bodhaḥ** knowing **dhūma-ādibhiḥ** (inst. by means of) smoke – etc. **iva** like **vahneḥ** (gen. of) fire *(The term in the genitive case and its connection with the word "inference" is the anchor point for other words in the genitive from 3.8-10, so the word "inference" has been supplied in the translation of those terms.)* **3.7** (1.61) **sattva-rajas-tamasām** (gen. pl. of) satva (sattva) – rajas – tamas **sāmya-avasthā** equilibrium – state **prakṛtiḥ** prime originator **prakṛteḥ** (abl. from) **mahān** the great one, the comprehensive **mahataḥ** (abl. out of) **ahaṁkāraḥ** personal identity **ahaṁkārāt** (abl. out of) **pañca** five **tanmātrāṇi** subtle elements, sensations (literally, "the measure of it") **ubhayam** both **indriyam** (power) **tanmātrebhyaḥ** (abl. from) subtle elements, sensations

sthūla-bhūtāni gross – elements **puruṣaḥ** human being **iti** thus *[**pañcaviṁśatiḥ gaṇaḥ; It is a group of twenty-five.**] (I doubt this is authentic. "Puruṣaḥ iti" is a fitting end for this important sutra and the number twenty-five is both incorrect and superfluous, a typical teacher's note.)* **3.8** (1.62) **sthūlāt** (abl. inferred from) the gross **pañca-tanmātrasya** (gen. belonging to) five – subtle elements, sensations (1.63) **bāhya-abhyantarābhyām** (inst. including) the outer ones – the inner ones **taiḥ** (inst. pl. along with) them **ca** also **ahaṁkārasya** (gen. of) personal identity **3.9** (1.64) **tena** (instr. by) that **antaḥ-karaṇasya** (gen. of) internal, inner – creator (1.65) **tataḥ** (tasil abl.) from which **prakṛteḥ** (gen. of) prime originator

(The author speaks without interruption in this chapter.)

3.1 The connection (bondage) on his part (see 2.1-2) **arises rather from not distinguishing (aviveka), which is not the same (as the other possibilities). 3.2 Like darkness, the dispelling of it is through the cause being checked. 3.3 From not distinguishing the principal (prakṛti vs. puruṣa** 3.13-14) **there arises the notion that one would be rid of non-distinguishing on the part of that other (the body** 2.17) **when he is rid of that (connection), 3.4 which is mere talk, but not the reality, because that (notion) is in the domain of thought. 3.5 Even though that (non-distinguishing) is not to be conquered by reasoning, like confusion over directions, without direct awareness, 3.6 there is knowing through inference of things that aren't physically seen, like that of fire by smoke and so on. 3.7 Thus is (known) the human spirit: the gross elements (physically seen) must arise from sensations; the five sensations and both sets of powers must emerge from a personal identity; the personal identity must arise from something great (mahat). That great one must arise from a prime originator. That prime originator must be a state of equilibrium of truth, passion, and dullness (sattva, rajas, tamas). 3.8 (That is,) there is inference of a personal identity because the gross (elements) must belong to the five sensations** (see VD 1.4-8, etc.), **including also the outer and the inner (powers, the indriyas) along with them. 3.9 By that there is inference of an inner creator (the great one)** (see VD 8.15), **from which there is inference of a prime originator.**

In sutra 3.1 the words "the connection on his part" link back to the identical words in sutra 2.1 and indicate the author's intent to continue the discussion by clarifying the connection between the human spirit and his world of experience, after examining and rejecting some more traditional views. The word "viveka" means "distinguishing", applying the faculty of discrimination or intellect. It does

not, however, refer to the habit we all entertain of thinking and analyzing, which is also a function of intellect, but one that is applied in the opposite direction, explaining the world after the fact. The problem of bondage is revealed to be simply not distinguishing, which means not being aware of the distinction between the eternal awareness and the diverse world of which one is aware. The solution to that non-distinguishing is by "the cause being checked", the simple removal of the negation from non-distinguishing, leaving distinguishing, by the intellect, just as light is the means to dispel darkness. This simile is especially fitting because the principle of light commonly represents intellect, which is an aspect of mahat.

Getting rid of the bondage associated with the connection does not, however, result in the ultimate elimination of an individual and his life experience, as the opponent believes (see also YD 1.5). Neither does mere reasoning lead to eliminating the non-distinguishing and thereby dispelling the bondage (see YD 1.4). This "domain of thought" is to be restricted or contained (see YD 1.1). Even distinguishing in the form of mindfulness of the principles is not complete without the other aspect, which is distinguishing of the self as pure and unaffected by the ever-changing mind and world. In the series outlined in 3.7, the causal members are neither the gross elements nor the gross individual person but the subtle sensations—smell, taste, form, and feel—arising out of the subtlest one named śabda, meaning "sound" or "word" (VD 2.10-18). Sound originates in the ether, associated with mahat. The two sets of "powers" as they are traditionally taught, are the senses (the ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose), and the powers of action (the hands, the feet, the speech organs, the sex organs, and the organs of elimination), but of course they don't need to be taught to be known.

Mahat

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस्य। मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्। पारम्पर्येऽप्येकत्र परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामात्रम्। समानः प्रकृतेर्द्वयोः। अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः। महदाख्यमाद्यं कार्यं तन्मनः। चरमोऽहंकारः। तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम्। आद्यहेतुता तद्द्वारा पारम्पर्येऽप्यणुवत्। पूर्वभावित्वे द्वयोरेकतरस्य हानेऽन्यतरयोगः।

3.10 (1.66) **saṁhata-para-artha-tvāt** (abl. because) aggregate – separate, apart – for the benefit – being **puruṣasya** (gen. of) the human being **3.11** (1.67) **mūle** (loc. there, to) a foundation **mūla-abhāvāt** (abl. because) foundation – no such thing **amūlam** without foundation **mūlam** **3.12** (1.68) **pāramparye** (loc. in) a

continuous series **api** really **ekatra** in one place **pariniṣṭhā** (f. nom. s.) limit **iti** said to be, given **saṁjñā-mātram** name – merely, just **3.13** (1.69) **samānaḥ** (with gen.) equal **prakṛteḥ** (gen. of) prime originator, nature **dvayoḥ** (loc. in regard to) those two (1.70) **adhikāri** the one of authority **traividhyāt** (abl. by) threefoldness **na** not **niyamaḥ** ruled **3.14** (1.71) **mahat-ākhyam** great – called ādyam first **kāryam** effect **tat-manaḥ** his – mind **3.15** (1.72) **caramaḥ** the outer thing **ahaṁkāraḥ** the personal identity **3.16** (1.73) **tat-kāryatvam** his – effect – being **uttareṣām** (gen. belonging to) those subsequent things **3.17** (1.74) **ādya-hetu-tā** the first – a reason, a basis for knowing – being **tat-dvārā** (inst. by) (of) them – means **pāramparye** (loc. within) series **api** but **aṇuvat** (vati like) atomic **3.18** (1.75) **pūrvabhāvitve** (see pūrvabhāvin MW) (loc. in relation to) the preceding **dvayoḥ** (loc. as for) the two, the pair **ekatarasya** (gen. of) one of them **hāne** (loc. where) leaving off, quitting **anyatara-yogaḥ** the other – association, relevance

3.10 Because of that aggregate being for the benefit of something apart from it, there is inference of (that being) the human spirit, 3.11 (but) because there is no such thing as a foundation to a foundation, that foundation (the prime originator, 3.9**) is without a foundation. 3.12 It is really just the name given to the limit at that one place in the series. 3.13 The one of authority (mahat) is not ruled by that threefoldness (prakṛti), (being), in regard to those two (mahat and prakṛti), the equal of that prime originator. 3.14 Called "mahat"** (see 3.7 and Vaisheshika 4.4, 7.5)**, <u>he</u> is the first (the principal), his mind (just) an effect, 3.15 the personal identity (just) the outer thing. 3.16 Being his effect belongs to those subsequent things (the powers** 3.7**), 3.17 that are <u>like</u> the atomic though within the series, being a basis for knowing the first (mahat) by means of them,** (see VD 1.12-13) **3.18 (but) as for those two (sets of powers** 3.7**) in relation to that which precedes them (mahat), upon quitting of the one (that pair) there is (still) association with the other (mahat).**

This chapter describes the yogin as the only human being (puruṣa). It names his threefold tendency to originate or create, "prakṛti" (sattva, rajas, tamas), and it names that inner creator, "mahat" (great).

Puruṣa is the abstract concept of the eternal human being, whereas mahat is the great awakened human being that is the solipsist yogin, the one that begins to know and to create. He is known by inference (3.7-9), by perception (3.16-17), and on his own (3.18). That is our foundation, just as the big bang is the physicist's. Both lack prior foundation, but knowledge based on reasoning always begs for a prior cause, whereas immediate self-awareness does not. Sutra 3.18 states that the two sets of powers are preceded by mahat, but even in their absence he is not absent. This view is directly opposed to the one just expressed by the opponent in 2.10, that he cannot exist on his own. The personal identity is a filter through which mahat's creation is experienced and his experience created, and the instrument by which his creative impulse to act is carried out. Through that filter appear all of the aspects of the life having to do with people, such as friendship, love, jealousy, power, and dispute, but it is also the starting point of the great inquiry after the meaning of one's existence. The solipsist yogin does not look outside himself to find liberation. He knows that there is no creator before him and that there is no nature (prakṛti) without him. The opponent holds nature to be separate from human beings as limited personal identities and he has no room for mahat, but the author says that the role of originator is not separate from him but rather his very essence, and borrowing the word from Vaisheshika, he calls the yogin "mahat", great.

Chapter Four

Two Views of Reality

परिच्छिन्नं न सर्वोपादानम्। तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेश्च। नावस्तुनो वस्तुसिद्धिः॥ (restored) नाविद्यातोऽप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात्। वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः। विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिश्च। विरुद्धोभयरूपा चेत्। न तादृक्पदार्थाप्रतीतेः॥ अबाधाददुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाच्च नावस्तुत्वम्।

4.1 (1.76) **paricchinnam** disjunct, separate **na** not **sarva-upādānam** all this – included, accepted as the self **4.2** (1.77) **tat-utpatti-śruteḥ** (abl. known from) of it – origin – scripture **ca** indeed **4.3** (1.78) **na** not **avastunaḥ** (abl. from) unreal **vastu-siddhiḥ** real – establishment, bringing about **4.4** (1.20) **na** not **avidyātaḥ** (tasil resulting from) lack of higher knowledge **api** in fact **avastunā** (instr. coming about by means of) something unreal **bandha-ayogāt** (abl. because) bondage – non-fit **4.5** (1.21) **vastutve** (n. loc. if it were considered) reality **siddhānta-hāniḥ** established doctrine(s) – rejection **4.6** (1.22) **vijātīya-dvaita-āpattiḥ** other tribes

or schools – non-dualism – falling into **ca** and **4.7** (1.23) **viruddha-ubhaya-rūpā** (f.) opposite(s) – both – form **cet** if (you say) **4.8** (1.24) **na** it is not **tadṛś-padārtha-apratiteḥ** (abl. because) such a thing – meaning – unintelligible

4.9 (1.79) **abādhāt** (abl. because) not excluded **aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-janya-tvāt** (abl. known from) uncorrupted, innocent – source, cause – arising from – the state **ca** and **na** not *(not cana)* **avastu-tvam** unreality – its being, that it is

(The opponent:) **4.1 All this is not accepted (upādāna) unto oneself. It is separate. 4.2 Indeed this is known from the scripture on the origin of it. 4.3 There is no bringing about something real from something unreal. 4.4 It does not come about by means of something unreal because that doesn't fit with bondage. In fact, that (notion) results from a lack of higher knowledge. 4.5 If that were considered reality, there would be rejection of those established doctrines (scripture** 4.2). **4.6 Moreover, falling into the dualism of other schools, 4.7 if you say it is a form consisting of both of these opposites together (real and unreal), 4.8 well it is not, because the meaning of such words is unintelligible.**

(The author:) **4.9 That it is not unreality is known from the state arising from innocence of the cause (of bondage), and because (there) he (mahat, the knower** (continuing from 3.18)**) is not excluded.**

The exposition of the series clearly shows that the manifest world emergent from nature springs from consciousness and is included in the self, not separate from it, but this does not sit well with traditional learned knowledge. From a purely objective point of view, this would be a very unfamiliar concept and it would naturally provoke strong objections. In the series, one might assume the gross elements to be "real" and the more abstract things to be "unreal". To the liberated person, however, the reality is that creation is accepted or incorporated in oneself through the series beginning with the great mahat. It is not just known through inference but also from "innocence of cause", a way of being where the true nature of the human spirit is not excluded by non-distinguishing, a way where the cause of bondage is checked. The word "upādāna" in sutra 4.1, which means including or accepting unto oneself, has been fashioned by tradition into a technical term meaning "material", which is fine as long as it is accepted and understood that the material is found included within the self and not without.

॥ (restored text) न वयं षड्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत्। अनियतत्वेऽपि नायौक्तिकस्य संग्रहोऽन्यथा बालोन्मत्तादिसमत्वम्॥ भावे तद्योगेन तत्सिद्धिरभावे तदभावात्कुतस्तरां तत्सिद्धिः। न कर्मण उपादानायोगात्। नानुश्रविकादपि तत्सिद्धिः साध्यत्वेनावृत्तियोगा-दपुरुषार्थत्वम्। तत्र प्राप्तविवेकस्यानावृत्तिश्रुतिः। दुःखाद्दुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाड्यविमो-कः।काम्येऽकाम्येऽपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात्। निजमुक्तस्य बन्धध्वंसमात्रं परं न समानत्वम्।

4.10 (1.25) **na** not **vayam** we **ṣaṭ-pada-artha-vādinaḥ** (plural) six – words – meaning – advocates **vaiśeṣika-ādivat** (vati "like") Vaisheshika – etc. **4.11** (1.26) **aniyatatve** (loc. if) not fixed or established – being **api** even **na** nor **ayauktikasya** (gen. of) unfitting, unworkable **saṁgrahaḥ** congregation **anyathā** otherwise **bāla-unmatta-ādi-sama-tvam** child-like, simple, naive – overcome with fantasy, crazy, enraptured – etc. – equal to – being **4.12** (1.80) **bhāve** (loc. if) something exists **tat-yogena** (inst. through) that **tat-siddhiḥ** it – bringing (brought) about **abhāve** (loc. if) non-existence (of that) **tat-abhāvāt** (abl. through) of it – non-existence **kutastarām** (intensified form of kutas) how is it ever? **tat-siddhiḥ** it, anything – brought about **4.13** (1.81) **na** it is not *(a separate assertion in answer to the question)* **karmaṇaḥ** (abl. comes through) righteous action **upādānatva-ayogāt** (abl. because) inclusiveness – unsuitable, doesn't fit, doesn't work

4.14 (1.82) **na** not **anuśravikāt** (abl. through) Vedic tradition **api** even **tat-siddhiḥ** it – achieving **sādhyatvena** (inst. with) anything that is practiced **āvṛtti-yogāt** (abl. because) relapse **a-puruṣa-artha-tvam** not – human being – purpose **4.15** (1.83) **tatra** (loc.) in that **prāpta-vivekasya** attained – discrimination **anāvṛtti-śrutiḥ** non-relapse – scripture **4.16** (1.84) **duḥkhāt** (abl. because) suffering **duḥkham** suffering *(A pair like this means "it is because it is", something self-perpetuating.)* **jalābhiṣekavat** (vatup neuter nom. sing. "having") water – sprinkling **na** no **jādya-vimokaḥ** coldness – relief from **4.17** (1.85) **kāmye akāmye api** whether optional or obligatory rites **sādhyatva-aviśeṣāt** (abl. because) something that is practiced – not distinctive, common **4.18** (1.86) **nija-muktasya** (gen. point of view) native – liberated **bandha-dhvaṁsa-mātram** bonds – fallen to dust – completely, simply **param** it is supreme **na** there is no **samānatvam** equality with, "comparison"

(The opponent:) **4.10 We (teachers) are not advocates of the meaning of the six words, like Vaisheshika and the others, 4.11 nor of any such unworkable thing, even if it isn't so established (as Vaisheshika,** (i.e., the author's teaching)**).**

Otherwise we are just a another congregation equal to those naive enraptured ones and others (like them). 4.12 If a thing exists, it is brought about through that (something that exists), (so) if that doesn't exist, how is anything ever brought about through the non-existence of it? 4.13 It is not. It is through karma, because (your) inclusiveness just doesn't work.

(The author:) **4.14 That (karma) is not the purpose of a human being, not even achieving it through the Vedic tradition, because there is relapse with anything that is practiced**; **4.15 (but) in that (tradition) there is scripture on the non-relapse of one who has attained distinguishing. 4.16 There is suffering just because there is suffering, and there is no relief from such coldness (in) having a sprinkling of water, 4.17 because that is just a common practice, whether personal or obligatory. 4.18 To one of that native liberation, his bonds simply fallen to dust, <u>that</u> is supreme. There is no comparison.**

The six terms that identify the Vaisheshika are: the physical, the essential constituents, action, the universal, the particular, and inherence. In that work it is explained that the self is inherent, or prior to, or causal of sensations. It is also taught that sensations are the essential constituents of physical things, inherent in them or prior to them, as opposed to the idea that the physical objects with their attributes exist "a priori", and that human experience of them is passive and secondary. Vaisheshika also teaches that the causal role of action or karma is a different kind of thing than the causal role of the self and of sensation in bringing about physical reality.

The opponent's claims here are important objections and they clearly represent his materialist view based on learned knowledge, that objects in the hard physical world can only be produced out of solid physical parts. The idea that hard reality is produced by manifesting out of abstract consciousness simply doesn't make sense to him. To support his view the opponent reminds the author of the doctrine of existent effect, which says (to him) that all physical things are just effects or products made up of parts that already exist, and that when the thing perishes the parts remain, so nothing comes out of nothing, and nothing is ever really lost. The author has a different take on this doctrine as we will see in 17.18, but his opponent will have none of it. He says that the Vaisheshikas and others like them are just a bunch of silly dreamers full of rapture.

Well, now the author treats him in kind with a backhanded comment about stupidity. In sutra 4.16, in addition to the direct "cold water" meaning, jalābhiṣeka means sprinkling with water as in Vedic rites, and jādya (coldness) also means dullness, non-discrimination, or stupidity; in other words, Vedic rites don't cure non-discrimination. No matter what the quality of the rite or sacrifice, it is still just a physical act that is practiced, and therefore it has no relation to realizing the light of distinguishing.

As for the bonds falling to dust; with a little practice, consistent with our sense of progress even while in the present moment, an astonishing phenomenon begins to emerge where any self-doubt, anger, or discomfort that nags and torments in that moment can be faced down and recognized for the ridiculous illusion that it is, as we awaken and remember to let go, to open into the true free self. It can even be a little amusing to see that illusion disappear and the suffering it brings reduced to nothing. On the other hand, with resentment, for example, one may hold on and drag it down into a world of righteous anger and karma where there seems to be a solid justification for the negative feeling, but as hard as it may be, this kind of thing should be faced immediately and unmasked as the needless self-destructive mind-game that it is.

Chapter Five

The Opponent's Proof

द्वयोरेकतरस्य वाप्यसंनिकृष्टार्थपरिच्छित्तिः प्रमा तत्साधकतमं यत्तत् त्रिविधं प्रमाणं तत्सिद्धौ सर्वसिद्धेर्नाधिक्यसिद्धिः। यत्संबद्धं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षम्। योगिनामबाह्यप्रत्यक्षत्वान्न दोषः। लीनवस्तुलब्धातिशयसम्बन्धाद्वादोषः। ईश्वरासिद्धेः। मुक्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः। उभयथाप्यसत्करत्वम्। मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा। तत्संनिधानादधिष्ठातृत्वं मणिवत्। विशेषकार्येष्वपि जीवानाम्। सिद्धरूप-बोद्धृत्वाद्वाक्यार्थोपदेशः। अन्तःकरणस्य तदुज्ज्वलितत्वाल्लोहवदधिष्ठातृत्वम्।

5.1 (1.87) **dvayoḥ** (loc. in relation to) the two **ekatarasya** (gen. that of) the one **vā** alternatively to **api** indeed, surely **a-saṁ-ni-kṛṣṭa – artha – paricchittiḥ** not-drawn-in-together – thing – accurate defining (excess clipped all around) **pramā** proof **tat-sādhakatamam** (superl.) it – most effective in accomplishing **yat tat**

which – that **trividham** threefold **pramāṇam** standard of proof (*"paricchitti" means defining by way of "cutting all around" or cutting away from, so it calls for an ablative connection with "asaṁnikṛṣṭa", which is equivalent to the "excluded" in VD 3.7.)* **5.2** (1.88) **tat-siddhau** (loc. given) this – proof **sarva-siddheḥ** (abl. since) all – proof **na** no **adhikya-siddhiḥ** excess – proof **5.3** (1.89) **yat sambaddham sat** that which – in contact **tat-ākāra-ullekhi-vijñānam** of something – external appearance – (ullekhin) marking out, drawing, delineating – recognizing **tat-pratyakṣam** of it – sense perception **5.4** (1.90) **yoginām** (gen. on the part of) yogis **abāhya-pratyakṣatvāt** (abl. just because) non-external – perception – theirs being **na** no **doṣaḥ** fault **5.5** (1.91) **līna-vastu-labdha-atiśaya-sambandhāt** (abl. from) clinging – reality – acquired – superiority – contact **vā** nor **adoṣaḥ** lack of fault **5.6** (1.92) **īśvara-asiddheḥ** (abl. because of) supreme one, lord, governor – lack of proof (1.93) **mukta-baddhayoḥ** (loc. dual; in) liberated – bound **anyatara-abhāvāt** (abl. because of) either one – absence, non-existence **na** no **tat-siddhiḥ** that – proving

5.7 (1.94) **ubhayathā** in both ways, in both cases **api** in fact, really **asatkaratvam** lack of production of truth (1.95) **muktātmanaḥ** (gen. s. of) a liberated individual **praśaṁsā** praising, glorification **upāsā** paying homage **siddhasya** (gen. of) accomplished **vā** or **5.8** (1.96) **tat-samnidhānāt** (abl. through) (of) it – direct presence **adhiṣṭhātṛtvam** governorship **maṇivat** like a crystal (1.97) **viśeṣa-kāryeṣu** (loc. pl.) various kinds – things to be done, religious actions, worship **api** (with loc.) though **jīvānām** (gen. pl. belong to) individual living souls *(The simile "maṇivat" in 5.8 could be confused with the Vaisheshika commentator's iron needle and lodestone (VD 5.1.15), but sutras 5.9 and 8.14 make it clear that the metal simile refers to brightness instead of magnetism.)* **5.9** (1.98) **siddha-rūpa-boddhṛtvāt** (abl. coming from) proved, established – form – being the knower **vākya-artha-upadeśaḥ** assertion – meaning – teaching, learning (1.99) **antaḥ-karaṇasya** (gen. of) inner creator **tat-ujjvalitatvāt** (abl. known from) its – brightness **lohavat** (vati like) iron, metal **adhiṣṭhātṛtvam** governorship

(The opponent:) **5.1 Alternatively to (your) one in relation to the two** (see 3.18)**, it is surely <u>proof</u> that defines a thing from what is not drawn in together (as the definition), the threefold standard of proof being the most effective in producing it. 5.2 Given this proof, since it is the proof of all, there is no superfluous proof. 5.3 That which is in contact, which is recognition by delineating the external appearance of a thing, is <u>perception</u> of it. 5.4 There is no fault on the part of yogis just because of theirs being a non-external**

perception, 5.5 nor is there a lack of fault just because such contact (perception) might belong to those who have acquired superiority clinging to (physical) reality, 5.6 (but) because of the lack of any such proof of (your) supreme governor (mahat), in the liberated or the bound, since it is not existent in either one, there is no proving that.

(The author:) **5.7 Whether it is praising the liberated individual (yogi) or paying homage to the accomplished (and bound), really either way there is a lack of production of truth. 5.8 Though the kinds of worship are different, they belong to those living individuals, (but) governorship is known through its direct presence, like a crystal. 5.9 Learning the meaning of the assertion that the governorship of the inner creator is known by its metal-like brightness can only come from being the knower of the essential <u>form</u> (rūpa) of what is being proved.**

The phrase "alternatively to the one in relation to the two" (dvayoḥ ekatarasya vā 5.1) is used by both the author and the opponent to claim alternative relationships between the "two", meaning the two sets of indriyas, and the "one" mahat (see 3.18, also 13.5, 16.12). The opponent appeals to an accepted standard of proof, the threefold—perception, inference, and testimony—claiming that knowledge of a thing occurs when its defining elements are drawn up by the intellect inside a boundary that divides what the thing is from what it is not. In this proof, a preexisting object is recognized by an individual according to its name, form, and function, known through teaching, direct sensory perception of its attributes, and understanding of its place in the scheme of universals and particulars. He says that such proof is a better alternative than the author's order of the powers of sense and action as products of the great inner self.

To him, the mystical internal perception of a Yogi would still be valid but not necessarily that of a layman, even a rich one. The interpretation of sutra 5.6 in this translation is very different from the traditional one that identifies Sankhya as atheistic (which it is indeed). Neither the author nor the opponent really have much to say here about what we would call "God". The opponent is simply objecting to the author's claim that supreme governorship is found within, in the form of mahat. He says it fails the test of perception and thus the threefold standard of proof, but the supreme governor, which has also been called mahat, the first, the one of authority, and the inner creator, is the highest form of the yogin. The term "supreme governor" does not refer to some external great being, and of course it cannot be known by the yogin through the threefold standard of proof but simply

by its immediate and constant presence as his awareness itself. We often hear and use words like "inner" and "deep" in relation to self-awareness, implying something dark, silent, and hard to access, but it is the opposite. The word "bright" means that it is right there, right before the eyes, so to speak, the most alive and immediately present thing one could ever experience, because it is one's consciousness itself, here and now. It cannot possibly take years of deep meditation to realize this truth, because it is so simple and obvious.

As a helpful illustration to aid in this realization, the author gives the example of a crystal and a rose, where the crystal takes on the color of a rose held near to it, but also appears in its own clear form when the rose is absent. His idea of learning the meaning of something through comprehension of its essential form is opposed to the opponent's definition of learning through the kind of perception that is limited to direct sensory contact with a real actual object. The primacy of subtle comprehension over proof based on gross perception, inference, and testimony, is a central theme in his teaching. According to him there are two forms of the perceiver, the bliss/intelligence form and the enjoyer/experiencer form, and perception is not limited to the latter. The bliss/intelligence form called "mahat" has a third aspect as well. It is the first manifestation of the awakening of consciousness, called "sattva", which is inherent in the intelligent mahat and characterized as brightness. These three correspond with the traditional "sat-cit-ānanda", or truth-intelligence-bliss.

प्रतिबन्धदृशः प्रतिबद्धज्ञानमनुमानम्। आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः।उभयसिद्धिः प्रमाणात्तदुप-देशः। सामान्यतो दृष्टादुभयसिद्धिः। चिदवसानो भोगः। अकर्तुरपि फलोपभोगोऽन्ना-द्यवत्। अविवेकाद्वा तत्सिद्धेः कर्तुः फलावगमः। नोभयं च तत्त्वाख्याने। विषयोऽवि-षयोऽप्यतिदूरादेर्हानोपादानाभ्यामिन्द्रियस्य। सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिः।

5.10 (1.100) **pratibandha-dṛśaḥ** (abl. from) connection – appearance **pratibaddha-jñānam** connected (following logically MW) – understanding **anumānam** inference **5.11** (1.101) **āpta-upadeśaḥ** a trusted authority – instruction **śabdaḥ** testimony **5.12** (1.102) **ubhaya-siddhiḥ** (nom. s.) both – proving, confirming **pramāṇāt** (abl. by) evidence, means of proof **tat-upadeśaḥ** his – instruction **5.13** (1.103) **sāmānyataḥ** (tasil) in the same way **dṛṣṭāt** (abl. by) learned knowledge **ubhaya-siddhiḥ** both – proving, confirming **5.14** (1.104) **cit-avasānaḥ** intelligence – stopping point **bhogaḥ** enjoyment (1.105) **akartuḥ** (gen.

belonging to) not the creator **api** in fact **phala-upabhogaḥ** fruit – sensory enjoyment **anna-adyavat** (vati "like") food – and the rest

5.15 (1.106) **avivekāt** (abl. adverbial) not distinguishing **vā** even **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. because) that – proof **kartuḥ** (gen. belonging to) the creator **phala-avagamaḥ** fruit – comprehension **5.16** (1.107) **na** not **ubhayam** (n. nom. s.) the two **ca** and **tattva-ākhyāne** (loc. having to do with) true – testimony **5.17** (1.108) **viṣayaḥ** the sphere **aviṣayaḥ** out of the sphere **api** and even **atidūra-ādeḥ** (abl. because of) very distant – etc. **hāna-upādānābhyām** (inst. dual; "through") rejecting – accepting **indriyasya** (gen. of) the powers of sense and action **5.18** (1.109) **saukṣmyāt** (abl. because) smallness, triviality, insignificance *(This word can mean subtlety, but only in a nit-picking analytical or atomic way, like acuity, or getting the subtle points of an argument. Here and in 11.13, like its source word "sūkṣma", which is found in YD 3.3, 3.18, 6.1, it has the more literal meaning of something (an understanding) that is small, lesser, or trifling. It is not the higher, more comprehensive understanding, but the opposite (11.14), the "mithyā jñānam" of YD 1.3.)* **tat-an-upalabdhiḥ** (nom. f.) of those – no such – comprehension

(The opponent:) **5.10 Inference is understanding what follows logically from the appearance of a connection. 5.11 Testimony is instruction by a trusted authority, 5.12 his instruction establishing both by a means of proof, 5.13 and in the same way establishing both by learned knowledge. 5.14 Sensory enjoyment of the fruit (of creation,) like food and so on, belongs, in fact, to something that is <u>not</u> the creator of it, such enjoyment (being) where intelligence stops.**

(The author:) **5.15 Even not distinguishing, direct comprehension of the fruit <u>does</u> belong to its creator, for <u>it</u> (comprehension) is the proof of that (sensory enjoyment); 5.16 and those two having to do with true testimony are not. 5.17 Belonging to the powers, either through rejecting or accepting, is the sphere (of perceived objects), and even that which is out of the sphere because of being very distant, etc. (e.g., hidden or small), 5.18 (but) there is no such (direct) comprehension of <u>those</u> (distant etc.) things, because of the triviality.**

The opponent, assuming once again his role as a teacher, turns to the other two parts of the threefold standard of proof, saying that testimony confirms both perception and inference. The author replies that the proof of creation is the comprehension itself, not passive sensory perception and inference confirmed by testimony, as the opponent claims. The author reinforces his theme that for the purpose of liberation, learned knowledge and reasoning from evidence,

represented by spoken or written language, is to be understood as secondary to direct creative perception and comprehension.

Reasoning serves best in explaining the physical world. The kind of knowledge that we all depend on throughout the day is a knowledge of explanation and prediction. We construct a past, explain it, and call it real, or we construct a future based on reasoning and call it probable. This is all done outside the realm of philosophy, but it is interesting for the philosopher examining a present moment reality that all claims to knowledge, past, present, or future, happen in that moment, and each fact stands alone there. As for the rest of the facts, well, we assure ourselves that we could bring them to mind if we wanted to, one fact at a time, and then that assurance occupies the present moment. The busy accomplisher in us says "Obviously, but who cares? Let's get on with life!", and I agree, but I am also that philosopher as any reader of the Darshanas would no doubt be as well.

To a philosopher, the meaning of his existence as a sentient being cannot be known by explanation and prediction. The only effective method is to abandon the intellectual analysis structured in language, and actually attend to the immediate experience of himself as the subject, and to his raw perception, and to the relationship between the two, as often as he can, because the goal of liberation can not be achieved by analysis alone. Any proof achieved by patching together syllogisms cannot compare with the direct realization of one's own form, so the opponent's claim that there is a lack of proof of the supreme governor within, fails in the light of that realization.

Just like the author of the Vaisheshika (VD 6.3), the author here says that sensory experience arises from the power of comprehension, not the other way around. Such comprehension is not commonly known by all, but it is known only by the one. Of course the word "comprehension" as used in this translation and commentary does not have the commonly understood sense of something that depends on a preexisting thing to be comprehended, be it an object, or a truth taught by a teacher, or a written or verbal expression of any kind. The meaning of the word as it is used here can only be known by constantly examining one's own power of knowing, directly and in the immediate present, but without the analysis based on inference, or the word knowledge based on testimony.

Chapter Six

The Author's Proof

कार्यदर्शनात्तदुपलब्धेः वादिविप्रतिपत्तेस्तदसिद्धिरिति चेत्। तथाप्येकतरदृष्ट्यैकतरसिद्धेर्ना-पलापः। त्रिविधविरोधापत्तेश्च। नासदुत्पादो नृश्रृङ्गवत्। उपादाननियमात्। सर्वत्र सर्वदा सर्वसम्भवात्। शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्। कारणभावाच्च।

6.1 (1.110) **kārya-darśanāt** (abl. coming from) effect – seeing **tat-upalabdheḥ** (abl. out of) of it – understanding **6.2** (1.111) **vādi-vipratipatteḥ** (abl. because) teacher, authority – opposing view **tat-asiddhiḥ** that – lack of proof **iti** (a quote) **cet** if you say, think, argue, etc. … well then

6.3 (1.112) **tathā** in that case **api** indeed, well **ekatara-dṛṣṭyā** (inst. established by) in one – seeing, mental beholding or comprehension **ekatara-siddheḥ** (abl. by) another's, someone else's – proof **na** no **apalāpaḥ** denial **6.4** (1.113) **trividha-virodha-āpatteḥ** (abl. by) threefold – contradiction, inconsistency – occurrence **ca** even **6.5** (1.114) **na** not **asat-utpādaḥ** untrue – coming forth **nṛ-śṛṅgavat** (vati like) man – horn(s) **6.6** (1.115) **upādāna-niyamāt** (abl. because) accepting **–** definition **6.7** (1.116) **sarvatra** in every place **sarvadā** at all times **sarva-sambhavāt** (abl. because) (of) all – make-up, material source **6.8** (1.117) **śaktasya** (gen. of) powered, made possible **śakya-karaṇāt** (abl. because) powerer, enabler **6.9** (1.118) **kāraṇa-bhāvāt** (abl. because) cause **–** the very existence **ca** and

(The author:) **6.1 Out of an understanding of it that comes (only) through seeing the <u>effect</u>** (see Vaisheshika 3.4, etc.)**, 6.2 if you think "there is a lack of proof of it", because of an opposing view of some authority;**

6.3 well, in that case, what is established by direct seeing in the one (person), is not denied by someone else's proof, 6.4 even by the occurrence of inconsistency with the threefold (standard of proof). 6.5 Whatever comes forth, it is not something untrue, like horns on a man, 6.6 because that (direct seeing) is the definition of accepting: 6.7 because in every place, at all times, it is the source of all, 6.8 because it is the enabler (empowerer) of all that is possible, 6.9 and because it is the very existence of <u>cause</u>.

Acceptance of the self-connection in the series requires acceptance that direct comprehension is the material source of all creation (see 6.1), that it is the cause (see 6.9) and the enabler of all that is possible, without the need for proof by any

other means. The impossible "man-horn" derives from a traditional illustration of proof that uses the example of a cow, with horns being one of the proofs.

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत्। नाभिव्यक्तिनिबन्धनौ व्यवहाराव्यवहारौ। नाशः कारणलयः। पारम्पर्यतोऽन्वेषणाद्बीजाङ्कुरवत्। उत्पत्तिवद्वादोषः। हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमने-कमाश्रितं लिङ्गम्। आञ्जस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेस्तत्सिद्धिः प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्वा। त्रिगुणाचेतनत्वादि द्वयोः प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादाद्यैर्गुणानामन्योन्यं वैधर्म्यम्। लघ्वादिदर्मैः साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं गुणानाम्। उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यत्वं महदादेर्घटादिवत्। परिमाणात्। समन्वयात्। शक्तितश्चेति।

6.10 (1.119) **na** not **bhāve** (loc. in) existence **bhāva-yogaḥ** true, genuine – connection **cet** if … well then

6.11 (1.120) **na** not (so) **abhivyakti-nibandhanau** (nom. dual) manifestation – binding **vyavahāra-avyavahārau** behaving – not behaving (1.121) **nāśaḥ** extinction **kāraṇa-layaḥ** cause – dissolution **6.12** (1.122) **pāramparyataḥ** (tasil "through") series **anveṣaṇā** (from anviṣ, anu+iṣ, "to impel") seeking after **bīja-aṅkuravat** (vati like) seed – sprout **6.13** (1.123) **utpattivat** (vati like production) **vā** (or, alternatively) production **adoṣaḥ** without fault, valid (1.124) **hetumat** having cause, being caused (by reason or motive) **anityam** non-eternal **avyāpi** non-comprehensive **sakriyam** having action, active **anekam** non-singular, manifold **āśritam** dependent, attached to **liṅgam** indicator **6.14** (1.125) **āñjasyāt** (abl. adverbial) obviously **abhedatas** (tasil stemming from) equivalence **vā** or **guṇa-sāmānyādeḥ** (abl. through) qualities – similarity – etc. **tat-siddhiḥ** of that – proof **pradhāna-vyapadeśāt** principal – designation **vā** or **6.15** (1.126) **triguṇa-acetanatva-ādi** (f. nom. s.) consisting of the three guṇas – non-sentient – being – and the rest **dvayoḥ** (gen. belonging to) both **6.16** (1.127) **prīti-aprīti-viṣāda-ādyaiḥ** (inst. pl. by) satisfaction, contentment – discontent – lethargy – etc. **guṇānām** (gen. pl. of) guṇas **anyonyam** mutual relation to each other **vaidharmyam** inconsistency, essential difference (1.128) **laghu-ādi-dharmaiḥ** (inst. pl. through) light – etc. – properties **sādharmyam** consistency, essential similarity **vaidharmyam** difference **ca** and **guṇānām** (gen. pl. of) guṇas *(Like the author of Vaisheshika, this author uses sādharmya, vaidharmya, and dharma together. See VD 1.1-3.)* **6.17** (1.129) **ubhaya-anyatvāt** (abl. because) both – other – being **kāryatvam** being product **mahat-ādeḥ** (gen. of) mahat – and the rest

ghaṭa-ādi-vat (vati "like") jar, pot – etc. **6.18** (1.130) **"parimāṇāt"** (abl. from) measuring (1.131) **samanvayāt** (abl. from) series (1.132) **śaktitaḥ** (tasil) in consequence of power **ca** and **iti** called *(These last three may have been separated by an ancient copyist to be more consistent with 1.116-18.)*

(The author continues:) **6.10 If you think "that is not the true connection in one's existence," …**

6.11 … well, it is not (a matter of) manifesting and binding (by) behaving or not behaving, extinction (by) dissolution into the cause. 6.12 Through the series there is a seeking, like seed and sprout. 6.13 It is just as valid as the alternative of production, which is caused, non-eternal, non-comprehensive, active, manifold, dependent, the indicator. 6.14 The proof of that is either through the similarity of those qualities and others, stemming obviously from the equivalence (of the two models), or through the designation of a principal. 6.15 Belonging to both (models) are the non-sentient consisting of the three guṇas and the rest. 6.16 (In one) there is the mutual relation of the guṇas to each other, their essential difference by contentment, discontent, lethargy, and so on; and (in the other) there is the essential similarity and difference (in objects) through the guṇas' properties of (being) light and so on, 6.17 because of both being something other, being a <u>product</u> of mahat and the rest, like pots and so on, 6.18 coming from measuring, arising out of the series, and resulting from that power (6.8)**. Thus it is said.**

The opponent's view is one of incarnation and bondage through behavior that is proper or not proper and a final extinction by dissolution into nature. This is a model of production, where objects and observers alike are built of atoms or "produced" out of the three qualities of nature. The author's model is that of a seed unfolding naturally into successively more detailed forms, where the whole creative and causal process originates and develops within the consciousness of the perceiver, according to the hierarchy of the principles enumerated in 3.7. He claims that there is no more fault in this view than in the opposing view. Keeping in mind that manifestation means "becoming evident", manifestation and production are obviously the same in concept; for example, one can witness the production of a pot that comes into existence on the potter's wheel even though no new material comes into existence. The various qualities listed in 6.13, are shared by the world of the production model and the world of the "becoming evident" model, but they exempt the human spirit in that both worlds have the following characteristics:

- caused vs. his being eternal 1.12 and 2.1;
- non-eternal vs. eternal 1.12;
- non-comprehensive vs. all-pervading, common to all things 1.12;
- with action vs. without action 2.13;
- manifold vs. inapplicability of diverse experience 1.17;
- dependent vs. not dependent 1.18
- the indicator vs. without guṇas 2.18.

In addition to the fact that the manifest and the produced share these qualities, both views designate a principal. The author's principal in the series is the great intellect designated as mahat, the inner creator, whereas the opponent with his production model designates nature as principal. From here on, the meaning of the word "principal" depends on which of the two views is being presented.

The manifest or the produced, either way you look at it, consists of that which is born of the three guṇas but not sentient like the great intellect. The difference between the two views in terms of the three guṇas (sattva, rajas, and tamas) is that in the one they are fundamental qualities of human consciousness, and in the other they are fundamental qualities or attributes of objects. In the liberating view, pleasure as blissful contentment is sattva; displeasure or discontent, which is the need to change, is rajas; and depression or lethargy is tamas, resistant to both pleasure and change. These are qualities of awareness as opposed to the qualities of objects in sutra 6.16; light vs. heavy, bright vs. dark, hot vs. cold, and so on.

Both halves of this chapter begin with an "if … then" clause and end with the author's own threefold proof, stated first in terms of the source and then in terms of the object or product; so sutra 6.18 is the complement to sutras 6.7-9, with measuring preexisting objects (see also 11.8) being in the outward direction, and accepting the causal role of the self being inward; development through the series being outward, and the source being inward; and the outer world that is in consequence of power, being the counterpart to the inner empowerer.

Chapter Seven

The Container

तद्धाने प्रकृतिः पुरुषो वा तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्छत्वम्। कार्यात्कारणानुमानं तत्साहित्यात्। अव्यक्तं त्रिगुणाल्लिङ्गात् तत्कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेर्नापलापः। सामान्येन विवादाभावाद्धर्मवन्न साधनम्। शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः पुमान्। संहतपरार्थत्वात्। त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्। अधिष्ठानाच्चेति। भोक्तृभावात्। कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः। जडप्रकाशायोगात्प्रकाशः।

7.1 (1.133) **tat-dhāne** (loc. as, to be) that – containing **prakṛtiḥ** nature **puruṣaḥ** human being **vā** or (1.134) **tayoḥ** (loc. between) the two **anyatve** (loc. if it were considered to be, considering) the other, the second thing named **tucchatvam** vanity **7.2 (**1.135) **kāryāt** (abl. from) effect **kāraṇa-anumānam** cause – inference **tat-sāhityāt** (abl. because) with it – association **7.3** (1.136) **avyaktam** (something) unmanifest **triguṇāt** (abl. produced from) the three guṇas **liṅgāt** (abl. through) sign, mark, proof (1.137) **tat-kāryatas** (tasil through) its – effect **tat-siddheḥ** (gen. of) that – proof **na** no **apalāpaḥ** denial

7.4 (1.138) **sāmānyena** (inst.) in general **vivāda-abhāvāt** (abl. because) dispute – absence **dharmavat** (vati like it is with) dharma **na** not **sādhanam** leading towards establishing something **7.5** (1.139) **śarīra-ādi-vyatiriktaḥ** the body – etc. – separate, distinct from **pumān** (n. s. of puṁs) person (1.140) **saṁhata-para-artha-tvāt** (abl. since) aggregate – apart – for the sake of – being **7.6** (1.141) **triguṇa-ādi-viparyayāt** (abl. adv.) the three guṇas – etc. – as opposed to **7.7** (1.142) **adhiṣṭhānāt** (abl. because) governor **ca** and **iti** called **7.8** (1.143) **bhoktṛ-bhāvāt** (abl. known from) enjoyer – existence (1.144) **kaivalya-artham** (abl. because) exclusivity, being the only one – meaning **pravṛtteḥ** progressing through life **ca** and **7.9** (1.145) **jaḍa-prakāśa-ayogāt** (abl. because) dull, inanimate – bright – separation **prakāśaḥ** the bright one

(The opponent:) **7.1 Between the two, nature or a human being, considering the container of (all) that to be the other (the human being) is just vanity. 7.2 There is inference of a cause from an effect because of its association with it. 7.3 There is no denying that the proof of that is through its effect, an unmanifest entity through its (perceptible) indicator (the body) produced from the three guṇas.**

(The author:) **7.4 It does not go towards establishing something just because there is a general absence of dispute, like it is with dharma. 7.5 This person is distinct from his body and the rest, because of an aggregate being for the sake of something apart from it; 7.6 and because, as opposed to the three guṇas, etc. (nature** 7.3**), 7.7 he is the one called "governor" (mahat), 7.8 the meaning of his being the only one is known from his existence as the enjoyer and from his progress through life. 7.9 He is the bright one out of that separation (being "apart"** 7.5**) between dull and bright (intellect).**

The opponent claims that we know of the unmanifest only through the manifest. To him, the unmanifest entity that is known from the manifest body is the ātman or individual, and he says that this is undeniable, but whenever he claims that something cannot be denied simply because it is commonly acknowledged as true by everyone, the author is compelled to make the correction.

Every single adult person in this world has already learned the living view, which is old and undeniable, and no one disagrees with that, but the liberating view is new, and that's the thing; considering this unfamiliar view requires not vanity but courage and humility: the courage to abandon being a perpetual student in awe of the authority of a master, and the humility in being able to abandon the certainty in dearly held and rigidly professed doctrines.

One particular obstacle to coming to an understanding of the new view is that even the language in which we try to express the new view belongs to the old view. The new view is not realized by using the old methods of gross perception, inference, and old language testimony, but by simply being established in one's own awareness, not dependent on objects, analysis, and speech. (The three worlds of objects, analysis, and Vedic testimony are treated fully in the Yoga Darshana.)

निर्गुणत्वान्न चिद्धर्मा। श्रुत्या सिद्धस्य नापलापस्तत्प्रत्यक्षबाधात्। सुषुप्त्याद्यसाक्षत्वम्। जन्मादिव्यवस्थातः पुरुषबहुत्वम्। उपाधिभेदेऽप्येकस्य नानायोग आकाशस्येव घटादिभिः। उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तद्वान्। एवमेकत्वेन परिवर्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः। अन्यधर्मत्वेऽपि नारोपात्तत्सिद्धिरेकत्वात्। नाद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधो। जातिपरत्वात्। विदितबन्धकारणस्य दृष्ट्या तद्रूपम्।

7.10 (1.146) **nir-guṇa-tvāt** (abl. coming from) without – qualities – being **na** no such **cit-dharmā** intellect – role **7.11** (1.147) **śrutyā** (inst. by) scripture **siddhasya** (gen. of) established **na** no **apalāpaḥ** denial **tat-pratyakṣa-bādhāt** (abl. through) (of) it – immediate – excluded *(see also 18.2)* **7.12** (1.148) **suṣupti-ādi-asākṣitvam** deep sleep – etc. – state of non-witnessing (1.149) **janman-ādi-vyavasthātaḥ** (tasil by reason of) birth, life – etc. – respective difference **puruṣa-bahutvam** persons, souls – multiplicity

7.13 (1.150) **upādhi-bhede** (loc.) substitute, representation – splitting, division **api** (loc. w/api even though) **ekasya** (gen. of) the one **nānāyogaḥ** manifoldness **ākāśasya** (gen. of) the ether **iva** like **ghaṭa-ādibhiḥ** (inst. with) jars – and the like **7.14** (1.151) **upādhiḥ** representation **bhidyate** that is divided **na** not **tu** but **tadvān** that which has (contains) it **7.15** (1.152) **evam** in that definite way **ekatvena** (inst. known through) oneness **pari-vartamānasya** (gen. of, for) all around, everywhere – existing, living **na** no **viruddha-dharma-adhyāsaḥ** inconsistent notion – role – unfit imposition **7.16** (1.153) **anya-dharma-tve api** (loc. w/api even though) something other – role – may be **na** not **aropāt** (abl. through) absence of confusion or doubt **tat-siddhiḥ** it – establishing **ekatvāt** (abl. because) oneness **7.17** (1.154) **na** not **advaita-śruti-virodhaḥ** non-duality – scripture – contradiction **jāti-para-tvāt** individual lives – different – there being **7.18** (1.155) **vidita-bandha-kāraṇasya** (gen. point of view) known – bondage – cause **dṛṣṭyā** (inst. by) seeing, direct cognition **tat-rūpam** his – form, nature

(The opponent:) **7.10 There is no such role for intellect** (see "where intelligence stops" 5.14)**, because of its being without the guṇas. 7.11 There is no denying of that which is established by scripture, (just) because direct perception is excluded; 7.12 (e.g.,) there is no such witnessing in deep sleep and so on, (and) there is a multiplicity of human beings by reason of the respective difference by birth, and so on.**

(The author:) **7.13 Though there is division in the representation, a manifoldness of the one, like that of the ether with jars and the like, 7.14 it is the representation that is divided, but not that which contains it (mahat). 7.15 Through oneness** (see VD 7.10) **it is known that there is no imposing of the inconsistent notion of a role for living (souls) all around in that definite way. 7.16 Because of that oneness, there is no establishing of that just because of the absence of doubt, even though there is a role for what is other (than the oneness, the personal identity). 7.17 There is no contradiction of that scripture on non-duality by (the notion of) there being different individual lives. 7.18**

For one to whom the cause of bondage is known, his form is apprehended through direct cognition.

The opponent insists that creation is not the province of mahat as intellect; that discrimination, perception, and the impulse to act do not contain the creative function, because that is the domain of Nature as the three guṇas. He argues that the world must continue to exist while one is sleeping, even though there is no perception or comprehension in deep sleep. He also argues that there must be a multiplicity of individual souls, rich and poor, healthy and sick, happy and miserable, because they are all seen in the world with their various burdens to bear and their various fruits of life to enjoy. In his view, each person is born with his own particular combination of these based on what he deserves. In the Yoga sutras 7.4-6 that author suggests a technique for examining the false notion that the constant immediate consciousness known directly as one's greater self also exists in our bodies, the false belief that those pillars of flesh somehow actually contain the great expansive awareness the yogin knows as his own. To say that they don't may seem absurd at first, but after living with the new perspective of the Darshanas for some time, the enormous difficulty of comprehending the idea will become the opposite, a clear and undeniable certainty. The old belief-based knowledge on its own will seem quite inadequate compared to the new knowledge based on direct comprehension. For the living liberated yogin in solipsist mode, consciousness is not contained in his body. Nor is it contained in the bodies of others, because both their would-be consciousness and their bodies are contained within his consciousness.

The author's statement that there is no proof through the mere absence of doubt is again, twice in the same chapter, a response to the opponent's statement that there can be no denial of his view (see 7.3). He objects to the opponent's proof by the general absence of doubt, just as the opponent objects to his "immediate comprehension" without proof. The author says that the one creative intelligence is not divided, that the many people seen in one's environment are representations of oneself, which mirror one's own qualities even more closely than the other created objects do. The traditional analogy of clay pots and space (ether) illustrates that even though the empty pots seem to divide space into separate parts, space remains whole and unbroken whether the pots are present or not. All beings and all objects in the universe have this relationship to the great self, mahat, identified with the ether. This is the very meaning of the scriptural injunctions as to "seeing the self in all beings and all beings in the self".

Now, is this "self" some other self, other than you? Of course not. The word "self", found everywhere in the scriptures in one form or another, doesn't mean any such thing. In the context of this world of "representations", the author sees other people in his world just as the opponent does and just as we all do, but only one soul is ever seen, only one consciousness. The knowledge of non-duality of souls in the direct cognition of this consciousness is not assailed in the least by the observation of the physical people-forms or their testimony. This doesn't mean that the yogin would claim that his loved ones are mere illusions. He just accepts them into the realm of his own soul, and from this comes genuine love, compassion, and non-violence in his thoughts, words, and deeds.

Chapter Eight

The Ways of Misunderstanding

नान्ध्यादृष्ट्या चक्षुष्मतामनुपलम्भः। वामदेवादिर्मुक्तो नाद्वैतम् अनादावद्य यावदभावद्भविष्यदप्येवम्। इदानीमिव सर्वत्र नात्यन्तोच्छेदः व्यावृत्तोभयरूपः साक्षात्सम्बन्धात्साक्षित्वम्। नित्यमुक्तत्वम्। औदासीन्यं चेति। उपरागात्कर्तृत्वं चित्सांनिध्यात् (चित्सांनिध्यत्)। (The repetition is artificial.)

8.1 (1.156) **na** no **andha-ādṛṣṭyā** (inst. "by the example of", like; *see also 11.16 with instr. w/iva*) blind – seeing **cakṣuṣmatām** (gen. on the part of) those who have sight **anupalambhaḥ** (a matter of) lack of recognition **8.2** (1.157) **vāmadeva-ādiḥ** vāmadeva – and others **muktaḥ** liberated **na** there is no **advaitam** non-duality **8.3** (1.158) **anādau** (loc. in) the preexisting **adya-yāvat** today – as much as ever **abhāvāt** (abl. adverbial) that being absent **bhaviṣyat** the future **api evam** most definitely so **8.4** (1.159 *(this sutra was mistakenly combined with 8.5)*) **idānīm** at this moment **iva** like, as **sarvatra** everywhere, in every case

8.5 na not **atyanta-ucchedaḥ** ultimate, final – cutting short (1.160) **vyāvṛtta-ubhaya-rūpaḥ** turned away from, free from, rid of – both – form **8.6** (1.161) **sākṣāt** (abl. adverbial) right before one's eyes **sambandhāt** (abl. because) connection **sākṣitvam** state of witnessing **8.7** (1.162) **nitya-muktatvam** forever – freed – state of **8.8** (1.163) **audāsīnyam** indifference **ca** and **iti** as you say **8.9** (1.164) **uparāgāt** (abl. because) influence **kartṛtvam** being doer, creator **cit-sāṁnidhyāt** (abl. from) intellect – proximity, presence, attendance

(The opponent:) **8.1 It is not just a matter of lack of recognition of it (the one form** 7.18**) on the part of those who should be able to see, like the blind and the sighted. 8.2 Vāmadeva and others, liberated, there is no non-duality. 8.3 That (non-duality) being absent, in the preexisting (world) it is as much today as ever; (and) the future, most definitely so. 8.4 As it is at this moment (here), it is everywhere.**

(The author:) **8.5 His form being free from both of those (time and place) is not a matter of a final cutoff. 8.6 Clearly, because there is (still) a connection, it is a state of clear witnessing, 8.7 and the state of having being freed forever** (2.1)**, 8.8 is just the "indifference," (nature** (see 8.11)**) as you say. 8.9 Being the creator arises out of influence from the presence of intellect.**

The notion that there are others who are capable of liberation but not yet liberated is central to the opponent's argument that many souls exist; for example, scripture that Vāmadeva (a Vedic Rishi) and others are liberated, while there exists the multiplicity of people referred to in 7.12, who are not liberated, seemingly verifies that there are many souls. This work asserts a kind of duality in the concurrence of the two opposing views but non-duality "advaita" here means non-duality of souls, and of course non-plurality. Advaita or "ekatva" (oneness) of soul is actually asserted in this work and not denied (the denial in sutra 8.2 being in the voice of the opponent).

In sutra 8.3, having addressed one obvious objection to non-duality, rooted in his belief in a multiplicity of souls, the opponent brings up a second one. His view of reality assumes a preexisting universe that is "not beginning" (anādi), meaning not created through the series beginning with mahat. The temporal aspect of that view is the belief in the existence of a continuous and unstoppable march of time, including a history of that preexisting universe, a real and true past that actually existed, independently of immediate perception of it through remembering, and an inevitable future. Sutra 8.4 refers to the place-related aspect of the opponent's view ("at this moment" removes the time-related aspect). This third part of the "preexisting" obstacle to liberation is the belief in the reality of an extended physical world beyond the sphere of one's immediate perception, a world that exists independently of one's knowledge of it, one that persists and does not cease upon the withdrawal of awareness.

The author concludes his statement on form, begun in sutra 7.18, by saying that the true form of a person is free from the notion of a preexisting universe of both time and place, one that is independent of perception. (His response here is

reminiscent of that in 2.12, 4.14, and 6.11, abruptly denying the doctrines of karma, re-incarnation, and final dissolution.) In the living view an indifferent person/spirit (puruṣa) is thought to be the witness and an indifferent nature is thought to be the creator or cause, but in the liberating view, the roles of both witness and creator are attributed to mahat, whereas nature alone is his pure potential, and the very first thing that emerges from that potential is the intellect, and not physical objects or whatever sub-atomic components they are made of.

विमुक्तमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थं वा प्रधानस्य। विरक्तस्य तत्सिद्धेः। न श्रवणमात्रात्तत्सिद्धिरनादि-
वासनाया बलवत्त्वात्। बहुभृत्यवद्वा प्रत्येकम्। प्रकृतिवास्तवे च पुरुषस्याध्याससिद्धिः।
कार्यतस्तत्सिद्धेः। चेतनोद्देशान्नियमः कण्टकमोक्षवत्। अन्ययोगेऽपि तत्सिद्धिर्नाञ्जस्ये-
नायोदाहवत्। रागविरागयोर्योगः। सृष्टिः। महदादिक्रमेण पञ्चभूतानाम्। आत्मार्थत्वा-
त्सृष्टेर्नैषामात्मार्थ आरम्भः। दिक्कालावाकाशादिभ्यः।

8.10 (2.1) **vimukta-mokṣa-artham** final release – liberation – for the purpose of **svārtham** for its own purpose **vā** or **pradhānasya** (gen. belonging to) the principal **8.11** (2.2) **viraktasya** (gen. belonging to) the indifferent one **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. because) that establishment **8.12** (2.3a) **na** no **śravaṇa-mātrāt** (abl. because) hearing – mere **tat-siddhiḥ** of it – establishing *(This is the end of sutra 8.12, the perfect complement to 8.11.)*

8.13 (2.3b) **anādi-vāsanāyāḥ** (f. gen. s. of vāsanā) the preexisting – imagined notion **bala-vat-tvāt** (abl. coming from) strength – being possessed (2.4) **bahu-bhṛtyavat** (vati like) multitude, host – dependent(s) **vā** or, "and respectively" **pratyekam** individuals one by one (2.5) **prakṛti-vāstave** (loc. (of vāstava) where) of nature – the reality **ca** and **puruṣasya** (gen. of) person, human being **adhyāsa-siddhiḥ** by unfit imposition – establishing *(The terms "vā" and "ca", indicating the two alternatives to the first term in 8.13, are both found seated between the terms with which they are associated in their respective clauses, which clauses were later wrongly (but helpfully) identified as separate sutras. The same mistaken division into separate sutras was applied to 8.14.)* **8.14** (2.6) **kāryatas** (tasil adverbial; in that way, as) a product **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. known by) that – establishing (2.7) **cetana-uddeśāt** (abl. from) the aware – example **niyamaḥ** defining (it) **kaṇṭaka-mokṣavat** (vati like, as if) thorns – liberation (2.8) **anya-yoge** (loc. in) (something) other – relation to **api** and **tat-siddhiḥ** it – proving **na** not **āñjasyena** (inst.) through directness, honesty, straightforwardness **ayodāhavat**

(vati like) glowing of molten metal **8.15** (2.9) **rāga-virāgayoḥ** (loc. in) passion – dispassion **yogaḥ** connection, joining **8.16 sṛṣṭiḥ** creation (2.10) **mahat-ādi-krameṇa** (inst. through) mahat – beginning with – series **pañca-bhūtānām** (gen. pl. belonging to) five – gross elements *(see 3.7)* **8.17** (2.11) **ātma-artha-tvāt** (abl. because) his own – benefit – being **sṛṣṭeḥ** (gen. of) creation, i.e., the created **na eṣām** (gen. belonging to) these **ātma-arthe** his own – benefit **ārambhaḥ** undertaking, beginning, origination **8.18** (2.12) **dik-kālau** (nom. dual) dimension – time **ākāśa-ādibhyaḥ** (abl. out of) the ether – and the (four) others

(The opponent:) **8.10 That which is for the purpose of the liberation of final release** (8.5)**, or that which is for one's own purpose, belongs to (our) principal (nature), 8.11 because the establishing of it belongs to that indifferent one. 8.12 There is no establishing of it from mere hearing.**

(The author:) **8.13 That (belief) comes from being possessed of (by) the strength of the imagined notion (vāsanā) of** *1.)* **a preexisting (world), or** *2.)* **individuals one by one, like a host of dependents, and** *3.)* **that this establishing of a human being where in reality there is nature, is an unfitting imposition; 8.14 which is known by establishing that (first) as a product, defining (the second) from the example of the aware (the liberated, e.g., Vāmadeva) as if it (liberation) were like liberation from thorns, and establishing that (third) in relation to something other (than soul), not through directness (of perception) like the glowing of molten metal. 8.15 Whether in passion or dispassion, there is still a connection** (see 8.6)**. 8.16 There is the creation of the five gross elements through the series beginning with mahat, 8.17 (but) if it is for one's own benefit, this origination of creation, because of its being for one's own benefit, does not belong to these (gross elements), 8.18 (i.e.) dimension and time coming out of the ether, and the others** (see VD 1.4-5 commentary)**.**

The opponent responds to the author's statement in 7.8 that mahat is the entity that exists for the twofold purpose of experience and spiritual progress. To him, nature is that entity, and liberation means a "final release" where the individual soul (ātman) has managed to bring his cycle of karma to an end and has merged with Brahman. The overpowering strength of the opposing belief system is a major obstacle to the realization of true liberation.

The opponent believes only in a preexisting and continuing world of time and space, and in a multiplicity of individual souls. He also believes that it is unfitting or wrong (adhyāsa) to look inward for the site of the created world. The "liberation from thorns" analogy refers to the unprovable notion on the part of the unliberated personal identity that there are liberated individuals in his world among the unliberated. These liberated people, praised in the scriptures, are supposedly proof that there are many souls and not just one. The notion of multiplicity of souls is a convenient and tidy contemplation that fulfills our need for community, but it is a less tenable aspect of the living view than aggregation is. In the liberated person it fades to nothing.

The author says that the realization of mahat as principal instead of nature as principal is through direct perception of the great intellect, which is bright, "like metal" (see also 5.9). The opponent's proof as to the unfitness of this notion is that the world is created by nature through concretion or aggregation of atoms and therefore it is something "other" than soul, whereas the author says it does not come from the gross elements but rather from subtler things. Of course they are both right, and their two opposing views are the two great comprehensive aspects of human experience, but this dualism will be revealed later as the author's point of view and not the opponent's.

Chapter Nine

Mind

अद्यवसायो बुद्धिः। तत्कार्यं धर्मादिः। महदुपरागाद्विपरीतम्। अभिमानोऽहंकारः। एका-दशपञ्चतन्मात्रं तत्कार्यम्। सात्त्विकमेकादशकं प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहंकारात्। कर्मेन्द्रियबुद्धी-न्द्रियैरान्तरमेकादशकम्। आहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेर्न भौतिकानि।

9.1 (2.13) **adhyavasāyaḥ** determination, ascertainment, discernment **buddhiḥ** intellect **9.2** (2.14) **tat-kāryam** whose – effect **dharma-ādiḥ** duty, sense of right, responsibility – etc. **9.3** (2.15) **mahat-uparāgāt** (abl. of comparison) mahat – influencing (role) **viparītam** w/abl. opposite of **9.4** (2.16) **abhimānaḥ** conceit, vanity, self-interest **ahaṁkāraḥ** personal identity

9.5 (2.17) **ekādaśa-pañca-tanmātram** *(samāhāra dvandva compound, a complex)* eleven – five – subtle elements, sensations **tat-kāryam** (of) that – effect **9.6** (2.18) **sātvikam** of or related to sattva **ekādaśakam** eleventh **9.7 pravartate** it

proceeds **vaikṛtāt** (abl. adverbial) modified **ahaṁkārāt** (abl. out of) the personal identity **9.8** (2.19) **karma-indriya-buddhi-indriyaiḥ** (inst. pl. included with them) action – powers – intellect, discerning – powers **āntaram** internal **ekādaśakam** eleventh **9.9** (2.20) **āhaṅkārikatva-śruteḥ** (abl. for there is) being of the personal identity – scripture **na** not **bhautikāni** (ika having or consisting of) gross elements

(The opponent:) **9.1 Intellect is (just) discernment, 9.2 whose effect is (knowing one's) dharma and all that, 9.3 the opposite of the influencing of (your) great one. 9.4 The personal identity is (just) that self-interest (through dharma).**

(The author:) **9.5 The effect of that (intellect) is the complex of the eleven with the five sensations.** (the eleven = ten indriyas + mind) **9.6 The eleventh (mind) is of sattva. 9.7 It proceeds out of the personal identity modified. 9.8 The eleventh is internal, included with the powers of action and the powers of discerning, 9.9 which do not consist of the gross elements, for there is scripture on their being of the personal identity.**

The opponent says that intellect, just mentioned in 8.9, is something that guides an individual on the right path, involving many lifetimes, which is just the opposite of the great force that determines that path, as if it were nothing more than the basic ability to discern right from wrong or good from bad. He says that out of those two, knowing and following one's pre-established dharma or duty in life is the good choice. Thus intellect would be the instrument of free will in an individual.

Choice is known at all levels in living beings, starting with the primal evolutionary sense seen in all creatures as to what is or is not life-supporting at any given moment, such as the hard-wired "inference" of the danger of fire at the slightest whiff of smoke. It extends even to the constant nagging superintendence of one's conscience and sense of responsibility or dharma, and this is what the opponent sees as the self-interest of the personal identity (ahaṅkāra).

The author responds by declaring that intellect is not merely the instrument of distinguishing right from wrong, but the very cause of creation. Through the personal identity, it is the container of mind, which he calls "the eleventh" because it is the whole that is more than the sum of its ten parts, the indriyas. Mind is a modified form of mahat/sattva, but it only exists in the context of the personal identity. That is why, according to the author's teaching, the entire universe that exists in any moment is just the personal universe of the yogin, consisting solely of

his experience as that particular person at that particular moment and in that particular place, including any perception, thought, belief, or memory he happens to be entertaining. The notion that there is "the rest of" the universe outside the sphere of his personal immediate awareness, though for the purpose of living life it is, in that moment, held to be true beyond any doubt, is a learned and inferred knowledge, and it belongs to the living view, not the liberating view.

देवतालयश्रुतिर्नारम्भकस्य। तदुत्पत्तिश्रुतेर्विनाशदर्शनाच्च। अतीन्द्रियमिन्द्रियं भ्रान्ताना-
मधिष्ठाने। शक्तिभेदेऽपि भेदसिद्धौ नैकत्वम्। न कल्पनाविरोधः प्रमाणदृष्टस्य। उभया-
त्मकं मनः। गुणपरिणामभेदान्नानात्वमवस्थावत्। रूपादिरसमलान्त उभयोः।

9.10 (2.21) **devatā-laya-śrutiḥ** powers of sense as gods – dissolution – scripture **na** not **ārambhakasya** (gen. belonging to) originator **9.11** (2.22) **tat-utpatti-śruteḥ** (abl. known through) them – production – scripture **9.12 vināśa-darśanāt** (abl. known by) destruction – seeing **ca** and **9.13** (2.23) **atīndriyam** super – power **indriyam** power **bhrāntānām** (gen. of, over) wandering, confused, (unliberated) **adhiṣṭhāne** (loc. in the case of) one governing (liberated) **9.14** (2.24) **śakti-bhede** (loc. in) powers, abilities – division **api** in fact **bheda-siddhau** (nom. dual; twofold) division – established **na** not **ekatvam** oneness

9.15 (2.25) **na kalpana-avirodhaḥ** imagined to be true – no inconsistency **pramāṇa-dṛṣṭasya** (gen. for) measure of truth – learned knowledge **9.16** (2.26) **ubhaya-ātmakam** both – consisting of, including **manaḥ** mind **9.17** (2.27) **guṇa-pariṇāma-bhedāt** (abl. through) quality – transformation – difference, various **nānātvam** variety, manifoldness, diversity **avasthāvat** (vati as) life circumstance. **9.18** (2.28) **rūpa-ādi-rasa-mala-antaḥ** beauty – to start – taste – dirt – to end **ubhayoḥ** (loc. dual; in) both

(The opponent:) **9.10 There is scripture on their dissolution into the devatā (gods, powers of sense); they do not belong to (your) originator. 9.11 It is known through scripture on the production of them, 9.12 and by seeing the destruction. 9.13 In the case of one governing over the confused, his power becomes a super power. 9.14 In fact, in this division of abilities, a twofold division is established, not oneness.**

(The author:) **9.15 For one whose measure of truth is that learned knowledge (scripture), there is no inconsistency with what is imagined (super powers). 9.16 Mind includes both. 9.17 Through the various transformations**

of the guṇas there is diversity, (appearing) as circumstance. 9.18 In both it ranges from beauty to taste to dirt.

Dissolution into the devatā (the "gods", see YD 5.14) is the opponent's version of cessation. He says that effort and result belong to nature as principal and not to mahat as principal. In his view, the confused, who have not worked their way through the lower worlds of tamas and rajas, have ordinary powers, while those who have achieved final release but still live, have super powers, and that this difference alone proves a duality of souls. He has already said in 8.2, "Vāmadeva among others, liberated, there is no non-duality." Here, as in the second half of Chapter Four (revisited in 11.13), there is a subtle and amusing undertone of name-calling or mutual ribbing between the opponent and the author. Which one is the confused and which the dreamer?

Indeed, one might very well hear that subjectivism and especially solipsism are absurd and imaginary at best, and that is true if they are taken alone, without acknowledging the certainty of learned knowledge. But the same could be said about dependence on learned knowledge without the constant attendance to self-awareness. The philosophy of Yoga, however, includes both and rejects neither. Any philosopher who dismisses the implications of a present-moment perceptual reality, clinging to remembered and inferred and explained truths, is missing an enormous dimension of knowledge. Also, needless to say, anyone who believes in an unseen non-physical God, or a human soul, or heaven, or hell, or miracles, or salvation, or even achievement, failure, or disparity of human worth, etc. etc., as nearly all of us do on this earth, has no business calling <u>any</u> philosophy absurd.

Imagination is a function of mind, and it includes both the super and the ordinary. "Circumstance" means the actual time and place and immediate conditions in which the yogin finds himself at any given moment, and again, in the liberating view this actually represents the totality of creation in that moment, here and now. The expression "rūpa-ādi-rasa-mala-anta" means literally, "beginning with beauty (form) and taste and ending with or extending to dirt (smell)" and it refers to the "guṇas" of Vaisheshika, rupa-rasa-gandha-sparśa (VD 1.5). The author says that both the beauty and the dirt of life are experienced by the living liberated person, so life experience is not due to circumstance earned through karma.

Chapter Ten

The Powers

द्रष्टृत्वादिरात्मनः करणत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम्। त्रयाणां स्वालक्षण्यम्। सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च। क्रमशोऽक्रमशश्चेन्द्रियवृत्तिः । वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः। तन्निवृत्तावुपशान्तोपरागः स्वस्थः। कुसुमवच्च मणिः। पुरुषार्थं करणोद्भवोऽप्यदृष्टोल्ला-सात्। धेनुवद्वत्साय। करणं त्रयोदशविधमवान्तरभेदात्। इन्द्रियेषु साधकतमत्वगुणयो-गात्कुठारवत्। द्वयोः प्रधानं मनो लोकवद्भृत्यवर्गेषु। अव्यभिचारात्। तथाशेषसंस्कारा-धारत्वात् स्मृत्यानुमानाच्च ।

10.1 (2.29) **draṣṭṛtva-ādiḥ** state of witnessing – etc., "and all that" **ātmanaḥ** (gen. on the part of) individual **karaṇa-tvam** agency, doing – the business of **indriyāṇām** (gen. belonging to) powers (2.30) **trayāṇām** (gen. pl. of, according to) the three **svālakṣaṇyam** (ṣyañ) specific quality of something, characteristic **10.2** (2.31) **sāmānya-karaṇa-vṛttiḥ** being universally or commonly considered or known by everyone – doing – manner of functioning, mode, way **prāna-adyāḥ** (gen. belonging to) breath – etc. **vāyavaḥ** the airs **pañca** five

10.3 (2.32) **kramaśaḥ** (kramaśas) serial **akramaśaḥ** non-serial **ca** and, as well as **indriya-vṛttiḥ** powers of sense – way of functioning **10.4** (2.33) **vṛttayaḥ** (nom. pl.) **pañcatayaḥ** (pañcat + ayac saṁkhyārthaka) fivefold **kliṣṭa-akliṣṭāḥ** (from kliś) afflicted or not afflicted **10.5** (2.34) **tat-nivṛttau** (loc. when) of those – cessation **upaśānta-uparāgaḥ** pacified – coloring, influence **sva-sthaḥ** self – abiding (2.35) **kusumavat** (vati) as a flower **ca** and **maṇiḥ** crystal, gem **10.6** (2.36) **puruṣa-artham** human being – interest **karaṇa-udbhavaḥ** producer, agent – origin, generation **api** thus **adṛṣṭa-ullāsāt** unseen – appearing, becoming visible (2.37) **dhenuvat** (vati like) cow's (milk) **vatsāya** (dative for the sake of) calf **10.7** (2.38) **karaṇam** creating, creation **trayodaśa-vidham** thirteenfold **avāntara-bhedāt** (abl. through) intermediate – division, subdivision, set **10.8** (2.39) **indriyeṣu** (loc. among) indriyas, powers of sense **sādhaka-tama-tva-guṇa-yogāt** (abl. because) effective – most – being – quality (2.40) **kuṭhāravat** (vati like) axe **dvayoḥ** (loc. dual; among) the two **pradhānam** the head, the chief **manaḥ** mind **lokavat** (vati as) the world **bhṛtya-vargeṣu** (loc. among) dependents – company (2.41) **avyabhicārāt** (abl. (indeclinable MW) adverbial) unfailing, with absolute

necessity **10.9** (2.42) **tathā** that way, thus **aśeṣa-saṁskāra-ādhāra-tvāt** (abl. because of) without exception, entire – mental constructs – foundation – its being (2.43) **smṛtyā** (inst. with, including) remembering, memory **anumānāt** (abl. coming from) inference **ca** also, including

(The opponent:) **10.1 On the part of an individual there is (only) a state of <u>witnessing</u> (creation), etc.; his distinctive quality is of the three (forms of Brahman), the business of doing (being the doer) belonging to his powers (indriyas), 10.2 their way of doing five(fold), as everyone knows, the (five) airs belonging to the (indriya of) breath and so on.**

(The author:) **10.3 The way of functioning of the powers of sense is serial as well as non-serial, 10.4 (and yes) the ways are fivefold, whether they are afflicted or not afflicted** (dirt or beauty 9.18); **10.5 (yet) like the (colored) flower, when there is cessation of those (ways), their coloring influence is pacified, (and then) there is the crystal abiding in itself. 10.6 Like the cow's milk for the sake of the calf, the generation by an agent in the interest of the human being is through the becoming visible of the unseen, 10.7 a thirteenfold creation through the intermediate set. 10.8 Unfailing among its company of dependents, appearing as the world, is mind, the head of those two (sets of powers) like (the head of) an axe, because of its quality of being the most effective among the powers. 10.9 It is thus because of its being the foundation of all (mental) constructs without exception, including memory** (YD 1.6) **and also (those) from inference** (YD 1.4)**.**

The opponent argues with the author's statement in 8.5-9 concerning the human being as the witness and nature's creation through the presence of intellect, and the author replies by reinforcing his thesis of the serial nature of creation starting with intellect. The serial mode is that in which one thing proceeds from the next, and the non-serial mode is that of the groups of five that do not have any such relationship of prior and posterior between them as production or containment, but instead manifest and dissolve by conjunction and disjunction. As for the number being five, we know from our own experience that there are five senses. It is not a matter of spiritual or scriptural revelation. The analogy of the cow and the calf here is beautiful. Both the cow and the calf are seen, but the flow of milk is not seen, even though its effect is seen as the calf grows.

सम्भवेन्न स्वतः। आपेक्षिको गुणप्रधानभावः। क्रियाविशेषात्। तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात्तदर्थम-भिचेष्टा लोकवत्। समानकर्मयोगे बुद्धेः प्राधान्यं लोकवत् (लोकवत्) (The repetition is artificial.)**। अविशेषाद्विशेषारम्भः। तस्माच्छरीरस्य। तद्बीजात्संसृतिः आविवेकाच्च प्रवर्तनमविशेषाणाम्। उपभोगादितरस्य। सम्प्रति परिमुक्तो द्वाभ्याम्।**

10.10 (2.44) **sambhavet** (opt.3.sg.) it can happen **na** not **svataḥ** (svatas) of one's own self, of one's own accord **10.11** (2.45) **āpekṣikaḥ** relative **guṇa-pradhāna-bhāvaḥ** qualities – principal – relation **kriyā-viśeṣāt** (abl. according to) activity – particular (MW) **10.12** (2.46) **tat-karma-arjitatvāt** (abl. from) one's – karma – acquired – having been **tat-artham** one's – benefit **abhiceṣṭā** (inst.) efforts **lokavat** (vati appearing as) the world

10.13 (2.47) **samāna-karma-yoge** (loc. (whatever) is the case) equally, whatever – action – relevance **buddheḥ** (gen. belonging to) intellect **prādhānyam** (ṣyañ of pradhāna) principalness, the role of principal **lokavat** (vati appearing as) world **10.14** (3.1) **aviśeṣāt** (abl. coming from) undifferentiated **viśeṣa-ārambhaḥ** differentiated – origination, inception *(This compound has a genitive connection that is the referent for the genitive word in the following sutra.)* **10.15** (3.2) **tasmāt** from that **śarīrasya** (gen. that of) the body **10.16** (3.3) **tat-bījāt** (abl. arising from) its – seed **saṁsṛtiḥ** the course of life (3.4) **ā-vivekāt** (ā w/abl.; approaching, leading up to) distinguishing **ca** and **pravartanam** proceeding forth **aviśeṣāṇām** (gen. of) undifferentiated ones, the t|hree guṇas **10.17** (3.5) **upabhogāt** (abl. for the sake of, "because" there is to be) experience **itarasya** (gen. that of) the other **10.18** (3.6) **samprati** (ind.) at the moment, immediate, now **pari-muktaḥ** utterly – free **dvābhyām** (abl. from) both

(The opponent:) **10.10 This (mind) cannot just happen of its own accord. 10.11 There is the relation of one's qualities to the principal (nature), which is relative according to one's particular activity, 10.12 through effort for one's own benefit, having been acquired through one's karma, appearing as the world.**

(The author:) **10.13 Whatever the karma, the role of principal belongs to intellect, appearing as the world. 10.14 The origination of the differentiated (powers) comes from the undifferentiated. 10.15 From that comes that (origination) of the body, 10.16 the course of life belonging to the undifferentiated ones (the guṇas) arising from its seed and proceeding forth**

for leading to distinguishing. 10.17 That of the other (the body) is for experience. 10.18 That which is immediate (puruṣa) is utterly free from both.

Again the opponent argues for an indifferent nature as principal, creating one's particular life circumstances in reaction to one's past karma, but the author claims intellect (mahat) as principal, from which arises the twofold purpose of life: realization and enjoyment. He states again that the human spirit transcends both progress and the experience of enjoyment or pain.

Chapter Eleven

The Body and the Fivefold Opposing View

मातापितृजं स्थूलं प्रायश इतरन्न तथा। पूर्वोत्पत्तेस्तत्कार्यत्वं भोगादेकस्य नेतरस्य। सप्तदशैकं लिङ्गम्। व्यक्तिभेदः कर्मविशेषात्। तदधिष्ठानाश्रये देहे तद्वादात्तद्वादः। न स्वातन्त्र्यात्तदृते छायावच्चित्रवच्च। मूर्तत्वेऽपि न संघातयोगात्तरणिवत्। अणुपरिमाणं तत्कृतिश्रुतेः। तदन्नमयत्वश्रुतेश्च ।

11.1 (3.7) **mātā-pitṛ-jam** mother – father – born **sthūlam** the gross **prāyaśaḥ** *(prāyaśas)* as a rule **itarat** (n. neut, see itara) another **na tathā** not so, not that **11.2** (3.8) **pūrva-utpatteḥ** (abl. since) former – produced by **tat-kāryatvam** of it – being a product **bhogāt** (abl. for) enjoyment **ekasya** (gen. belonging to) the one **na** not **itarasya** (gen. belonging to) the other **11.3** (3.9) **saptadaśa-ekam** consisting of seventeen parts – one whole **liṅgam** the sign, the visible proof of the unmanifest person (liṅgaśarīra or subtle body) **11.4** (3.10) **vyakti-bhedaḥ** manifestation – division, variety **karma-viśeṣāt** (abl. by) action – difference

11.5 (3.11) **tat-adhiṣṭhāna-āśraye** (loc. absolute; as for) that – governance – seat **dehe** (loc. abs.) gross body **tat-vādāt** (abl. propagating from) it – saying **tat-vādaḥ** **11.6** (3.12) **na** not **svātantryāt** (abl. adverbial) on its own **tat-ṛte** that – without **chāyāvat** shadow – like **citravat** variegation, picture, painting – like **ca** and, or **11.7** (3.13) **mūrtatve api** (loc. though) embodiment, incarnation **na** not **saṁghāta-yogāt** compacting, concretion – resulting from **taraṇivat** like the sun (the crosser over) **11.8** (3.14) **aṇuparimāṇam** minute, a minute division, atom – measuring **tat-kṛti-śruteḥ** it – creation – hearing **11.9** (3.15) **tat-annamayatva-śruteḥ** (abl. because of) it – food – made of – being – hearing **ca** and

(The opponent:) **11.1 The gross (body** 10.15-17**), as a rule, is born from a mother and a father (but) there is another that is not. 11.2 It belongs to the one (nature** 10.11**), not the other (intellect** 10.13**), since it is produced by the former, being a product of it for enjoyment. 11.3 It is the one whole consisting of seventeen parts, the indicator (the subtle body). 11.4 The variety in manifestation (of bodies) is by the difference in karma.**

(The author:) **11.5 As for the notion of the body as the seat of governance over that (intellect) the saying of it propagates from the saying of it. 11.6 Like a shadow or a painting, it (the body) does not exist on its own without that (intellect), 11.7 which, like the sun, is not a result of concretion, even though there is incarnation. 11.8 It is the measuring in <u>atoms</u> that comes from (mere** (compare with 8.12)**) hearing about the creation of it 11.9 and from (mere) hearing about its being made of food (earth).**

The opponent sees the physical body as a gross representation of a seventeenfold subtle body or "liṅgaśarīra": the five airs, the ten indriyas, mind, and intellect, all produced by nature. The author argues that the governance of mahat as intellect works the other way around, and he gives an example. To become visible, a shadow and a painting both depend on a light source such as the sun. The shadow depends on the light being blocked and the painting depends on its not being blocked. Also, the shadow occurs naturally by simply becoming evident, while the painting is a produced object. (This use of two examples, one produced and the other natural, is similar to 1.10 with the white cloth and the seed.)

In the liberating view, the abstract entity called the "principal" is not created by a packing together of minute concrete atoms, but rather the particular atoms, subdivisions of the whole, are created by the universal abstract entity. The term "like the sun" in 11.7 completes the analogy begun in 11.6. The sun "makes" both the painting and the shadow by making them evident (again, intellect is brightness). The author dismisses blind faith in the words of the scriptures without self-examination, and the literal translation "hearing", rather than "scripture" with its connotation of authority, better conveys his intent, especially in the context of saying propagating from saying. (See also "it is said in that regard" VD 7.5.) His argument in regard to intellect, as an aspect of mahat, being the cause and not the effect, corresponds very closely with Vaisheshika 7.4-9.

पुरुषार्थं संसृतिर्लिङ्गानां सूपकरवद्राज्ञः पाञ्चभौतिको देहः। चातुर्भौतिकमित्येके ॥ ऐकभौतिकमित्यपरे॥ न सांसिद्धिकं चैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः। प्रपञ्चमरणाद्यभावश्च मदशक्तिवच्चेत्प्रत्येकपरिदृष्टे सौक्ष्म्यात् (in Aniruddha's manuscript) सांहत्ये तदुद्भवः। ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः। बन्धो विपर्ययात्। नियतकारणत्वान्न समुच्चयविकल्पौ। स्वप्नजागराभ्यामिव मायिकामायिकाभ्यां नोभयोर्मुक्तिः पुरुषस्य। इतरस्यापि नात्यन्तिकम्। संकल्पितेऽप्येवम् ॥displaced text॥ विपर्ययभेदाः पञ्च।

11.10 (3.16) **puruṣārtham** people – for the sake of **saṁsṛtiḥ** MW course, revolution, (esp.) passage through successive states of existence **liṅgānām** (gen. pl. belonging to) subtle bodies **sūpakāravat** like the cooks **rājñaḥ** (gen. s. of rājān) a king **11.11** (3.17) **pāñca-bhautikaḥ** consisting of five gross elements **dehaḥ** body (3.18) **cātur-bhautikam** consisting of four gross elements **iti eke** according to some (3.19) ***[eka-bhautikam iti apare It is said later** (in 20.10) **to consist of one gross element (earth).]*** *(not authentic)*

11.12 (3.20) **na** not **sāṁsiddhikam** natural, innate, self-existent **caitanyam** consciousness, awareness **pratyeka-ādṛṣṭeḥ** (to be inferred from) individuals one by one *(see 8.13)* – seeing (3.21) **prapañca-maraṇa-ādi-abhāvaḥ** expansion, manifest form – death, passing away – etc. – non-existence **ca** and, nor **11.13** (3.22) **mada-śakti-vat** (vatup having, possessed by) rapture, the impaired judgment of intoxication – the power of **cet** if you think … then **pratyeka-paridṛṣṭe** (loc. w/cet if) individuals one by one – seen, known **saukṣmyāt** (abl. from) triviality **sāṁhatye** (ṣyañ of saṁhata) (loc. w/cet if) "struck-together-ness", concretion **tat-udbhavaḥ** their – origination **11.14** (3.23) **jñānāt** (abl. through) subtle understanding **muktiḥ** the liberating (3.24) **bandhaḥ** bondage **viparyayāt** (abl. through) the opposite of it **11.15** (3.25) **niyata-kāraṇatvāt** (abl. from) the state of the cause being brought under control *(see 3.2)* **na samuccaya-vikalpau** (nom. dual) accumulation, piling up – alternation, variation, manifoldness **11.16** (3.26) **svapna-jāgarābhyām iva** (inst. w/iva "like", "by the example of") sleeping – awake **māyika-amāyikābhyām** (inst. with) one having illusion – one not having illusion **na** no **ubhayoḥ** (loc. dual; in two) **muktiḥ** liberating **puruṣasya** (gen. of) one person **11.17** (3.27) **itarasya** (gen. of) the other **api** moreover **na** no **ātyantikam** permanence (3.28) **saṁkalpite** (loc. when) imagined, made up in the mind **api evam** most definitely so *(For api evam see also 8.3 and 15.18.) (3.29-36*

have been restored to their original place in Chapters 22-23.) **11.18** (3.37) **viparyaya-bhedāḥ** opposing, misconception – division, breakdown, an enumerated set **pañca** five

(The opponent:) **11.10 The course of life is for the sake of the (individual) people belonging to the indicators (bodies) like a king's cooks. 11.11 The body <u>does</u> consist of the five gross elements. According to some it consists of four gross elements.**

(The author:) **11.12 It is not to be inferred from seeing those individuals one by one that there is a self-existent consciousness (in them), nor is there non-existence of it upon passing away of the manifest form etc. 11.13 If you think it (this view) is possession by the power of rapture** (see 4.11), **well, in seeing individuals one by one, (the notion) that the origination of that (consciousness) is in being struck together (from atoms) comes from triviality (of understanding). 11.14 The liberating (view) is through a higher understanding (jñāna** VD 1.3), **bondage through the <u>opposite</u>. 11.15 Coming from the state where the cause is checked, there is no** *1.)* **accumulation (of atoms) or** *2.)* **manifoldness (of souls), 11.16 no** *3.)* **liberating of one person in two, with one having illusion and one not having illusion, like someone who is asleep and someone who is awake. 11.17 Moreover, there is no** *4.)* **permanence of the other,** *5.)* **most definitely so, when it is (just) made up in the mind. 11.18 These five are the divisions of the <u>opposite</u> (view).**

In Vaisheshika sutra 1.3 that author says that the unsurpassed good comes through understanding (jñāna), and here in sutra 11.14 this author makes the same statement, that liberation is realized through jñāna, using the same word. This understanding is a subtle thing, whereas the world view as seen through the muddy filter of bondage is gross. We are all taught that everything is made out of small parts. Measuring the atoms means reckoning the parts and pieces of creation, giving substance to the idea of concretion and giving name and form to the myriad components out of which all things are made, including bodies. The opponent was also taught that view (as was the author), but he has never taken the liberty of advancing toward a true comprehension by thinking independently. He defends the principle of aggregation of the gross elements into bodies, and he argues with the author's statement in 10.16 about "the course of life".

When it comes to refuting the notion that consciousness is a product of the physical atomic body, these authors do not abstain from strong language. Here in sutra 11.13 our author calls the idea trivial or small-minded, while the author of the Vaisheshika calls it ignorant and mindless (see VD 7.4-9). Of course, in the living view there are other bodies, other souls, and other objects in a preexisting world, things that persist independently of the series beginning with consciousness, things that perish not upon the withdrawal of perception but upon physical death. In the liberating view, however, these beliefs are seen as misapprehension. The two views exist together as mutual complements in the living liberated person. Viparyaya means opposite or opposing, but it also means mistaken thinking or misconception. It should be taken as the opposite view or the "living" view, which is equally as valid as the liberating view but opposed in an inside-out kind of way; inverse and yet complementary in that the two opposing views complete each other.

Five beliefs of the opposing view are given in sutras 11.15-17 as follows:

1.) accumulation of atoms;
2.) manifoldness of souls;
3.) liberated and non-liberated souls;
4.) permanence or perpetuity;
5.) the preexisting world as definite and real, not imagined.

Chapter Twelve

The Vaisheshika System vs. Karma

अशक्तिरष्टाविंशतिधा तु । तुष्टिर्नवधा। सिद्धिरष्टधा। अवान्तरभेदाः पूर्ववत्। एवमितर-स्याः। आध्यात्मकादिभेदान्नवधा तुष्टिः। ऊहादिभिः सिद्धिः अष्टधा (Aniruddha)। नेतरादितरहानेन विना। दैवादिप्रभेदा। आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तं तत्कृते सृष्टिरविवेकात् ।

12.1 (3.38) **aśaktiḥ** non-power **aṣṭaviṁśatidhā** twenty-eight **tu** but **12.2** (3.39) **tuṣṭiḥ** satisfaction, gratification, fulfillment **navadhā** ninefold **12.3** (3.40) **siddhiḥ** accomplishment **aṣṭadhā** eightfold **12.4** (3.41) **avāntara-bhedāḥ** intermediate, subdivisions (the eleven) **pūrvavat** as before **12.5** (3.42) **evam** just the same **itarasyāḥ** (gen. of) the other (fem. refers to aśakti) **12.6** (3.43) **ādhyātmika-ādi-bhedāt** (abl. because) individual-related (ātman + manas) – the others (diś, kala) – the set **navadhā** (ninefold) **tuṣṭiḥ** fulfillment **12.7** (3.44) **ūha-ādibhiḥ** (inst. with,

including) marking, noting, considering, deliberating – the others **siddhiḥ** accomplishing **aṣṭadhā** eightfold **12.8** (3.45) **na** no **itarāt** (abl. coming from) the one/the other **itara-hāne** (inst. w/vinā) the one/the other – abandoning, letting go **na** is not so **vinā** without (3.46) **daiva-ādi-prabhedā** belonging to or coming from the gods – etc. – species, kind, sort

12.9 (3.47) **ā-brahma-stamba-paryantam** up to and including – Brahman – a tuft or clump of sod – entirely **tat** (the indeclinable form) thus **kṛte** (loc.) done **sṛṣṭiḥ** the creation **avivekāt** (abl. arises from) non-distinction

(The opponent:) **12.1 But the non-power** (he is referring to the divisions outlined in the Vaisheshika) **is twenty-eight-fold: 12.2 the fulfillment ninefold, 12.3 the accomplishing (of it) eightfold, 12.4 the divisions of the intermediate set as before (eleven). 12.5 (Yours) is just the same as that of the other (the non-power group, as follows:) 12.6 The fulfillment is ninefold because of the set of those related to the individual, and the others, 12.7 and the accomplishing of it is eightfold including deliberation and the others. 12.8 What comes from that one (view, Vaisheshika), cannot be (held) without abandoning the other, the one about the gods, etc** (see 9.10).

(The author:) **12.9 Thus done, creation arises from non-distinction, from Brahman to a clump of sod** (see 15.18, 24.16).

After the author assigns a number to his "opposite" view, the opponent, in turn, puts a number to his. He points out the similarity between the author's principles as described in Chapter Three and the principles of Vaisheshika (meaning "having to do with the particulars"), which counts only four subtle elements in its enumeration sutras (VD 1.4-6), but he addresses only the "non-power" principles. He says the Vaisheshika system is completely incompatible with his belief in gods, religious rites, karma, etc.

The masculine mahat is the face of the feminine prakṛti (the prime originator), and those two as a unit, are considered by the author to be containers. They are the ones to whom the abilities or powers of perception and action are attributed, whereas all the principles that are created or produced make up the non-power group. With certain additions to the five subtle elements and to the five gross elements the whole non-power group is counted as twenty-eight-fold: nine plus eight plus eleven.

The "fulfillment" set is the nine divisions of the physical (dravya) in the Vaisheshika system (VD 1.4). It starts with the five gross elements—earth

(prithivi), water (apas), fire (tejas), air (vayu), and the ether (ākāśa)—and is increased to nine by the development of dimension and time (diś and kāla) and then mind and the individual (manas and ātman). It is called "fulfillment" because the nine divisions are the components of concrete physical reality, which is the point of completion and fulfillment of the creative process, for the sake of enjoyment. The author also calls it the fruit of creation (see 5.15).

The "accomplishing" set, also drawn from Vaisheshika (VD 1.5), are the eight (not seventeen!) divisions of guṇa, which are the essential constituents that give rise to the dravya set. These guṇas from Vaisheshika begin with four subtle elements—touch, taste, smell, and form—and become eight by the addition of ūha and the rest. The word "ūha", meaning "deliberation", corresponds to "saṁkhyāḥ" (VD 1.5), which means reckonings, or deliberation, reasoning, reflection, etc. (see "Saṁ-khyā, f." MW p. 1128.) The three others, "the rest", are: *1.)* measurings (parimāṇāni); *2.)* a single unnamed set consisting of certain discernings (buddhayaḥ) and certain endeavors (prayatnāḥ), corresponding to mind; and finally *3.)* the sense of individuality (pṛthaktvam). The intermediate set is elevenfold: the ten indriyas and mind. Mind is thus counted twice in this scheme, once as the "eleventh" of Sankhya (9.5) and again as the physical mind of Vaisheshika.

The author replies that these particulars are exactly how creation emerges when Brahman becomes excluded, as the feminine aspect, the prime originating force, begins to lose her balance and to reel into diversity, and as the masculine aspect, mahat, begins to forget his eternal nature and to fail in his ability to distinguish it from his creation.

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशाला। तमोविशाला मूलतः। मध्ये रजोविशाला। कर्मवैचित्र्यात्प्रधानचेष्टा गर्भदासवत्। आवृत्तिस्तत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरयोनियोगाद्धेयः। समानं जरामरणादिजं दुःखम्। न कारणलयात्कृतकृत्यता मग्नवदुत्थानात्। अकार्यत्वेऽपि तद्योगः पारवश्यात्। स हि सर्व-वित्सर्वकर्ता। ईदृशेश्वरसिद्धिः सिद्धा (सिद्धी)। प्रधानसृष्टिः परार्थं स्वतोऽप्यभोक्तृत्वादुष्ट्र-कुङ्कुमवहनवत् ।

12.10 (3.48) **ūrdhvam** above, on high **sattva-viśālā** sattva – abounding in **12.11** (3.49) **tamas-viśālā** tamas – abounding in **mūlatas** (ind.) at the root – in the lower region **12.12** (3.50) **madhye** (loc. in) the middle **rajas-viśālā** rajas – abounding **12.13** (3.51) **karma-vaicitryāt** karman – diversity (from vicitra)

pradhāna-ceṣṭā (for) the principal – exertion, endeavoring **garbha-dāsavat** (vati like) womb-born – servant(s) **12.14** (3.52) **āvṛttiḥ** returning **tatra** there, to that **api** even **uttara-uttara-yoni-yogāt** higher and higher – birth(s) – through **heyaḥ** abandoned, given up (3.53) **samānam** the same with **jarā-maraṇa-ādi-jam** aging – death – etc. – born of **duḥkham** suffering **12.15** (3.54) **na** no **kāraṇa-layāt** (abl. because) cause – dissolution into, melting *(see 6.3)* **kṛta-kṛtyatā** accomplishment (nāśa 6.3) – to be done – right, proper **magnavat** (vati like) sunk, submerged **utthānāt** (abl. through) rising **12.16** (3.55) **akāryatve** without what is to be done **api** even **tat-yogaḥ** his – connection **pāravaśyāt** (abl. through) subject to another's will, servitude **12.17** (3.56) **sa** he **hi** because, for **sarvavit** knowing all **sarvakartā** doing all (3.57) **īdṛśa-īśvara-siddhiḥ** one endowed with such qualities – supreme governor – establishing **siddhī** (dual) two proofs. *(I believe there was an ancient copying error on this word (see the devanagarī), where siddhī, which fits perfectly, became siddhā, which doesn't work at all.)*

12.18 (3.58) **pradhāna-sṛṣṭiḥ** principal – the creation **para-artham** other – for the benefit of **svatas** for his own **api** really **abhoktṛtvāt** (abl. because) not being the enjoyer **uṣṭra-kuṅkuma-vahanavat** (vati like) oxcart – saffron – carrying

(The opponent:) **12.10 Abounding in goodness on high, 12.11 abounding in darkness beneath, 12.12 abounding in passion in the middle, 12.13 like those born to servitude; the exertion of the principal (nature) through the diversity of karma; 12.14 (all) that is given up (in the end), even the returning to that through higher and higher births, (and) the same with suffering born of aging and dying, and all that. 12.15 There is no accomplishment of what has to be done through rising** (see VD 1.1), **like someone who is sunk, because there <u>is</u> that (final) dissolution into the cause** (see 6.11)**. 12.16 Even without what has to be done, his connection** (see also "tat-yogaḥ" 2.1, 3.1) **<u>is</u> through being subject to the will of another** (see 2.5-7). **12.17 For <u>he</u> is the one who comprehends all and creates all, and these are the two proofs establishing that the one who is endowed with such qualities, (Brahman** 12.9**) is that supreme governor (not mahat).**

(The author:) **12.18 The principal's (mahat's) creation for the benefit of something apart (from it) is really for his <u>own</u> (benefit) because not being the enjoyer would be like carrying saffron with an oxcart** (see 23.9)**.**

Here the opponent describes the three planes of human existence that are associated with the doctrine of reincarnation or transmigration of souls according to the law of karma. He says that there is no rising to the ultimate good through

understanding as stated in the first sutra of the Vaisheshika, but that man is instead governed by and subject to the will of a higher power.

We all understand God to be an all-knowing and all-powerful higher being, and not just an abstract power either, but a great unseen person-like being. Yes, it is possible to stretch the meaning to encompass some kind of other principle that is not the mighty anthropomorphic, conscious, human-image, discriminating God that we learned about in church, temple, or synagogue; but to be fair, the word "God" does indeed mean just that.

It is a wonderful concept and a noble belief, despite the shameful bickering and even violence over who's God is real and whose isn't. But how can that be helped when God is seen to be a separate personality who stands aloof and judges one's every thought and deed as right or wrong, who is pleased or displeased with one's actions, like a parent; and who rewards and punishes accordingly? These things are not so much Godly but more like characteristics of petty worldly people, whose very nature seems to be to squabble over meaningless things, and to glory in conflict and conquest.

On the other hand it has been said that God is love, and seriously too, by a great many believers, and of course he is. How does one even know God but through prayer or devotion, which is a manifestation and reflection of that love; and no one would compare prayer to talking to someone on the street. It is an internal connection bathed in feeling and abstraction. How simple, then, to complete that connection and become one with him, not as some foolish individual marching around claiming to be God, but as the only truly knowable human consciousness.

The author concludes this half of the Sankhya Darshana with a nice little analogy. In his world, saffron probably ranked highest among all commodities for value compared to weight, as opposed to dung or firewood, which would be much more suitable for transportation in a crude heavy oxcart. Saffron, prized as a yellow dye, also aptly represents the well-established theme of coloring of consciousness through experience, which will be developed later in this work. He says that life experience, beginning in sattva and the others (the saffron), is not contained in subservient individuals, each one borne about in a gross body (the oxcart) created by nature.

Chapter Thirteen

Cessation and Letting Go

अचेतनत्वेऽपि क्षीरवच्चेष्टितं प्रधानस्य। कर्मवद् दृष्टेर्वा कालादेः। स्वभावाच्चेष्टितमनभिसं-
धानाद् भृत्यवत्। कर्माकृष्टेर्वानादितः। विविक्तबोधात्सृष्टिनिवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य सुदवत्पाके।
इतर इतरवत्तद्दोषात्। द्वयोरेकतरस्य वौदासीन्यमपवर्गः। अन्यसृष्ट्युपरागेऽपि न विरज्यते
प्रबुद्धरज्जुतत्त्वस्यैवोरगः। कर्मनिमित्तयोगाच्च नैरपेक्ष्येऽपि प्रकृत्युपकारेऽविवेको निमित्तम्
नर्तकीवत्प्रवृत्तस्यापि निवृत्तिश्चारितार्थ्यात्। दोषबोधेऽपि नोपसर्पणं प्रधानस्य कुलवधूवत्
।नैकान्ततो बन्धमोक्षौ पुरुषस्याविवेकादृते ।

13.1 (3.59) **acetanatve api** (loc. w/api even though, even that) without intelligence, design, or conscious intent – being, which is **kṣīravat** like milk **ceṣṭitam** (itac having) exertion, effort, behavior **pradhānasya** (gen. belonging to) principal **13.2** (3.60) **karmavat** (vatup having, in accordance with) karma **dṛṣṭeḥ** (abl. known from) seeing **vā** either, or **kāla-ādeḥ** (abl. coming from) time – etc. (the gross elements) (3.61) **svabhāvāt** (abl. due to) one's own innate disposition **ceṣṭitam** (itac having) effort (in life) **anabhisaṁdhānāt** (see abhisaṁdhāna MW) (abl. because of) absence of design **bhṛtyavat** (vati like) servant **13.3** (3.62) **karma-ākṛṣṭeḥ** (abl. known from) karman – the effect of drawing to oneself **vā** or **anāditaḥ** (tasil through) the beginningless, the preexisting

13.4 (3.63) **vivikta-bodhāt** (abl. known through) discriminative – consciousness **sṛṣṭi-nivṛttiḥ** creation – cessation **pradhānasya** (gen. of) principal **sūdavat** (vati as) cook(s) **pāke** (loc. regarding, with) the cooking (3.64) **itaraḥ** one **itaravat** like the other **tat-doṣāt** (abl. apart from) in those – fault **13.5** (3.65) **dvayoḥ ekatarasya vā** *(see 5.1)* **audāsīnyam** an abiding apart (from) *(see the source word "udāsīna" MW)* **apavargaḥ** completion, coming to a close **13.6** (3.66) **anya-sṛṣṭi-uparāge api** (loc. w/api even though) another – creating – coloring, influence **na** not **virajyate** (from virañj) to be dismissed **prabuddha-rajju-tattvasya** (gen. point of view "to") wake up, become aware of – rope – reality **iva** like, as (it appears) **uragaḥ** snake (3.67) **karma-nimitta-yogāt** (abl. from) karma as instrumental cause – resulting from **ca** indeed, surely **13.7** (3.68) **nairapekṣye api** (ṣyañ of nirapekṣa) (loc. concessive w/api in spite of) disinterestedness **prakṛti-upakāre** (loc. regarding, considering to be) nature – service **avivekaḥ**

without distinguishing **nimittam** cause (3.69) **nartakīvat** (vati like) female dancer **pravṛttisya** (gen. of) activity **api** but really **nivṛttiḥ** cessation **cāritārthyāt** (abl. adverbial) the object being attained **13.8** (3.70) **doṣa-bodhe** (loc. when) fault – knowing, awareness **api** indeed **na** no **upasarpaṇam** approaching softly **pradhānasya** (gen. on the part of) principal **kula-vadhūvat** (vati likeness of) a refined woman **13.9** (3.71) **na ekāntataḥ** not at all **bandha-mokṣau** bondage and/or liberation **puruṣasya** (gen. of) the person **avivekāt** (abl.) non-distinguishing **ṛte** (w/abl.) without, but for

(The opponent:) **13.1 Having one's effort (in life), even that which, like (the flow of) milk** (10.6), **is without conscious intent, does belong to (our) principal (nature). 13.2 That one's effort, servant-like because of the absence of design, is due to one's innate disposition, is known either from seeing what comes from time and the others (the gross elements) in accordance with karma, 13.3 or from the drawing effect of karma, through the preexisting (world).**

(The author:) **13.4 Apart from the fault in those (your proofs** 13.2-3**), the one and the other alike, there is known through discriminative consciousness a <u>cessation</u> of the principal's creation, as (your) cooks** (see 11.10) **(finish) with the cooking, 13.5 (but) alternatively to that (your view in** 5.1**) of the one in relation to the two, such a completion is (rather) an abiding apart from it (the creation)** (see 3.18)**. 13.6 (For example,) a deadly snake (on the road), surely resulting from his karma as the cause, as it appears to one who (then) becomes aware that the reality is (only) a rope; it is not to be dismissed, even though it is just the coloring influence (of imagination) creating that other thing (the snake illusion). 13.7 Without distinguishing, that cause would be in service to nature in spite of her being disinterested, but really there is cessation of her activity, its object being attained, like a dancing girl, 13.8 Indeed when there is awareness of that fault** (see 13.4)**, there is not (even) a soft approach like a refined woman, on the part of (your) principal. 13.9 There is no bondage or liberation of a person at all, but for that non-distinguishing** (13.7)**.**

Effort in accordance with karma is seen in the particularity of one's time, place, and circumstance (see 1.12-14), where one's behavior or work in life is fixed according to that natural law. In the traditional view, seeing one's activity or effort in life, and seeing one's life circumstances as the result of karmic law are two proofs of the handiwork of nature as the divine creative and reactive force. Both are thought to persist through time in a preexisting world, independently of one's

awareness of them, but in the liberating view there is no continuity or persistence.

The opponent has offered two proofs, both already denied by the author in 1.16-17. One is the infinite variety of things in nature's creation (13.2), and the other is the seeming connection of quality of life with an ongoing cyclic system of reward and punishment for right and wrong behavior (13.3). (Those two are the space-related and the time-related, respectively.)

His view of the relationship between the individual and his subtle senses and powers is that the former is proved by the latter. Alternatively, the author's view is that even when the latter are completely stilled, the self is still present (see 3.18). This idea is presented in very much the same way as it is in the Yoga, that upon containment of the ways of thought there is abiding of the self in his own form (see YD 1.2).

There is the story of a man who is filled with fear upon encountering a deadly snake on the road in the twilight, but when he looks closer he realizes that his frightening "reality" of the moment before was actually just a coil of rope lying there. The author's point is that in the liberating view both realities are valid in their time and both inevitably come to an end, so the snake experience with its fear is not to be dismissed as a mistake after the fact. Of course, again and again and again, in the <u>living</u> view of common sense and reason that each and every one of us already knows, it is something else.

Sutras 13.7-9 are a development of the point made in 10.5, that there is cessation and not continuance. The female dancer illustrates the active role of nature. Whether it is like the lively rajasic performance of a servant dancer, or the gentle sattvic movement of a refined person, nature's activity ceases when the awareness of it ceases because awareness is the cause, not nature. In the state of non-distinguishing it is seen to be the other way around, but this view is a state of bondage. Liberation always comes out of the bondage as an awakening, and ultimately neither the liberation nor the bondage even exists but for the tendency to fall asleep to the reality of the self.

प्रकृतेराञ्जस्यात्ससङ्गत्वात्पशुवत्। रूपैः सप्तभिरात्मानं बध्नाति प्राधानं कोशकारवद्विमोच-यत्येकरूपेण। निमित्तत्वमविवेकस्य न दृष्टहानिः। तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नेति नेतीति त्यागाद्विवेक-सिद्धिः। अधिकारिप्रभेदान्न नियमः। बाधितानुवृत्त्या मध्यविवेकतोऽप्युपभोगः। जीवन्मु-

क्तश्च।उपदेश्योपदेष्टृत्वात्तत्सिद्धिः। श्रुतिश्च। इतरथान्धपरम्परा। चक्रभ्रमणवद् धृतशरीरः । संस्कारलेशतस्तत्सिद्धिः। विवेकान्निःशेषदुःखनिवृत्तौ कृतकृत्यता नेतरात् (नेतरात्)।
(The repetition is artificial.)

13.10 (3.72) **prakṛteḥ** (gen. belong to) nature **āñjasyāt** (ṣyañ of añjasa) (abl. adverbial) honestly, straightforwardly, surely **sasaṅgatvāt** (abl. through) attachment **paśuvat** (vati like) domesticated, tethered animal

13.11 (3.73) **rūpaiḥ** (inst. pl.) ways **saptabhiḥ** (inst. in these ways) seven or "often used to express an indefinite plurality" (MW), "many" **ātmānam** himself **badhnāti** binds (reflexive ātmanepada) **pradhānam** principal **kośakāravat** (vati like) "case (cocoon) maker", silkworm **vimocayati** liberates himself **eka-rūpeṇa** one way **13.12** (3.74) **nimitta-tvam** cause – (this) being **avivekasya** (gen. of) non-distinguishing **na** not **dṛṣṭa-hāniḥ** learned knowledge – abandoning, letting go **13.13** (3.75) **tattva-abhyāsāt** principle, truth – discipline of repeated study, constant mindfulness **na iti na iti iti tyāgāt** (abl. through) "no" – "no" – thus – leaving, abandoning, forsaking, letting go **viveka-siddhiḥ** distinguishing – accomplishing, realizing **13.14** (3.76) **adhikāri-prabhedāt** (abl. from the standpoint of) one of authority, governor – subdivision **na** no **niyamaḥ** rule, restriction **13.15** (3.77) **bādhita-anuvṛttyāḥ** (abl. arising from) that which has been excluded – return **madhya-vivekataḥ** (madhya + tasil) "out of the midst" in the midst – distinction **api** even **upabhogaḥ** life experience (3.78) **jīvan-muktaḥ** living – liberated **ca** indeed, thus **13.16** (3.79) **upadeśya-upadeṣṭṛ-tvāt** (abl. through) taught – teacher – being **tat-siddhiḥ** his – achievement (3.80) **śrutiḥ** scripture **ca** in addition to **13.17** (3.81) **itarathā** otherwise **andha-paramparā** blind – tradition (3.82) **cakra-bhramaṇavat** (vati like) wheel – spinning **dhṛta-śarīraḥ** retaining a body, continuing to live, existing (3.83) **saṁskāra-leśataḥ** (tasil brought about through) mind construct – little **tat-siddhiḥ** his – achievement **13.18** (3.84) **vivekāt** (abl. through) distinguishing **niḥśeṣa-duḥkha-nivṛttau** (loc. upon) without remainder, complete – suffering – cessation **kṛta-kṛtya** – **tā** done – to be done – the having **na** not **itarāt** (abl. through) the other way

(The opponent:) **13.10 Surely, that (bondage) must belong to nature, through attachment, like a domesticated animal.**

(The author:) **13.11 (More) like a silkworm, the principal liberates himself in one way, (though) he binds himself in seven (many) ways, 13.12 not letting go of the learned knowledge, this being the cause of his non-distinguishing.**

13.13 It is through letting go, thus: "there is no ...", "there is no ...", that distinguishing is realized, (and) by constant mindfulness of the truth, 13.14 (but) for the subdivision of the governor (mahat), there is no such rule. 13.15 He is (thus) the living liberated one, his life experience arising from the return of what has been excluded (learned knowledge), even in the midst of distinguishing. 13.16 His achievement is through being teacher and taught in addition to scripture. 13.17 Otherwise there is just blind tradition, his achievement brought about through a little mind construct, maintaining a body like spinning the wheel (of karma). 13.18 The having done that which is to be done happens upon the complete cessation of suffering through distinguishing, not through that other way.

Unlike a donkey or a cow, the silkworm is bound by cords of his own making, and upon the realization of his true form he comes out of his bondage, not by atonement and redemption but simply by abandoning his confinement. For the inward-looking phase only, there is abandoning by affirmation of the liberating view and negation of the obstacles to liberation inherent in the living view, negations such as: "There are no other souls, no liberation or ignorance in other people. There is no origination of the world from gross elements. There is no permanence of creation. There is no preexisting world or a real past that is independent of my awareness." This is the kind of re-examination and letting go of learned beliefs that is required for the sake of liberation. The other thing, affirmation or mindfulness of the new truth, is not mere memorization and recitation of truisms, but a constant immediate attendance to one's own awareness and superintendence in the present moment, and to the flow of creation from within, through the channels of the serial elements.

The statement of exemption for the lower self, expressed in sutra 13.14, teaches an important point and serves as a caution. The whole subject of establishing the state of distinguishing is for the higher self, the intellect, the seeker of truth, examining consciousness rather than the physical world. On the other hand, the subdivision of mahat, which is the gross personal identity and the body that functions in day to day life, continues to live according to the objective worldly view. It would be absurd and untrue to go about living your daily life in the physical world claiming that it is dissolved when you look away or that memory creates the past, or that other people don't have souls. Pondering and reflecting, even with the aid of a book (whether reading or writing), is a solitary practice, but once we start saying things, we are bound by the rules of ordinary life. Out of the

two-fold purpose of life, spiritual realization on the one side and the experience of life on the other, the teaching of the liberating view applies to the former only. This is the domain of the great mahat alone, making the intellectual connection (yoga) with his manifest creation. Still, though the spiritual and the material views are opposite, they are not mutually exclusive, because when there is the development of comprehension of that inner aspect of truth that is not the taught and learned truth, the two opposites are found to complete one another.

Since, according to the teaching on the liberating view, the yogin is to disregard the notion of the existence of any other souls, the relationship of student and teacher between him and some other person should only be considered as a "representation" of the inner experience. The grasping of essential points and the development of subtle knowledge is primary, whereas hearing or reading words is secondary. The principle stated in sutra 13.16 is not just the blind propagation of learned words and the accumulation of superficial intellectual understanding within the traditional institution of teacher and student. The true teacher is the yogin's ability to examine his own consciousness and to establish subtle cognition of his own intellect and its counterpart, pure awareness, the silent substrate that is puruṣa. According to this teaching, puruṣa is the yogin alone. It is not one of many puruṣas, because being one of many is the role assumed by his personal identity. Neither is puruṣa a great universal spirit of which he is only a part. According to this teaching, puruṣa, the "human being", is wholly and only the yogin, the reader.

Without the realization of the true nature of this teaching and of scripture, one is reduced to memorizing and repeating learned knowledge as mere information, drawing on his recollection from a great inner repository of names, relationships of cause and effect, similarities and differences, classifications, and so on. The bright intellectual self can argue energetically and endlessly on either side of any point of superficial knowledge if there is the desire to win and the kind of mind that fairly whirls with things to say and points to prove, but true learning and true teaching can be found only in the eye of that tempest of words, and in that place it can be realized that the teaching and the learning are really the same thing.

Accumulation of facts, a habit of quick inference, and skill in verbal articulation are qualities of externally directed intelligence only, but for the person who believes that he or she is more than just the external thing, and who feels compelled to find a deeper personal truth, a different path appears, which is a different kind of inquiry, and an essential part of the answer to that inquiry is found through the internal dynamic of study, as teacher and student.

As for the teacher, when liberation is established there is no other person, no master outside the yogin who can teach him. One may see the body and hear the voice of some teacher figure, or read the characters in ink on the paper in a book, but these are secondary realities. The message and the knowledge, which is the primary reality, is created in that moment by the intellect, and in the liberating view it is not assigned or credited to any other person as its source. According to an ancient proverb, "knowledge in books stays in the books."

Chapter Fourteen

The Stories

राजपुत्रवत्तत्त्वोपदेशात्। पिशाचवदन्यार्थोपदेशोऽपि। आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्। पितापुत्रवदुभयोर्दृष्टत्वात्। श्येनवत्सुखदुःखी त्यागवियोगाभ्याम्। अहिनिर्ल्वयनीवत्। छिन्नहस्तवद्वा। असाधनानुचिन्तनं बन्धाय भरतवत्। बहुभिर्योगे विरोधो रागादिभिः कुमारीशङ्खवत्। द्वाभ्यामपि तथैव। निराशः सुखी पिङ्गलावत्। अनारम्भेऽपि परगृहे सुखी सर्पवत्।बहुशास्त्रगुरूपासनेऽपि सारादानं षट्पदवत्। इषुकारवन्नैकचित्तस्य समाधिहानिः। कृतनियमलङ्घनादानर्थक्यं लोकवत्। तद्विस्मरणेऽपि भेकीवत् नोपदेशश्रवणेऽपि कृतकृत्यता परामर्शादृते विरोचनवत् दृष्टस्तयोरिन्द्रस्य ।

14.1 (4.1) **rāja-putravat** (vati like) king – son *(not "king's son" or "kings for sons (Veda Vyasa)")* **tattva-upadeśāt** (abl. from) truth – teaching (4.2) **piśācavat** (vati like) primitives **anya-artha-upadeśaḥ** other – purpose(s) – teaching **api** even

14.2 (4.3) **āvṛttiḥ** reversion, returning **asakṛt-upadeśāt** (abl. from) repeatedly – teaching (4.4) **pitā-putravat** (vati like) father – son **ubhayoḥ** (loc. in) both **dṛṣṭatvāt** (abl. because) being learned **14.3** (4.5) **śyenavat** (vati like) osprey (referring to "kurara" in MB 178) **sukha-duḥkhī** having pleasure or pain **tyāga-viyogābhyām** (abl. from) abandoning – separation (4.6) **ahi-nirvlayanīvat** the shed skin of a snake (4.7) **chinna-hastavat** like cut-off hands **vā** or **14.4** (4.8) **asādhana-anucintanam** unconducive to the goal – attitude **bandhāya** (dative tending to) bonding **bharatavat** like Bharata **14.5** (4.9) **bahubhiḥ** (inst. pl. with) many **yoge** (loc. in) association **virodhaḥ** hostility, clashing **rāga-ādibhiḥ** (inst. pl. through) passion, desire – etc. **kumārī-śaṅkha-vat** girl – shells – like (4.10) **dvābhyām** (inst. by) two **api** even **tathā** in that way **eva** just so (4.11) **nirāśaḥ**

(nir-āśa) without any hope or wish or desire **sukhī** happy **piṅgalāvat** like Piṅgalā **14.6** (4.12) **anārambhe** (loc. in the case of) without any undertaking **api** even **para-gṛhe** (loc. in) another – house **sukhī** (n. s. of sukhin) happy **sarpavat** like a snake **14.7** (4.13) **bahu-śāstra-guru-upāsane api** (loc. w/api even) many – lessons – master – attending **sārādānam** (sāra-ādāna) taking the essence **ṣaṭpadavat** like a bee *(This could be a subtle reference to Vaisheshika)* (4.14) **iṣu-karavat** (vati like) arrow – maker **na** not **eka-cittasya** (gen. point of view; for) single-minded (resolute) **samādhi-hāniḥ** focus – abandoning **14.8** (4.15) **kṛta-niyama-laṅghanāt** established – rules, laws, ways – disregarding, transgression **ānarthakyam** uselessness, pointlessness **lokavat** (vati like) world (4.16) **tat-vismaraṇe api** (loc. w/api even if) (of) them – forgetting **bhekīvat** (vati like) female frog **14.9** (4.17) **na** not **upadeśa-śravaṇe** (loc. upon) teaching – hearing **api** even, just **kṛta-kṛtyatā** (tā f. abstract) accomplished – task **parāmarśāt-ṛte** (abl. w/ṛte without) grasping (the point) **virocanavat** like Virocana the asura (4.18) **dṛṣṭaḥ** seen **tayoḥ** (loc. dual; between) those two **indrasya** (gen.) by Indra

(The opponent:) **14.1 That comes from the teaching of truth, like the king and the son; even teaching for other (moral) purposes, like that of the Piśāca.**

(The author:) **14.2 Like father to son, because of its being learned knowledge in both cases, what comes from such repeated teaching is the return (to suffering). 14.3 Like the osprey, having pleasure vs. displeasure from abandoning vs. separation (respectively), like a snake shedding its skin or like severed hands. 14.4 Like Bharata, an attitude toward bonding (to another) is unconducive of the goal; 14.5 (bonding) with many, there is clashing in the association, through desire, etc. like the girl's shells, (but) even with two it is just the same, like Piṅgalā, happy without any such desire, 14.6 even without any undertaking, happy in the house of another, like a snake. 14.7 For the single-minded, even with attendance at many lessons there is taking of the essence, like the bee, (or) like the arrow maker, not abandoning his contemplation; 14.8 (but) even if you forget them, like (in the story of) the frog princess, there is no point in disregarding established ways as in the world. 14.9 So it is not just on hearing the teaching, like Virocana, that what is to be done is done, not without grasping that (essential point) which is seen by Indra, between the two (Virocana and Indra).**

The opponent disagrees with the author's last statement in sutra 13.16. He says that living liberation is not through being teacher and taught in one person, but rather in two persons. In the example from scripture, the king is Pravāhaṇa and the

son involved is not his own, but rather Śvetaketu, the son of the sage Gautama (see Chandogya Upanishad V, 3, 1). The words spoken by that kshatrya to the brahmin Gautama, rather more religious than enlightening, are the lesson of the five agnis. The other reference, the stories and parables of the primitive tribes of ancient India referred to by the opponent as the Piśāca, have been translated into Sanskrit as "Kathā Sarit Sāgara", and subsequently into English in the last century.

Parents give their children repeated instruction in the ways of life, but this kind of instruction has nothing to do with liberation, and rightly so; but in adulthood, with the perpetuation of traditional knowledge without distinguishing, suffering continues to dominate. In sutras 14.3-7, the author recites the six lessons of the ascetic rishi Bodhya (Mahābhārata XII, 178 Ganguli (171 Tokunaga/Smith)), embellished with references to other traditional stories. Like the lesson of Virocana and Indra from Chandogya Upanishad VIII, 8, they illustrate the difference between superficial and essential understanding. The stories teach three themes that correspond to the threefold suffering mentioned in 1.1, all from the ascetic's point of view. The first represents physical pleasure versus physical pain; the second, social pleasure versus social pain; and the third, the loss of self-focus.

Sutra 14.3 is about physical pleasure and pain, like gulls either waiting or fighting for scraps of food, or like one losing a body part either painlessly or painfully. The ascetic renounces indulgence in physical pleasure and pain. Sutras 14.4-6 are about company, like King Bharata who becomes so attached to his beloved pet deer that he neglects the duties of life; or like the girl hoping to remain undiscovered as she provides food for company, taking off her shell bracelets to avoid the rattling noise; or like Piṅgalā who finally gives up the hope that her lover will come, renouncing the pain along with the hope; or like the solitary snake who avoids building a house of his own. Guests, lovers and households represent social pleasure and pain, and the ascetic is happy to have none. Sutra 14.7 is about maintaining clarity or focus by not succumbing to the scattering of thoughts. Grasping the essence of lessons requires such focus, like a bee who heads straight for the essential part of the flower, not distracted by other things, or like an arrow maker who remains attentive to the task before his eyes, not distracted by the passing by of a king and his entourage. In sutra 12.8 the author concludes by dismissing asceticism as a means of achieving liberation. Worldly life will suffice, even if one fails to observe all the rules and karmas; and one's cherished life will not revert to a lower form, as the Prince's lovely wife reverted to being a frog when he forgot the rule he had promised, not to show her water.

प्रणतिब्रह्मचर्योपसर्पणानि कृत्वा सिद्धिर्बहुकालात्तद्वत्। न कालनियमो वामदेववत्। अध्यस्तरूपोपासनात्पारम्पर्येण यज्ञोपासकानामिव। इतरलाभेऽप्यावृत्तिः पञ्चाग्नियोगतो जन्मश्रुतेः। विरक्तस्य हेयहानमुपादेयोपादानं हंसक्षीरवत्। लब्धातिशययोगाद्वा तद्वत्। न कामचारित्वं रागोपहते शुकवत्। गुणयोगाद्बद्धः शुकवत्। न भोगाद्रागशान्तिर्मुनिवत्। दोषदर्शनादुभयोः। न मलिनचेतस्युपदेशबीजप्ररोहोऽजवत्। नाभासमात्रमपि मलिन-दर्पणवत् न तज्जस्यापि तद्रूपता पङ्कजवत्। न भूतियोगेऽपि कृतकृत्यतोपास्यसिद्धिवत् (उपास्यसिधिवत्)। (The repetition is artificial.)

14.10 (4.19) **praṇati-brahmacarya-upasarpaṇāni** acts of reverence – student life – service to the master **kṛtvā** (ind.) having done **siddhiḥ** accomplishment **bahu-kālāt** (adv.) for a long time **tadvat** like that, like him

14.11 (4.20) **na** no **kāla-niyamaḥ** time – rule **vāmadevavat** (vati like) Vāmadeva **14.12** (4.21) **adhyasta-rūpa-upāsanāt** (abl. from) placed over, superimposed – form – worship **pāramparyeṇa** (inst. by) degrees **yajña-upāsakānām** (gen. on the part of) rite – worshippers **iva** as if (4.22) **itara-lābhe** (loc. upon) other – obtaining, attaining, finding **api** even **āvṛttiḥ** returning **pañca-agni-yogataḥ** (tasil) five – fires – according to **janma-śruteḥ** (abl. from) birth (janman), origin – scripture **14.13** (4.23) **viraktasya** (gen. point of view; to) one free from passion **heya-hānam** to be left – leaving **upādeya-upādānam** to be taken – taking **haṁsa-kṣīravat** (vati like) swan – milk (4.24) **labdha-atiśaya-yogāt** having acquired – superiority – from **vā** or **tadvat** (vati like) him (Indra) **14.14** (4.25) **na** no **kāma-cāritvam** (according to) desire – acting, behavingness; hedonism *(a kāmacārin is one behaving according to desire, or a hedonist, as opposed to a brahmacārin)* **rāga-upahate** (loc. when) stricken with passion **śukavat** (vati like) Śuka, son of Vyasa (4.26) **guṇayogāt** by cords/prakṛti **baddhaḥ** bound **śukavat** (vati like) parrot **14.15** (4.27) **na** no **bhogāt** (abl. from) experience **rāga-śāntiḥ** passion – pacification **munivat** (vati like) the monk (4.28) **doṣa-darśanāt** (abl. from) degradation – seeing **ubhayoḥ** (loc. in) both **14.16** (4.29) **na** not **malina-cetasi** (loc. of cetas) muddy – mind **upadeśa-bīja-prarohaḥ** teaching – seed – germinating **ajavat** (vati like) Aja (4.30) **na** not **ābhāsa-mātram** semblance – mere **api** even **malina-darpaṇavat** (vati like) muddy – mirror **14.17** (4.31) **na** not **tat-jasya** (gen. being of) that – born **api** in fact **tat-rūpatā** it – (ifc) formed of **pañkajavat** (vati like) lotus **14.18** (4.32) **na** not **bhūti-yoge** (loc. in the

case of) prosperity – association **api** even **kṛta-kṛtyatā** have done – to be done **upāsya-siddhivat** (vati like) to be revered – accomplishments **upāsya-siddhivat**

(The opponent:) **14.10 Like him (Indra), there is accomplishment having done reverence, study, and service for a long time** (101 years in Indra's case)**.**

(The author:) **14.11 Like Vāmadeva, there is <u>no</u> rule as to time, 14.12 as if it were by degrees through worship of the superimposed forms (the gods), on the part of worshippers at the religious rite, returning even upon attaining the other (worlds), according to the five agnis from the scripture on origins.** (Chandogya Up. V 4-8.) **14.13 To one who is free from passion, there is leaving what is to be left (and) taking what is to be taken, like the swan with milk; or like him (Indra), from having acquired <u>that</u> superiority (in understanding,** as opposed to 5.5)**. 14.14 No hedonism when stricken with passion, like Śuka, bound by cords, like a parrot**. **14.15 No pacification of passion through life experience, like the monk, because it comes from seeing the degradation in both (passion and experience). 14.16 There is no germination of the seed of teaching in a muddy mind, like (King) Aja; not even a mere semblance, like a muddy mirror. 14.17 In fact, like the lotus, being of what is <u>born</u> in that (mud, (that seed)), it (the teaching) does not consist of that (mud). 14.18 The having done what is to be done is not like the accomplishments of those who are to be revered** (the learned 14.1-2)**, even in the case of one associated with prosperity** (the King 14.1)**.**

Like the last section, these three scriptural references correspond to the threefold suffering mentioned in 1.1. Sutra 14.14 is about addiction to pleasure. "The man without attachments, no longer cherishing any desire for earning wealth, can sleep happily. Ho, it was well said by Śuka while going to the great forest from his father's abode, renouncing everything!" (Mahābhārata XII, 177 Ganguli). He uses a pun here. The name Śuka means parrot, and parrots were captured with nets made of cords. The word for a cord or strand is guṇa, which of course also refers to the three guṇas of nature. Sutra 14.15 is about family. According to Vijñana Bhikṣu, the monk could be Saubhari, who abandoned his solitude out of desire for the joys of a householder, only later to realize the futility of his perpetual desire for wealth and family (Viṣṇu Purāna IV, 2, 47). Sutra 14.16 is about shock. In the muddy state of grief, like King Aja after the death of his beloved wife, there is a loss of self-focus and a diminished ability for distinguishing (Śvetāśvatara Upanishad IV, 5). A mirror is supposed to show a clear reflection but a muddy one doesn't even do that.

The three examples above illustrate a range of distractions from hedonism to family life and even grief, but in the end the author dismisses the renunciation of a normal life that would inevitably hold such distractions, as a means of achieving liberation, whether it is the rajas of passion or the tamas of grief. Grasping the essential meaning of one's own awareness is the means, and the goal is simply the absence of suffering, not necessarily renunciation or prosperity. In this chapter the author seems to be saying, "You see, I can tell scriptural lessons as well as anyone, but the important thing is the essential understanding, not the telling. (For Vāmadeva, "liberated while yet in the (figurative) womb", see Aitareya Upanishad IV "and this has been declared by a Rishi", also Rig Veda IV, 27, 1.)

He concludes this chapter by referring back to its beginning and by transforming the mud and seed metaphor of 14.16 into an illustration of the difference between essential understanding and learned knowledge. In the turbid waters of word knowledge and the muddy depths of memorization and recitation without distinguishing, there is no essential understanding, but when one rises up into the light of distinguishing, the lotus of realization unfolds. The words are indeed born in the mud (see VD 2.10-18), but their essence can be seen as the flower. Now, this is not to say that recitation and chanting, or reading, studying, teaching, etc., have no value. They can certainly have a great value, but not without distinguishing.

Chapter Fifteen

Prayer

मङ्गलाचरणं शिष्टाचारात्फलदर्शनाच्छ्रुतितश्चेति। नेश्वराधिष्ठिते फलनिष्पत्तिः कर्मणा तत्सिद्धेः। स्वोपकारादधिष्ठानं लोकवत्। लौकिकेश्वरवदितरथा। पारिभाषिको वा। न रागादृते तत्सिद्धिः प्रतिनियतकारणत्वात्। तद्योगेऽपि न नित्यमुक्तः। प्रधानशक्तियो-गाच्चेत्सङ्गापत्तिः। सत्तामात्राच्चेत्सर्वैश्वर्यम्। प्रमाणाभावान्न तत्सिद्धिः। सम्बन्धाभावा-न्नानुमानम्॥ (restored text) पुत्रकर्मवदिति चेत्। नास्ति हि तत्र स्थिर एकात्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संस्क्रियते ।

15.1 (5.1) **maṅgala-ācaraṇam** prayer or rite for happiness or good luck – performance, usage **śiṣṭa-ācārāt** (abl. because) cultured, learned, educated – traditional, customary usage **phala-darśanāt** (abl. because) fruit(s), result(s) – seeing **śrutitaḥ** (tasil because) scripture **ca** and **iti** thus **15.2** (5.2) **na** not **īśvara-adhiṣṭhite** (loc. if) supreme governor – presided over, governed, superintended **phala-niṣpattiḥ** fruit, result – fruition **karmaṇā** (inst. through) karman **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. because) it – accomplishing

15.3 (5.3) **sva-upakārāt** (abl. from) self – benefit, service **adhiṣṭhānam** governance **lokavat** as the world (5.4) **laukika-īśvaravat** (vati like, in the sense of) worldly – lord **itarathā** (with vā) rather than (5.5) **pāribhāṣikaḥ** conventional meaning **vā** alternatively **15.4** (5.6) **na** not **rāgāt-ṛte** without desire (for it) **tat-siddhiḥ** it – accomplishing **prati-niyata-kāraṇa-tvāt** (abl. arising from) counter-checked, overruled – cause – state **15.5** (5.7) **tat-yoge** (loc. in) that connection **api** however **na** not **nitya-muktaḥ** eternal – free **15.6** (5.8) **pradhāna-śakti-yogāt** (abl. for) principal – powers – in connection with **cet** if … then **saṅga-āpattiḥ** sticking, clinging contact, attachment – happening, occurring **15.7** (5.9) **sattā-mātrāt** being that – simply **cet** if **sarva-īśvaryam** (over) all, everyone – being supreme ruler (5.10) **pramāṇa-abhāvāt** (abl. because) proof – absence **na** no **tat-siddhiḥ** it – establishing **15.8** (5.11) **sambandha-abhāvāt** (abl. because) connection *(same as pratibandha 5.1)* – absence **na** not **anumānam** inference **15.9** (1.32) (*These six sutras clearly belong here and not where they are found in manuscripts, because of the theme of prayer, the "if ... then" format of 15.9, which matches 15.6 and 15.7, and the proximity of the Buddhist doctrines of momentariness (15.10) and emptiness (16.1). Restoring them to their proper place also corrects both of the anomalies in the numeric structure.)* **putrakarmavat** like the ceremony for a son **iti** (quotes) **cet** if … then (1.33) **na** not **asti** it is **hi** because **tatra** in that place **sthiraḥ** steady, constant, persevering **eka-ātmā** one, same – individual **yaḥ** the one who **garbhadhādinā** (inst. by) impregnation ceremony – etc. **saṁskriyate** to be blessed

(The opponent:) **15.1 Because it is the custom of the learned, because of seeing results, and because of scripture, <u>thus</u> is the performance of prayer. 15.2 There is no fruition of result if governed by (your) supreme one (mahat), because it is accomplished through karma.**

(The author:) **15.3 Alternatively to the conventional meaning, which is like a <u>worldly</u> supreme governor (īśvara), governance comes rather from a self-benefit appearing as the world, 15.4 arising from the state where the cause (of**

bondage) is counter-checked, which is not accomplished without the desire for it. 15.5 It is not, however, the eternal free one in the connection with that (desire). 15.6 If you think it (governance) comes from a connection with the <u>powers</u> of a principal; well, then there would be the occurrence of attachment. 15.7 If you think it comes from simply <u>being</u> that, being the supreme lord (īśvara) of all; well, there is no establishing of that because of the absence of proof (pramāṇa). 15.8 There is not (even) inference (as proof of that), because of the absence of a connection. 15.9 If you think that (connection, (or seeing results 15.1)) **is like the "ceremony for a son", it is not, because the one who perseveres in that place (of sacrifice), by the impregnation rite or whatever, is the very same individual who is to be blessed by it.**

Having examined the value of what is learned (see 1.2), we now turn to what is done (see 1.3), worship and prayer. The opponent begins by defending the idea that karma and the fruition of its result comes from following the customs and scriptural injunctions as to prayers and proper actions.

Just as there is the desire for material things, even undertaking a course toward liberation from bondage and suffering is inspired by the desire for it on the part of the individual personal self, but we are reminded by the familiar exemption stated in sutra 15.5 that puruṣa has no connection to governance and no desire for liberation. For the individual, there is the desire for eliminating the suffering in bondage, but not for reasons of acquisition of special abilities or for glory or power over others, even in knowledge or prestige (see also YD 1.11). If that were the case the ultimate purpose of puruṣa (see 1.1) would be bondage itself through attachment; but, as sutra 15.5 points out once again, there is no such attachment for the free one. There <u>is</u> proof by direct comprehension of governorship in the one self, but the existence of an external God is not proved by perception or by inference. Even the benefit from Vedic rites and prayers would not be from or for anyone other than the performer himself, because there simply is no other.

स्थिरकार्यासिद्धेः क्षणिकत्वम्। न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात्। श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च दृष्टान्तासिद्धेश्च॥ श्रुतिरपि प्रधानकार्यत्वस्य। नाविद्याशक्तियोगो निःसङ्गस्य। तद्योगे तत्सिद्धावन्योन्याश्रयत्वम्। न बीजाङ्कुरवत्सादिसंसारश्रुतेः। विद्यातोऽन्यत्वे ब्रह्मबाधप्रसङ्गः। अबाधे नैरफल्यम्। विद्याबाध्यत्वे जगतोऽप्येवम्। तद्रूपत्वे सादित्वम्।

15.10 (1.34) **sthira-kārya-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) persevering – result – not accomplished **kṣaṇikatvam** momentariness (1.35) **na** not **pratyabhijñā-bādhāt** (abl. to be inferred just because) direct recognition – excluded **15.11** (1.36) **śruti-nyāya-vira-ūdhāt** (abl. known from) scripture – reasoning – men – conclusions **ca** and **15.12** (1.37) **dṛṣṭānta-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) example – not (necessarily) established **ca** indeed **15.13** (5.12) **śrutiḥ** scripture **api** even **pradhāna-kāryatvasya** (gen. of) principal – product – being **15.14** (5.13) **na** no **avidyā-śakti-yogaḥ** (in the) lack of higher knowledge – power – connection **niḥsaṅgasya** (gen. for) without attachment, indifferent **15.15** (5.14) **tat-yoge** (loc. if) that – connection **tat-siddhau** (loc. if) that – establishing **anyonyāśrayatvam** state of mutual dependence **15.16** (5.15) **na** not **bīja-aṅkuravat** (vati like) seed – sprout **sādi-samsāra-śruteḥ** (abl. to be understood from) having a beginning (as opposed to anādi) – the course of life, the world – scripture **15.17** (5.16) **vidyātas** (tasil as a result) higher knowledge **anya-tve** (loc. if) otherwise **brahma-bādha-prasaṅgaḥ** Brahman – excluded – occurrence, it would happen (5.17) **abādhe** (loc. when) not excluded **naiṣphalyam** there being no fruition

15.18 (5.18) **vidyā-bādhya-tve** (loc. in) higher knowledge – excluded by – being **jagataḥ** (gen. of) living world **api evam** *(see also 8.3, 16.7)* exactly so (5.19) **tat-rūpa-tve** (loc. in) that – being the form **sāditvam** state of beginning

(The opponent:) **15.10 That there is momentariness, because a result is not accomplished by one who perseveres, is not to be inferred just because direct recognition of it (the relation between the perseverance and the result) is excluded. 15.11 It is known from the conclusions of men of scripture and reasoning (higher knowledge); 15.12 because indeed it doesn't have to be established by an example. 15.13 There is even scripture on its (a result's) being a <u>product</u> of the principal (nature). 15.14 For that indifferent one (nature) there is no connection between the power (of governance) and a lack of such higher knowledge (avidyā). 15.15 If there were a connection with that (lack of higher knowledge, ignorance) in establishing that (power), there would be a state of mutual dependence. 15.16 That it is like seed and sprout is not to be understood from scripture on the world having a beginning. 15.17 If it were the other way, it would happen that <u>Brahman</u> would be excluded (bādha) by higher knowledge, there being no fruition when he is not excluded.**

(The author:) **15.18 The state of beginning is in the very form of that (exclusion), that of the living world that is exactly so, in his being excluded by the knowledge.**

The principle of momentariness is consistent with the teaching of the Darshanas in that the dimension of time is seen to be a mere present moment construct of memory or anticipation. The opponent argues that a relationship of cause and effect between a Vedic rite and the result is known by the testimony of scripture and by inference from the examples seen in the range of quality in the lives of others, whereas a knowledge limited to direct self-recognition would exclude that relationship. He cleverly says in 15.15 that if there were a claim to power in the ignorance of rejecting the external authority of scripture and that of the hierarchy of spiritual and intellectual leadership, then there would be ignorance in that claim to power. The author replies that life's very beginning is in the state of exclusion of Brahman, the state of losing to some extent the awareness of one's pure self as Brahman, being captured to some extent by knowing the facts and explanations of worldly experience and action, affirming that they "really" exist. Otherwise there would be no life and no world, and that is impossible.

Chapter Sixteen

Dharma and Happiness

॥ (restored text) तद्भावे तद्भावाच्छून्यं तर्हि। शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्य। अपवाद्मात्रमबुद्धानम्। उभयपक्षसमानक्षमत्वाद्यमपि। अपुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा॥ न धर्मापलापः प्रकृतिकार्यवैचित्र्यात्। श्रुतिलिङ्गादिभिस्तत्सिद्धिः। न नियमः प्रमाणान्तरावकाशात्। उभयत्राभ्येवम्। अर्थात्सिद्धिश्चेत्समानमुभयोः अन्तःकरणधर्मत्वं धर्मादीनाम्। गुणादीनां च नात्यन्तबाधः

16.1 (1.43) **tat-abhāve** (loc. upon) that – non-existence **tat-abhāvāt** (abl. from) that – non-existence **śūnyam** emptiness **tarhi** then, in that case **16.2** (1.44) **śūnyam** emptiness **tattvam** reality **bhāvaḥ** existence **vinaśyati** it passes away **vastu-dharmatvāt** (abl. because) real – being the nature of **vināśasya** (gen. of) passing away **16.3** (1.45) **apavāda-mātram** nay-saying – mere, nothing more than **abuddhānam** thoughtless **16.4** (1.46) **ubhaya-pakṣa-samāna-kṣematvāt** (abl. adv.) both – view of one side or the other – same – being or resting assured **ayam** this **api** in fact **16.5** (1.47) **a-puruṣa-arthatvam** not – human – purpose **ubhayathā** either way **16.6** (5.20) **na** no **dharma-apalāpaḥ** duty – denying **prakṛti-kārya-vaicitryāt** nature – effect(s) – manifoldness (5.21) **śruti-liṅga-ādibhiḥ** (inst. pl.) scripture – indicators – etc. **tat-siddhiḥ** it – establishing

16.7 (5.22) **na** not (such) **niyamaḥ** defined **pramāṇa-antara-avakāśāt** (abl. by) means of proof – other – admitting (5.23) **ubhayatra** either way **api evam** exactly so **16.8** (5.24) **arthāt** (abl. because) purpose **siddhiḥ** establishing **cet** if thought to be **samānam** same **ubhayoḥ** (loc. in) both **16.9** (5.25) **antaḥ-karaṇa-dharmatvam** inner – creator – role – being **dharma-ādīnām** (gen. belonging to) duty – etc. (5.26) **guṇa-ādīnām** (gen. belonging to) qualities – beginning with **ca-na** and not **atyanta-bādhaḥ** ultimately – excluded

(The opponent:) **16.1 From the non-existence of that (life) upon the non-existence of that (exclusion), there would be emptiness in that case. 16.2 That reality is emptiness, that its existence passes away because of passing away being the nature of what is real, 16.3 is nothing more than thoughtless nay-saying, 16.4 <u>this</u> (speaker** (the opponent)**), in fact, being comfortable (in saying) that the two views ("emptiness" and the "separate principle") are the same; 16.5 (but) either way, that is not the purpose of a human being. 16.6 There is no denying that it (the purpose of a human being) is <u>dharma</u>, because there is the manifoldness of the effects of <u>nature</u>, the proof of it through scripture, indicators, etc.**

(The author:) **16.7 Either way, that (dharma) is not defined exactly so by admitting those other means of proof. 16.8 It <u>is</u> the same in both, even if you think it is established because it is the purpose, 16.9 (but) that (purpose) belongs to all that begins with dharma and not to all that begins with the guṇas; that he is ultimately <u>excluded</u> being the dharma of the inner creator.**

The principles of momentariness and emptiness are associated with Buddhism and the opponent takes a subtle poke at that school with the word "abuddhānam". In his view, the author has denied the role of dharma as the causal force behind one's life circumstances. To him dharma is the pre-established fixed law of the universe, the way things "really" are whether one knows it or not. It is the unwritten law that dictates how a person must live his life and what work, customs, and prayers he must perform in order to advance to the ultimate end, all learned through the tradition of the educated and through scripture; but in the author's view, one's dharma is not defined by those criteria because the ultimate dharma of rising to the supreme good is accomplished in another way. Even so, in liberation a person still has his field of interest and his responsibility in life, regardless of whether or not he believes it to be determined by a pre-established universal order. One chooses his ultimate responsibility, but he does not escape from responsibility.

"Beginning with dharma" refers to the opponent's own definition of dharma as a product of intellect as stated in 9.2 ("dharma-ādi"). The perpetual state of exclusion of Brahman is not the burden of the totality of nature, but just that of the products of intellect. Dharma-ādi is a sub-group of guṇa-ādi (the whole of prakṛti), excluding only mahat in his state of self-awareness, who is exempt. The opponent's objection to a completely empty state is pointless because the author is not asserting such an impossible thing in the first place. Emptiness (śūnya) here means total freedom from distraction, not the utter annihilation of self-awareness.

Next the author examines the implication that when there is cessation of affliction, there is happiness as the underlying foundational state.

पञ्चावयवयोगात्सुखसंवित्तिः। न सकृद् ग्रहणात्सम्बन्धसिद्धिः। नियतधर्मसाहित्यमुभयो-
रेकतरस्य वा व्याप्तिः। न तत्त्वान्तरं वस्तुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः। निजशक्त्युद्भवमित्याचार्याः।
आधेयशक्तियोग इति पञ्चशिखः। न स्वरूपशक्तिर्नियमः पुनर्वादप्रसक्तेः। विशेषणान-
र्थक्यप्रसक्तेः। पल्लवादिष्वनुपपत्तेश्च। आधेयशक्तिसिद्धौ निजशक्तियोगः समानन्यायात्।

16.10 (5.27) **pañcāvayava-yogāt** (abl. known through) five-membered – connection **sukha-saṁvittiḥ** happiness – sense, feeling, knowledge **16.11** (5.28) **na** not **sakṛt-grahaṇāt** (abl. from) done together, at once, simultaneous, immediate – comprehension **sambandha-siddhiḥ** binding or joining together, inherent relation – establishing **16.12** (5.29) **niyata-dharma-sāhityam** rule – dharma *(this connection is karmadhāraya)* – intimately connected, associated **ubhayoḥ** (loc. in relation to) the two **ekatarasya** (gen. of) one **vā** alternatively **vyāptiḥ** pervading **16.13** (5.30) **na** not **tattva-antaram** principle – separate **vastu-kalpanā-prasakteḥ** (abl. known through) reality – imagining – indulging in **16.14** (5.31) **nija-śakti-udbhavam** inborn – power – emergence, rising up, generation, manifestation **iti** according to **ācāryāḥ** teachers

16.15 (5.32) **ādheya-śakti-yogaḥ** (to be) contained, attributed – power, ability – connection, association **iti** so says, according to **pañcaśikhaḥ** **16.16** (5.33) **na** not **svarūpa-śaktiḥ** own nature – power **niyamaḥ** rule **punar-vāda-prasakteḥ** (abl. because) tautology – occurrence (5.34) **viśeṣaṇa-ānarthakya-prasakteḥ** (abl. arising from) distinction specifying – meaninglessness – occurrence **16.17** (5.35) **pallava-ādiṣu** (loc. plural; in regard to, with) shoot, sprout – etc. **anupapatteḥ** (abl. because) inconsistent **ca** and **16.18** (5.36) **ādheya-śakti-siddhau** (loc. upon) contained, attributed – power – establishing **nija-śakti-yogaḥ**

inborn – power – association **samāna-nyāyāt** (abl. from) same – argument

(The opponent:) **16.10 A sense of happiness (through dharma/karma) is known through the five-membered (syllogism). 16.11 There is no establishing any such relation from an immediate comprehension. 16.12 Alternatively to that (your view** (in 3.18 and 13.5)) **of the one in relation to the two, it (happiness) pervades in association with the rule of dharma. 16.13 A separate principle is not known (just) through indulgence in imagining such a reality. 16.14 According to (us) teachers it is a manifestation of an inborn power.**

(The author:) **16.15 According to Pañcaśikha it is connection with a contained power. 16.16 The power (of happiness) being in one's (born) nature is not the rule because** *1.)* **of the occurrence of tautology arising from the occurrence of meaninglessness of the distinction, 16.17 and because** *2.)* **it is inconsistent with things beginning with the sprout. 16.18 Upon establishing it as a contained power, (however,) association with inborn power could follow from that same argument.**

Sukha means happiness or pleasure but in the sense of peace or contentment associated with the influence of sattva, and not feelings like giddiness or rapture or physical pleasures, which are all passions associated with the influence of rajas. In the opponent's view, happiness and suffering are bound to the rule of duty in choosing right from wrong actions, guided either by traditional rules learned through the testimony of the wise, or by inference, remembering past connections between karmas and their perceived results and thereby anticipating similar connections in the future. He appeals again to formal proof, even to establish the relation of karma and dharma to happiness. (This relates strongly to Vaisheshika 6.10-18). His demonstration of proof by the five-membered syllogism (found in Nyaya schools), which corresponds somewhat with the threefold pramāṇa, might have gone something like this:

1.) He must have good karma; *2.)* because he seems happy (perception).

3.) Whoever is happy has good karma; *4.)* and he seems happy (inference).

5.) I therefore declare that he has good karma (testimony).

Sutra 16.16 refers to his view of happiness as the quality of an instance of a good feeling in connection with a particular circumstance. In this view a person is born with a certain preestablished degree of happiness in his nature that has been acquired through right action (karma) in previous incarnations. Here the general

level of suffering or happiness in people's lives is associated with the quality of their life circumstances ranging from struggle to ease, poverty to wealth, sickness to health, and so on. These are traditionally thought to be a person's born nature, but the author points out that saying a person experiences happiness in some circumstance because he is happy by nature is a "tautology", which is a kind of redundancy, in this case an argument where there is no meaningful difference between the assertion and the reason, thus invalidating any inference and thus any proof.

The life circumstances of another person can be seen directly but not his general level of happiness or any other aspect of his experience, so there is no proof that happiness is attained through karma or duty.

We have already discussed the idea that any experience is potentially blissful, not because the experience causes the bliss, but because the foundation of all experience is bliss, and the key to seeing it that way is to see that the darkness obscuring it is an illusion. It might seem to follow then that the life of an enlightened person would be constantly blissful and free of stress. But, blind religious fervor and saint-worship aside, it is just an imagined ideal. The notion of permanent bliss doesn't even make sense in terms of these teachings, and it is not found anywhere in them. According to this author, the dawning of enlightenment is the immediate release from the suffering of bondage, through awakening; that is to say, one may still find the suffering, but the key to release is always at hand.

Chapter Seventeen

Veda and Testimony

वाच्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धः शब्दार्थयोः। त्रिभिः सम्बन्धसिद्धिः। न कार्ये नियम उभयथा दर्शनात्। लोके व्युत्पन्नस्य वेदार्थप्रतीतिः। न त्रिभिरपौरुषेयत्वाद्वेदस्य तदर्थस्यातीन्द्रि-यत्वात्। न यज्ञादेः स्वरूपतो धमत्वं वैशिष्ट्यात्। निजशक्तिर्व्युत्पत्त्या व्यवच्छिद्यते। योग्यायोग्येषु प्रतीतिजनकत्वात्तत्सिद्धिः। न नित्यत्वं वेदानां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः। न पौरुषेयत्वं तत्कर्तुः पुरुषस्याभावात्। मुक्तामुक्तयोरयोग्यत्वात्। नापौरुषेयत्वान्नित्यत्वमङ्कुरादिवत्। तेषामपि तद्योगे दृष्टबाद्धादिप्रसक्तिः। यस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपि कृतबुद्धिरुपजायते तत्पौरुषेयम् निजशक्त्यभिव्यक्तेः स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ।

17.1 (5.37) **vācya-vācaka-bhāvaḥ** to be said – saying – relation **sambandhaḥ** inherent connection **śabda-arthayoḥ** (loc. dual; between) sound, word, oral tradition – (its) purpose, intent, meaning (5.38) **tribhiḥ** (inst. pl. by) three **sambandha-siddhiḥ** inherent connection – establishing, proof **17.2** (5.39) **na kārye** (loc. as to) effect, product, produced **niyamaḥ** rule **ubhayathā** in the two ways **darśanāt** (abl. because) seeing, observing (5.40) **loke** (loc. in) world **vyutpannasya** (gen. belonging to) learned, accomplished, versed in **veda-artha-pratītiḥ** Veda – meaning – understanding

17.3 (5.41) **na** not **tribhiḥ** (inst. known by) the three **apauruṣeyatvāt** (abl. because) not generated by people (ḍhak of puruṣa) – being **vedasya** (gen. of) the Veda **tat-arthasya** (gen. of) it – meaning **ati-indriyatvāt** (abl. because) super – sensoriness **17.4** (5.42) **na** no **yajña-ādeḥ** (gen. of) Vedic rites – etc., and all that **svarūpataḥ** (tasil resulting from) own nature **dharmatvam** duty-state, state where the duty **vaiśiṣṭyāt** (abl.) because it is clear, clearly (5.43) **nija-śaktiḥ** inborn – power **vyutpattyā** (inst. by means of) scholarship, proficiency **vyavacchidyate** to be cut off or separated, removed, rejected **17.5** (5.44) **yogya-ayogyeṣu** (loc. pl. regarding, as for) those who are qualified – those who are qualified **pratīti-janakatvāt** (abl. through) understanding – generation – there being **tat-siddhiḥ** that – proof **17.6** (5.45) **na** no **nityatvam** constant presence **vedānām** (gen. of) Vedas **kāryatvaśruteḥ** (abl. because) produced – being – scripture (5.46) **na** not **pauruṣeyatvam** generated by people **tat-kartuḥ** their – creator **puruṣasya** (gen. of) person **abhāvāt** (abl. because) non-existence **17.7** (5.47) **mukta-amuktayoḥ** (loc. in either case, whether) liberated – unliberated **ayogyatvāt** (abl. because) unsuitability, inconsistency (5.48) **na apauruṣeya-tvāt** (abl. because) not – generated by people – being **nityatvam** constancy **aṅkura-ādivat** (vati like) sprout – etc. **17.8** (5.49) **teṣām** (gen. of) them **api** in fact **tat-yoge** (loc. in) to that – connection **dṛṣṭa-bādha-ādi-prasaktiḥ** learned knowledge – exclusion – etc., all the rest – occurrence, being stuck with **17.9** (5.50) **yasmin** (loc. in which case) **adṛṣṭe** (loc.) without learned knowledge **api** or even **kṛta-buddhiḥ** made up, fixed – (one's) understanding (resolution, belief) **upajāyate** there arises **tat-pauruṣeyam** it – generated by people (5.51) **nija-śakti-abhivyakteḥ** (abl. from) inborn power – manifestation **svataḥ** itself **prāmāṇyam** authoritativeness

(The opponent:) **17.1 The connection between speech and its meaning is the relation of saying and what is to be said, that connection which is established by the three (the threefold proof, pramāṇa). 17.2 Understanding of the meaning of the Veda belongs to the learned, in the <u>world</u>, (though) there is no**

rule that it is produced by them, because their seeing is (only) in those two ways (understanding and saying).

(The author:) **17.3 Because of the Veda's not being generated by people, because of the super-sensoriness of its meaning, it is not known by means of the three. 17.4 (The notion of) inborn power by means of Vedic scholarship is to be rejected, because it is clear that there is no state where the dharma of Vedic rites and all that results from one's (born) nature. 17.5 As for who is qualified versus who is unqualified, the proof of that is through there being the generation of understanding. 17.6 There is no constancy of the Vedas, for there is scripture on their being produced; nor are they generated by people, because of the non-existence of any person who could be the creator of them. 17.7 It is like the sprout, etc., not constancy, because of its not being generated by people, whether liberated or unliberated, because of that inconsistency. 17.8 In fact, in the connection of them (the Vedas) to that (being generated by people) there is the occurrence of the exclusion (of Brahman) through learned knowledge and all the rest; 17.9 or even without the learned knowledge, in which case there arises the belief that it is generated by people (the rishis), its authoritativeness itself coming from a manifestation of their inborn power.**

In a world of plurality of souls, the use of words is thought to be a way of conveying meaning from one person to another, but in the liberating view, meaning or understanding can't be transferred. All that is really known through the senses is the sound of spoken words or the sight of written words. The understanding of their meaning is a separate thing, and although communication is associated with understanding, it is not the cause of understanding. Even if the physical causality is followed right down to brain synapses and chemistry, that code is still code but comprehension is something else. In the liberating view, human thought is not seen as a mere mechanical phenomenon brought about by the evolution of language in populations of social organisms, but rather a functioning of an independent universal form, intellect. This intellect is not possessed by a physical bodily form but instead the body is in a sense "owned" by the intellect. In the opponent's view, however, there is a transfer of meaning from one person to another and the supposed proof is through the threefold standard, which consists of perception, inference, and testimony.

The author rejects the opponent's statement about Vedic scholarship. Veda is not just ordinary, common knowledge (dṛṣṭa) or even special scholarly knowledge (vidyā), but the deep intuitive knowledge of self-realization. In the end it makes its

way to verbal manifestation, but the true Veda, as we learn in the Vaisheshika (VD 1.1-2), is the expression of the essential comprehension of the principles that lead to the highest good, which is liberation. Understanding of essential meaning is beyond the sensory powers; it is beyond the hearing of speech, or the seeing of the written word, or even the inner sound associated with either of those media. Furthermore, the right or competence to engage in Vedic study is not gained by being born with good karma, and conversely, good karma is not gained by engaging in Vedic prayers and Vedic study. The proof of the fitness of Veda for you, or of you for Veda is in the generation of the essence of comprehension within you, rather than qualification by birthright. This generation is primal and is not caused by reading, hearing, or reciting, even though the verbal component accompanies the comprehension. Veda represents the inborn tendency toward seeking liberation, but it is not eternal in the same sense that puruṣa and nature are considered to be eternal. The verbal expression of Veda is read or recited or sung as "the Vedas" or Vedic literature, and the opponent believes that even though these Vedas were composed or "produced" by the human rishis, they were received through divine revelation, not human.

In sutra 17.7 the author reinforces his theme of generation from within like a sprout from a seed. Veda, the great knowledge of the relationship of both separation and union between the yogin and his universe, is always present, whether it is apprehended as a subtle persistent question, or comprehended as a steady clear truth. It is constant in form and constantly present, as opposed to its verbal counterpart, which appears in many changing forms, and which comes and goes. Veda is perpetual in his active awareness and, like the world, unfolds from within him like a sprout from a seed. The primary essential truth is revealed from within and does not come from reciting by memory or reading or hearing words whose authorship is credited to others. Those things are valid and real, and there is no need to consider them to be any kind of illusion, but for the purpose of realizing liberation it is necessary to understand that they are secondary, that they are effects and not causes.

नासतः ख्यानं नृश्रृङ्गवत्। न सतो बाधदर्शनात्। नानिर्वचनीयस्य तद्भावात्। नान्यथा-ख्यातिः स्ववचोव्याघातात्। सदसत्ख्यातिर्बाधाबाधात्। प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिभ्यां न स्फोटा-त्मकः शब्दः। न शब्दनित्यत्वं कार्यताप्रतीतेः। पूर्वसिद्धसत्त्वस्याभिव्यक्तिर्दीपेनेव घटस्य। सत्कार्यसिद्धान्तश्चेत्सिद्धसाधनम्।

17.10 (5.52) **na** no **asataḥ** (gen. of) untrue **khyānam** saying **nṛśṛṅgavat** (vati like) man – horn **17.11** (5.53) **na** nor **sataḥ** (gen. of) true **bādha-darśanāt** (abl. because) exclusion – seeing **17.12** (5.54) **na** nor **anirvacanīyasya** (gen. of) that which is indescribable, unsayable **tat-abhāvāt** (abl. because) it – non-existence **17.13** (5.55) **na** no **anyathā** (inst.) one way, the other way **khyātiḥ** saying **sva-vacas-vyāghātāt** (abl. because) own – declaration – contradiction

17.14 (5.56) **sat-asat-khyātiḥ** true – untrue – saying **bādha-abādhāt** (abl. adverbial) excluded – not excluded **17.15** (5.57) **pratīti-apratītibhyām** (inst. with, accompanied by) understanding – non-understanding **na** not **sphoṭa-ātmakaḥ** burst forth, unfurled (like a sprout), revealed, disclosed – having of the nature of **śabdaḥ** testimony, the word **17.16** (5.58) **na** not, nor **śabda-nityatvam** testimony – constancy **kāryatā-pratīteḥ** (abl. because) its being an effect – understanding **17.17** (5.59) **pūrva-siddha-sattvasya** (gen. of) previously – established – entity **abhivyaktiḥ** manifestation, becoming evident **dīpena** (inst. with) light, lamp, lantern **iva** like **ghaṭasya** (gen. of) pot **17.18** (5.60) **sat-kārya-siddhāntaḥ** existent – effect – doctrine **cet** if … then **siddha-sādhanam** established – establishing

(The opponent:) **17.10 There is no saying of what is untrue, like horns on a man, 17.11 nor (you say), of what is true, because of seeing exclusion (in it), 17.12 nor of what cannot be described because of the non-existence of it (the saying), 17.13 (so) there is no saying it is that other way, because of the self-contradiction of your own declaration.**

(The author:) **17.14 There is <u>saying</u> of true and untrue whether excluded or not excluded. 17.15 Testimony does not have the nature of something revealed, whether it is accompanied by understanding or non-understanding. 17.16 Nor is there constancy of testimony, because of the understanding of its being of the nature of an <u>effect</u>. 17.17 It is the manifestation of a previously established truth, like that of a pot with a lamp. 17.18 If you argue that it is the doctrine of existent effect, then you are just establishing something that is (already) established (i.e., you are absolutely right).**

The opponent is referring to the word "exclusion" in the previous discussion. If true statements representing learned knowledge cause exclusion, and false statements are unfitting, then what's left? Is there justification for making any statement? The subject of sutra 17.10 is the first way, which would be called "the one way", and 17.11 is the anyathā, "the other way". Taken together these two statements would seem to argue against making any assertion at all, but 17.11 itself refers to a certain assertion on the part of the author, which according to

these very rules would have to be seen as self-denying.

It is common to find layers of commentary accompanying ancient works like these, each commentator expanding on the last; the idea being that the terse form of the original cannot be understood by people of lesser intellect without lengthy explanations. It is also commonly said that the ancient commentators were enlightened saints in their own right, and that their authority is equal to that of the original authors. The original authors of these Darshanas, however, would not have you consider any other person to be enlightened or superior to you in intellectual ability. How could one even hold such unprovable beliefs except by a stupefying blind faith? If ten words can provide structure to your intuitive knowledge of a certain principle, a thousand more piled on by a self-indulgent talker can only confound it. Any part of those protracted analyses could easily be refuted anyway, and the same would apply to the refutations. Truly, my own commentary is not exempt from this, because every assertion has to sit incomplete on one side or the other in the duality. What we are left with then is thousands of pages of saying and more saying, true or not true, enlightened or not enlightened. In his response to the opponent's attempt to confound us, the author teaches that whatever the saying amounts to, if one looks for understanding in his own immediate awareness, the light of that understanding will appear before the words, like a lamp that causes a pot to appear out of the darkness.

He anticipates that the opponent might try to claim that all of this creation-from-within business is nothing more than the well-known doctrine of existent effect, that all effects must previously exist in their cause because it is impossible for something to come from nothing. He says that such an assertion amounts to "establishing what is already established", which is normally an error in argumentation, but in this case he means that the doctrine is actually correct in a way, in that testimony is an effect that exists previously in its cause, which is comprehension, and that includes testimony that is heard as well as that which is given (see VD 6.4-9).

Chapter Eighteen

Individual Souls and Parts

नाद्वैतमात्मनो लिङ्गात्तद्भेदप्रतीतेः। नानात्मनापि प्रत्यक्षबाधात्। नोभाभ्यं तेनैव। अन्यप-रत्वमविवेकानां तत्र। नात्माविद्या नोभायं जगदुपादानकारणं निःसङ्गत्वात्। नैकस्यानन्द-चिद्रूपत्वे द्वयोर्भेदात्। दुःखनिवृत्तेर्गौणः। विमुक्तिप्रशंसा मन्दानाम्। न व्यापकत्वं मनसः करणत्वादिन्द्रियत्वाद्वा। सक्रियत्वाद्गतिश्रुतेः । न निर्भागत्वं तद्योगाद्घटवत्। प्रकृतिपुरुष-योरन्यत्सर्वमनित्यम्।

18.1 (5.61) **na** no **advaitam** non-duality **ātmanaḥ** (gen. of) individual soul **liṅgāt** (abl. through) characteristic, mark, sign, indicator **tat-bheda-pratīteḥ** (abl. known by) them – division, diversity – recognizing **18.2** (5.62) **na** nor **anātmanā** (inst. coming about through) not an individual soul **api** indeed **pratyakṣa-bādhāt** (abl. just because) perception (of it) – excluded **18.3** (5.63) **na** not **ubhābhyām** (inst. with) both **tena** (inst.) by that means **eva** the same **18.4** (5.64) **anya-paratvam** other(s) – separateness **avivekānām** (gen. to) non-discriminating ones **tatra** there, where, in which case **18.5** (5.65) **na** not **ātmā** individual soul **avidyā** ignorance **na** nor **ubhayam** either one **jagat-upādāna-kāraṇam** the living world – self-accepted, inclusive – cause **niḥsaṅga-tvāt** (abl. because) without attachment, indifferent (MW) – being

18.6 (5.66) **na** no **ekasya** (gen. for) the one **ānanda-cit-rūpa-tve** (loc. in) bliss – intelligence – form – state of **dvayoḥ** (loc. between) the two **bhedāt** (abl. because) difference (5.67) **duḥkha-nivṛtteḥ** (abl. of comparison; to) suffering – cessation **gauṇaḥ** subordinate, secondary (5.68) **vimukti-praśaṁsā** liberation – glory **mandānām** (gen. for) the dull ones **18.7** (5.69) **na** nor **vyāpakatvam** pervasiveness **manasaḥ** (gen. of, for) mind **karaṇa-tvāt** (abl. because) doer – being **indriya-tvāt** (abl. adverbial) powers – being **vā** or, nor (5.70) **sakriyatvāt** (abl. because) its having activity **gati-śruteḥ** (abl.) (trans)migration – scripture **18.8** (5.71) **na nirbhāga-tvam** without – parts – being **tat-yogāt** (abl. because) them – connection **ghaṭavat** clay pots, jars – like **18.9** (5.72) **prakṛti-puruṣayoḥ** (loc. than) prime originator – human spirit **anyat** other than, different **sarvam** all of that **anityam** non-lasting

(The opponent:) **18.1 There is no non-duality of individual soul, which is known by recognizing the diversity of them through (perception of) the indicator (body); 18.2 nor indeed does that (body) come about through something that is not an individual soul, just because (direct) perception of it (another soul) is excluded. 18.3 It (perception) is not by means of both the same** (direct and object-based, see 19.7)**, 18.4 where it is (only) to the non-discriminating that there is separateness of the others (souls). 18.5 The individual soul is not ignorance, nor is either one the self-accepted cause of the living world, because of that (cause) being the indifferent (nature).**

(The author:) **18.6 For the one, in the state of his bliss/intelligence form, there is no glory of liberation for dull ones (souls), secondary to the cessation of suffering, because of a (supposed) difference between the two (the liberated and the dull). 18.7 Nor is there for his mind a pervasiveness (in other souls) because of its (supposedly) having activity in accordance with the scripture on migration, because of its being the doer (of karma), being (itself) that very power (of doing). 18.8 He (mahat, like the ether** 7.13, 24.9**) is not without parts, because there is his connection with them, like jars, 18.9 (but) all of that is non-lasting, something other than the prime originator or the human spirit.**

The opponent still argues for a multiplicity of individual souls because he sees a diversity of people in his world as opposed to the author's oneness or non-duality. Duality is apparent through observing the bodies and hearing the voices of other people, but duality or plurality of souls is not known in that way because there is no direct subjective experience of anything like that; there is inference and testimony but not perception. He insists that other people are not just representations of mahat, that the exclusion of perception of other souls and the fact that we can't know the "unknown" workings of karma is no reason to doubt those things. He says that the idea of a multiplicity of other souls is not just a matter of non-distinguishing and ignorance, and that the world is made neither by the one great soul nor by an individual soul, but by an indifferent nature.

In his response, the author, having already established happiness and intelligence as two inherent or contained aspects of the great form, coins the name "bliss/intelligence form". The single individual (ātman) and the bliss/intelligence form are not the same. Mahat is the aspect of the human being that embraces being the great cause of all creation, transcending the personal identity and all the rest. When the personal identity re-emerges and the yogin begins to perceive himself as a certain individual person, amongst others, within a certain time, place, and life

circumstance, only then is there the manifestation of worldly knowledge and experience. In liberation, mahat, the bliss/intelligence/truth is always readily visible as the indifferent viewer behind the view, but not the sufferer behind the suffering because all that takes place in the sleepy torpor where he becomes excluded. Liberation is the ability to re-awaken from suffering, as the witness.

न भागलाभोऽभागिनः निर्भागत्वश्रुतेः। नानन्दाभिव्यक्तिर्मुक्तिर्निर्धर्मत्वात्। न विशेषगु-
णोच्छित्तिस्तद्वत्। न विशेषगतिर्निष्क्रियस्य। नाकारोपरागोच्छित्तिः क्षणिकत्वादिदोषात्।
न सर्वोच्छित्तिरपुरुषार्थत्वादिदोषात्। एवं शून्यमपि। संयोगाश्च वियोगान्ता इति न देशा-
दिलाभोऽपि। न भागियोगो भागस्य। नाणिमादियोगोऽप्यवश्यम्भावित्वात्तदुच्छित्तेरितर-
योगवत्। नेन्द्रादिपदयोगोऽपि तद्वत्।

18.10 (5.73) **na** not **bhāga-lābhaḥ** parts, components – obtained **abhāginaḥ** (abl. from) having no parts **nir-bhāgatva-śruteḥ** (abl. to be understood from) without – parts – scripture **18.11** (5.74) **na** not **ānanda-abhivyaktiḥ** bliss – showing **muktiḥ** liberating **nir-dharma-tvāt** (abl. adverbial) without – dharma – there being

18.12 (5.75) *("Well," is easily supplied to introduce a response, as is very commonly done in speech.)* **na** neither **viśeṣa-guṇa-ucchittiḥ** various – qualities – elimination **tadvat** like that **18.13** (5.76) **na** nor **viśeṣa-gatiḥ** particular, certain – motion **niṣkriyasya** (gen. of) actionless **18.14** (5.77) **na** nor **ākāra-uparāga-ucchittiḥ** outer form, bodily aspect – influence – elimination **kṣaṇikatva-ādi-doṣāt** momentariness – etc. – fault **18.15** (5.78) **na** nor **sarva-ucchittiḥ** everything – elimination **a-puruṣa-arthatva-ādi-doṣāt** (abl. because) lacking – person – purpose – fault (5.79) **evam** thus **śūnyam** emptiness **api** or even **18.16** (5.80) **saṁyogāḥ** conjunctions **ca** (with na) neither **viyoga-antāḥ** disjunction – things ending **iti** just mentioned **deśa-ādi-lābhaḥ** place – etc. – acquiring **api** even (5.81) **na** neither (with the previous "ca") **bhāgi-yogaḥ** (to) a possessor – relation **bhāgasya** (gen. of) a part **18.17** (5.82) **na** not **aṇima-ādi-yogaḥ** aṇiman, minuteness – etc. – yoga (power) **api** indeed, "most" **avaśyam** certainly **bhāvitvāt** (abl. for) real necessity **tat-ucchitteḥ** (gen. for) those – elimination **itara-yogavat** (vati like) the other – yogas **18.18** (5.83) **na** no **indra-ādi-pada-yogaḥ** Indra – and the others – status – connection **api** surely **tadvat** (indeclinable) like that, like

(The opponent:) **18.10 That there are parts** (see 18.8) **obtained from something that has no parts is not to be understood from scripture on being without parts. 18.11 A showing of bliss** (see 18.6, also "enraptured" 4.11)**, without there being dharma** (see 16.6-7)**, is not liberating.**

(The author:) **18.12 Well, neither is** *1.)* **the <u>elimination</u> of various qualities like that (bliss), 18.13 nor** *2.)* **a certain (trans)migration (re-incarnation) of the actionless (soul), 18.14 nor** *3.)* **elimination of the influence of the outward aspect (the incarnation) because of its fault of being momentary (temporary) and the rest, 18.15 nor even thus** *4.)* **emptiness, the elimination of <u>all</u> that because of its fault of not being the purpose of a human being, and so on. 18.16 Neither are the <u>conjunctions</u> that <u>end</u> in those (four) disjunctions just mentioned the relation of a part to its possessor, even acquiring place and the others (time and circumstance** 1.12-14**). 18.17 There is most certainly not any yoga of minuteness and the others (the eight so-called supernatural powers), for the real necessity is for the elimination of those (notions), like the other such yogas, 18.18 like there would surely be no yoga of (acquiring) the status of Indra and the others.** (Compare 14.18)**.**

According to the author, mahat has components under the heading of mind, evolving from nature through the series, but the opponent disagrees and says you can't get elements from something that doesn't have them. In his view, nature creates the elements directly and the body is created from them as the seat of superintendence of an individual soul, which in turn possesses a mind. He says the parts <u>belong</u> to nature and not to the great mahat. This is his own/owner complex mentioned in 24.15.

In sutras 18.12-16 the author dismisses the idea of disjunction or getting rid of things as a means to final liberation, whether it is renunciation of the desire for happiness, or riddance of one's life circumstance, or of the temporary incarnation in that place, or even in the end, elimination of the whole works permanently because of the mistaken belief that such a final liberation could ever be a human being's ultimate purpose.

The only riddance to be done is that of misconceptions, the abandoning of darkness, thus accepting the ultimate freedom that comes with the light of distinguishing. He even indicates that if there is any fault to be found in the principles of momentariness and emptiness, that it is in the opponent's own definition of them, with temporary incarnations being the momentary and liberation being the complete and final end.

Neither, he says, does the relationship of parts (the world of experience, including other people) to the possessor and container (mahat) have anything to do with the four corresponding conjunctions: desire, circumstance, body, and karma.

He also rejects the notion of acquiring supernatural powers or equality with the powers of the gods. The highest power is knowledge. The lower powers are already ours and they are already fully developed. One could easily consider the wonders of his perceived creation, as they are now, to be miraculous. The Devatā (Indra and the other gods) represented in traditional teaching by the sensory organs, are beneath this level of complete knowledge anyway. The magical powers we all so earnestly wished for as children must be either through a divine knowledge or the ability to perform real supernatural feats. The one, we already have immediately available to us, and the other is ridiculous.

Chapter Nineteen

The Separate Principle

न भूतप्रकृतित्वमिन्द्रियाणामाहङ्कारिकत्वश्रुतेः। न षट्पदार्थनियमस्तद्बोधान्मुक्तिः षोडशा-दिष्वप्येवम्। नाणुनित्यता तत्कार्यत्वश्रुतेः। न निर्भागत्वं कार्यत्वात्। न रूपनिबन्धनात्प्र-त्यक्षनियमः। न परिमाणचातुर्विध्यं द्वाभ्यां तद्योगात्। अनित्यत्वेऽपि स्थिरतायोगात्प्रत्य-भिज्ञानं सामान्यस्य। न तदपलापस्तस्मात्।

19.1 (5.84) **na** not **bhūta-prakṛti-tvam** the gross elements – material origin – being **indriyāṇām** (gen.) sensory powers **āhaṅkārika-tva-śruteḥ** (abl. to be understood from) relating to the personal identity – scripture **19.2** (5.85) **na** nothing **ṣaṭ-pada-artha-niyamaḥ** six words – meaning – definition **tat-bodhāt** (abl. from, about) that (way) – comprehending **muktiḥ** liberating **19.3** (5.86) **ṣoḍaśa-ādiṣu** sixteen – etc. **api** or even **evam** exactly that way

19.4 (5.87) **na** not **aṇu-nityatā** (f. her) atom(s), minute part(s) – constancy **tat-kāryatva-śruteḥ** (abl. to be understood from) their – being produced – scripture **19.5** (5.88) **na** not **nirbhāgatvam** without parts – being **kāryatvāt** (abl. known from) produced – being **19.6** (5.89) **na** no **rūpa-nibandhanāt** (abl. from) form – (ifc) based on **pratyakṣa-niyamaḥ** perception – definition **19.7** (5.90) **na** not **parimāṇa-cātur-vidhyam** assessment – fourfold **dvābhyam** (inst. by means of) two **tat-yogāt** (abl.) that – by reason of **19.8** (5.91) **anityatve** (loc.) no – constancy

– there being **api** even **sthiratā-yogāt** steadfastness – because **pratyabhijñanam** self-recognition **sāmānyasya** (gen. on the part of) the universal form **19.9** (5.92) **na** no **tat-apalāpaḥ** it – denial **tasmāt** for that reason

(The opponent:) **19.1 The indriyas' being the material origin (prakṛti) of the gross elements is not to be understood from the scripture on their relating to the personal identity. 19.2 There is nothing liberating about comprehending that way, its definition in the meaning of the six words (Vaisheshika), 19.3 or even in the sixteen and the others.**

(The author:) **19.4 Well, constancy of her (prakṛti's) minute parts is not to be understood from the scripture on their being produced. 19.5 From (a thing's) being produced it is known that it is not without parts, 19.6 (but) there is no definition of <u>perception</u> that it must come from something based (only) on that (produced) form. 19.7 For that reason, it (perception) <u>is</u> by both means** (direct and object-based 18.3)**, not just that fourfold assessment** (indicator-based 18.12-16)**. 19.8 Even with there being no constancy (of the parts), there is recognition of the universal form, because of <u>its</u> steadfastness. 19.9 It is for <u>that</u> reason that there is no denial of it.**

नान्यनिवृत्तिरूपत्वं भावप्रतीतेः। न तत्त्वान्तरं सादृश्यं प्रत्यक्षोपलब्धेः। निजशक्त्यभिव्य-
क्तिर्वा वैशिष्ट्यात्तदुपलब्धेः। न संज्ञासंज्ञिसम्बन्धोऽपि। न सम्बन्धनित्यतोभयानित्यत्वात्।
नाजः सम्बन्धो धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात्। न समवायोऽस्ति प्रमाणाभावात्। उभयत्राप्यन्य-
थासिद्धेर्न प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं वा। नानुमेयत्वमेव क्रियाया नेदिष्ठस्य तत्तद्वतोरेवापरोक्षप्रतीतेः।
न पाञ्चभौतिकं शरीरं बहूनामुपादानायोगात्।

19.10 (5.93) **na** not **anya-nivṛtti-rūpa-tvam** other(s) – cessation – form – there being **bhāva-pratīteḥ** (abl. known from) existence – certainty **19.11** (5.94) **na** no **tattva-antaram** principle – separate **sādṛśyam** likeness, resemblance, similarity **pratyakṣa-upalabdheḥ** (abl. known from) immediate *(ibc; see various compounds in MW)* – observation **19.12** (5.95) **nija-śakti-abhivyaktiḥ** inborn – power – manifestation **vā** rather **vaiśiṣṭyāt** (abl. resulting from) there being a distinguishing quality **tat-upalabdheḥ** (abl. because) such – observation (5.96) **na** not **saṁjñā-saṁjñi-sambandhaḥ** named – name – relation **api** even

19.13 (5.97) **na** no **sambandha-nityatā** (fem. her) *(see 18.15)* relationship – constancy **ubhaya-anityatvāt** (abl. because) both – lack of constancy – there being **19.14** (5.98) **na** not **a-jaḥ** without, other than – origination **sambandhaḥ** relationship **dharmi-grāhaka-māna-bādhāt** (abl. because) having characteristics – grasper, perceiver – evidence – exclusion **19.15** (5.99) **na** not **samavāyaḥ** perpetual co-inherence, relation of a whole to its parts (manas to indriyas) **asti** (as an indeclinable) existent **pramāṇa-abhāvāt** **19.16** (5.100) **ubhayatra** either way **api** indeed **anyathā-siddheḥ** (abl. because) by other means – establishing **na** neither **pratyakṣam** perception **anumānam** inference **vā** or, nor **19.17** (5.101) **na** no **anumeyatvam** inference to be made **eva** such **kriyāyāḥ** (gen. s. fem. of) activity **nediṣṭhasya** (gen. on the part of) someone standing near **tat-tadvatoḥ** (loc. in regard to) that, such a thing – the one whose it is **eva** such **aparokṣa-pratīteḥ** (abl. just from) not imperceptible – certainty **19.18** (5.102) **na** not **pāñca-bhautikam** composed of five elements **śarīram** body **bahūnām** (gen. pl. belonging to) the many **upādāna-ayogāt** (abl. because) accepting – inconsistent

(The opponent:) **19.10 There being a <u>form</u> where there is cessation of the others (the parts) is not known (just) from the certainty of its existence. 19.11 There is nothing resembling (your) separate principle (mahat) known (just) from an immediate observation. 19.12 There is not even a relationship of the name ("mahat") with anything to be named, because such observation must result from there being a distinguishing quality, which is rather a manifestation of <u>inborn</u> power.**

(The author:) **19.13 There is no constancy (inherence) in that relationship because of there being a lack of constancy in both (inborn power and observation). 19.14 There is no relationship other than origination, because there would be exclusion of the evidence of the <u>perceiver</u> of what has the characteristics. 19.15 There is no inherence (of the parts), because of the absence of the (threefold) means of proof, 19.16 because indeed the establishing of it (inherence) is by the other (alone), which is neither perception** (see 19.5) **nor inference** (see 19.4) **either way, (but mere testimony). 19.17 There is no such inference to be made of (karmic) activity on the part of someone standing near, in regard to such a thing (inborn power), and the one whose it is, (just) from the certainty that he is not imperceptible. 19.18 The body is not composed of the five gross elements, belonging to the many, because that is inconsistent with accepting.**

The opponent says that there cannot be a form of perception that is independent of the objects of perception because to him objects are a necessary part of the very definition of perception. The "immediate" form of perception he objects to is the alternative to the form based on observation of produced objects; but according to the author, perception is not just a mental likeness of preexisting objects, because the perceiver is an independent entity that can be known in itself without any objects. Neither is it the reincarnating form of ātman, because it can be comprehended in its own form without any so-called "impressions" of past lives, and without observing the various life circumstances of others, so there is no co-inherence of the perceiver and the perceived based on actions and consequences.

"Inherence" (samavāya) means a constant and inseparable relation between an entity and its attributes, or a whole and its parts. In this case it would be between the perceiver and the gross objects being perceived. The opponent claims that the objects of perception are inherent in perception, but the author argues that there is neither perception nor inference to support the notion that the power of observation depends on preexisting objects to be observed, so the notion is entertained on the basis of testimony alone. There is no constant relationship, or co-inherence, between the perceiver and nature's gross elements or parts through inborn power. One can know directly the characteristics of a perceived object but one cannot know directly, without inference and testimony, what is evident to <u>another</u> perceiver or even that there <u>is</u> perception in another. Furthermore it cannot be inferred that there is any form of an object, any possessor of perceptible characteristics that can be counted as existing independently of its being perceived by a subject, because the subject is present in every single case without exception, either observing, remembering, analyzing, or believing.

Chapter Twenty

Bodies, Perception, and Forms of Brahman

न स्थूलमिति नियम आतिवाहिकस्यापि विद्यमानत्वात्। नाप्राप्तप्रकाशकत्वमिन्द्रियाणाम-प्राप्तेः सर्वप्राप्तेर्वा। न तेजोऽपसर्पणात्तैजसं चक्षुर्वृत्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः। प्राप्तार्थप्रकाशलिङ्गाद् वृत्तिसिद्धिः। भागगुणाभ्यां तत्त्वान्तरं वृत्तिः सम्बन्धार्थं सर्पतीति। न द्रव्यनियमस्तद्यो-गात्। न देशभेदेऽप्यन्योपादानतास्मदादिवन्नियमः। निमित्तव्यपदेशात्तद्व्यपदेशः। ऊष्म-जाण्डजजरायुजोद्भिज्जसांकल्पिकसांसिद्धिकं चेति न नियमः।

20.1 (5.103) **na** not **sthūlam** gross **iti** called (quotes) **niyamaḥ** restriction, limitation **ātivāhikasya** (gen. of) "beyond-bearing", enduring **api** indeed **vidyamānatvāt** (abl. because) existence **20.2** (5.104) **na** no **aprāpta-prakāśakatvam** unfound – illumination **indriyāṇām** (gen. pl. on the part of) the powers of sense **aprāpteḥ** (abl. since) it would not be found **sarva-prāpteḥ** (abl. because) all – is found **vā** (like "iva"; see MW) like that *(The word "vā" has the same sense here as it does in "dvayoḥ ekatarasya vā" where again the subject is the indriyas. It means "or" in the sense of "alternatively" or "according to that alternative")* **20.3** (5.105) **na** no such **tejas-apasarpaṇāt** (abl. because) light – gliding **taijasam** relating to light **cakṣus** seeing, the faculty (indriya) of sight, the eye **vṛttitas** (tasil in consequence of, through) working, functioning **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. because) it, that – establishing **20.4** (5.106) **prāpta-artha-prakāśa-liṅgāt** (abl. because) found – thing – illuminating, showing – indicator, mark, sign **vṛtti-siddhiḥ** functioning – proof

20.5 (5.107) **bhāga-guṇābhyām** (abl. from) part – essential constituent **tattva-antaram** principle – separate **vṛttiḥ** functioning, working **sambandha-artham** relationship – purpose, meaning **sarpati** it glides **iti** saying **20.6** (5.108) **na** not **dravya-niyamaḥ** *(see 20.1)* the physical – restriction, limitation **tat-yogāt** (abl. because) them (bhāga and guṇa) – relation, connection **20.7** (5.109) **na** no **deśa-bhede** (loc. w/api; though) location – division **api** though **anya-upādānatā** (in) others – acceptingness **asmat-ādivat** us and the rest – like **niyamaḥ** rule **20.8** (5.110) **nimitta-vyapadeśāt** (abl. because) instrumental cause – name, designation, representation **tat-vyapadeśaḥ** that – designation **20.9** (5.111) **ūṣmaja-aṇḍaja-jarāyuja-udbhijja-sāṁkālpika-sāṁsiddhikam** (singular) born of ("ja"): vapor, steam – egg – amnion – sprouting; – qualified to seek – qualified for perfection *(see Manu Smṛti I, 43-6) (The last two members of this compound have prakīrṇaka hañ (ika) taddhita terminations, denoting worthiness or qualification.)* **ca** and, whereas **iti** thus, so **na** not **niyamaḥ** defined

(The opponent:) **20.1 It (the body) is not limited to what we call the "gross" one** (see 11.1) **because there is indeed the existence of an enduring one. 20.2 On the part of the indriyas, there is no illumination of anything not found (in the world), for it would not be found, because everything is found like that. 20.3 There is no such relation of the eye to light, because light glides (to the eye), for it is (only) proved through its functioning. 20.4 It is proved through the functioning because it is the indicator that shows the object that is found.**

(The author:) **20.5 The saying "it glides"** (see VD 6.3) **is the very meaning of the relationship, a principle separate from the part and its essential constituent** (see VD 3.1-6)**. 20.6 It is not defined by the physicals** (of Vaisheshika)**, because of that relation to them. 20.7 Though there is a division by location, there is no rule of acceptingness in others, like an 'us' and an 'everyone else'. 20.8 It is designated by that ("separate principle"** (see VD 3.6)**) because it is the designation of an instrumental cause, 20.9 whereas anything (bodies) born of steam (insects, etc.), born of egg (birds, etc.), born of amnion (mammals), sprouting (plants); or (even) one (an incarnation) qualified for aspiring (to final liberation), or (even) one qualified for the complete accomplishment, is not thus defined.**

The opponent insists that the object that is seen is not produced by the faculty of sight but that the seeing simply proves its independent existence. He says that there is, in addition to the gross body, a "subtle" one that endures through the process of transmigration of the individual soul. In the liberating view, however, the mind and its senses are not just a screen on which images of preexisting objects are projected, because the process of creation functions the other way around, and the mind is the preexisting thing. The indriya is not formed of the gross elements. The independent perceiver functions through the instrumentality of mind and the indriyas. It works to implement the process of creation from the unmanifest essential constituents (guṇas) of the prime originator to the parts or elements. Here we can see a relation between these three principles and Vaisheshika's three: dravya meaning physical "parts", guṇa meaning their essential constituents, and karma meaning endeavoring, acting, etc.

The author's conclusion answers the opponent's objection in sutra 19.11 to a conceived form of perception as a "separate principle". His comment about "us and everyone else" refers to those "standing near" in 19.17. Even though one may observe the activity of other bodies occupying places in the immediate environment, the rule of accepting the governorship of creation through mind and subtle body does not apply to those observed bodies. Not only do bodies of the plant (21.1) and animal (20.9) kingdoms lack the designation of an instrumental cause, the "separate principle", but the human body also lacks it, even a person who is "qualified" to engage in Vedic rites and studies, and thereby accomplish final liberation. The possibility of liberation in others continues to be the center of contention in the debate on non-duality between the author and the opponent.

सर्वेषु पृथिव्युपादानमसाधारण्यात्तद्व्यपदेशः पूर्ववत्। न देहारम्भकस्य प्राणत्वमिन्द्रियश-क्तितस्तत्सिद्धेः। भोक्तुरधिष्ठानाद्भोगायतननिर्माणमन्यथा पूतिभावप्रसङ्गात्। भृत्यद्वारा स्वाम्यधिष्ठितिर्नैकान्तात्। समाधिसुषुप्तिमोक्षेषु ब्रह्मरूपता। द्वायोः सबीजमन्यत्र तद्धतिः। द्वयोरिव त्रयस्यापि दृष्टत्वान्न तु द्वौ। वासनयानर्थख्यापनं दोषयोगेऽपि न निमित्तस्य प्रधान-बाधकत्वम्। एकः संस्कारः क्रियानिर्वर्तको न तु प्रतिक्रियं संस्कारभेदा बहुकल्पनाप्रसक्तेः

20.10 (5.112) **sarveṣu** (loc. in) all those things **pṛthivi-upādānam** earth – accepting, taking, incorporating **asādhāraṇyāt** (abl. apart from) that which is not common **tat-vyapadeśaḥ** it – designation **pūrvavat** (vati like, as) before **20.11** (5.113) **na** no, it is not the case **deha-ārambhakasya** (gen. of, for) body – originator **prāṇa-tvam** breath – to be *(the author uses this same na+gen.+tva abstract sequence is his reply in 20.17)* **indriya-śaktitas** (tasil through) powers of sense – power, ability **tat-siddheḥ** (abl. because) of it – establishment **20.12** (5.114) **bhoktuḥ** (gen. belonging to) enjoyer **adhiṣṭhānāt** (abl. apart from) governance **bhoga-āyatana-nirmāṇam** enjoyment – seat, abode, house, building – formation, construction **anyathā** otherwise **pūti-bhāva-prasaṅgāt** (abl. because) smelly – become – occurrence of a possibility, "would" **20.13** (5.115) **bhṛtya-dvārā** (inst. of dvār) servant – means, expedient **svāmi-adhiṣṭhitiḥ** (of the) master – governing **na** not **ekāntāt** (abl. adverbial) solely, only, on his owvn **20.14** (5.116) **samādhi-suṣupti-mokṣeṣu** (loc. pl. being the case) contemplation – sleep – liberation, freedom **brahma-rūpa-tā** brahma – form(s) – state of being **20.15** (5.117) **dvayoḥ** (loc. in) two **sabījam** with seed **anyatra** (loc. in) the other **tat-hatiḥ** it – removal, absence

20.16 (5.118) **dvayoḥ** (loc. in) two **iva** as if it were **trayasya** (gen. of) the three, a triad **api** just **dṛṣṭatvāt** (abl. known from) learned – being, having been **na** not **tu** but **dvau** two **20.17** (5.119) **vāsanayā** (inst. fem. by the instrumentality of) vāsanā, imagination **anartha-khyāpanam** meaningless – statement **doṣa-yoge** (loc. if) fault – association **api** even **na** not **nimittasya** (gen. belonging to, for) instrumental cause **pradhāna-bādhaka-tvam** principal – excluding – to be **20.18** (5.120) **ekaḥ** an individual **saṁskāraḥ** together-putting, (mental) construct **kriyā-nirvartakaḥ** action – performing **na** not **tu** but **prati-kriyam** counter – action **saṁskāra-bhedāḥ** (mental) construct(s) – sets **bahu-kalpanā-prasakteḥ** (abl. coming from) many – imagined, invented – occurrence, addiction, tendency

(The opponent:) **20.10 Apart from that which is not common in all those (bodies), there is the incorporating of earth (as their material), the designation of it as (you said) before (a cause** 20.8**). 20.11 For the originator of the body to be breath because the establishment of it is (supposedly) through the ability of the powers of sense, is not the case. 20.12 Apart from (as opposed to) a governance that <u>belongs</u> to the enjoyer, there is construction of a <u>house</u> of enjoyment because otherwise <u>he</u> (the governor) would become that smelly (earthy) thing (the gross body). 20.13 The master's governing is through the expedient of a servant, not on his own; 20.14 contemplation, sleep, and liberation being those <u>forms</u> of Brahman, 20.15 with seed in two of them, which (seed) is removed in the other.**

(The author:) **20.16 That is just known from having been learned, as if it were 'in two of the three', but there are not (even) two (forms of Brahman). 20.17 It is a meaningless statement by way of fanciful thinking. Even if there were association (on his part) with such degradation, it is not for an instrumental cause to be excluding the principal. 20.18 There is the construct (saṁskāra) of an individual performing action but there is no counteraction, because (the notion of) <u>sets</u> of constructs comes (only) from the tendency of <u>imagining</u> the many.**

The opponent rejects the order of creation where the physical is built out of the ether through the breath of life (vayu or prāṇa). He says the physical body is built directly from nature's organic substance, earth (see "made of food" 11.9). He considers Brahman to be the master as a divine higher power, and he reveals in 20.14 his belief in a correspondence of these three forms of the master Brahman with three forms of servitude in human incarnation: contemplation (samādhi), for those competent to progress on the path to liberation through proper action (karma); sleep, representing a lower form where Brahman is dull and gross experience is predominant; and liberation, for a special few who have completed working through karma but still experience life. In his view, the two forms other than liberation still contain the seed for future incarnation, but in the author's view the state of being in the form of Brahman or mahat, the master within, is not dual in nature. It is the virtually pure, free state exclusively.

Chapter Twenty-One

Individuals and Consequences

न बाह्यबुद्धिनियमो वृक्षगुल्मलतौषधिवनस्पतितृणविरुधादीनामपि। भोक्तृभोगायतनत्वं पूर्ववत्। स्मृतेश्च। न देहमात्रतः कर्माधिकारित्वं वैशिष्ट्यश्रुतेः। त्रिधा त्रयाणां व्यवस्था कर्मदेहोपभोगदेहोभयदेहाः। न किं चिदप्यनुशयिनः। न बुद्ध्यादिनित्यत्वमाश्रयविशेषेऽपि वह्निवत्। आश्रयासिद्धेश्च। योगसिद्धयोऽप्यौषधादिसिद्धिवन्नापलपनीयाः। न भूतचैतन्यं प्रत्येकादृष्टेः संहत्येऽपि च (संहत्येऽपि च)। (The repetition is artificial.)

21.1 (5.121) **na** no **bāhya-buddhi-niyamaḥ** of the external – intellect – rule **vṛkṣa-gulma-latā-oṣadhi-vanaspati-tṛṇa-vīrudha-ādīnām** (gen. pl. belonging to) fruit trees – shrubs – vines – herbs, annuals – forest trees – grasses – creepers, etc. **api** of course **bhoktṛ-bhoga-āyatanatvam** enjoyer – enjoyment – being the house **pūrvavat** (vati as) before **21.2** (5.122) **smṛteḥ** (abl. known from) the law books, "institutes" **ca** and **21.3** (5.123) **na** not **deha-mātrataḥ** (tasil resulting from) bodies – alone **karma-adhikāritvam** karman – competency **vaiśiṣṭya-śruteḥ** (abl. for) endowment with distinguishing quality – scripture **21.4** (5.124) **tridhā** threefold **trayāṇām** (gen. pl. of) three **vyavasthā** respective allotment **karma-deha-upabhoga-deha-ubhaya-dehāḥ** (plural) karma – body – experience – body – both – body

21.5 (5.125) **na** it is not the case **kiñcid api** *(see MW under "ka")* one or another of these **anuśayinaḥ** (gen. belonging to) an anuśayin, a person "after-lying", sustaining the consequences of previous acts **21.6** (5.126) **na** no **buddhi-ādi-nityatvam** intellect – etc. – constancy **āśraya-viśeṣe** (loc. in) sites – particular **api** indeed **vahnivat** (vati like, just as with) fire **21.7** (5.127) **āśraya-asiddheḥ** (abl. because) site – no establishing **ca** indeed **21.8** (5.128) **yoga-siddhayaḥ** things which establish a connection **api** however **auṣadha-ādi-siddhivat** (vati like) herbs and the rest **na** not **apalāpanīyāḥ** (plural) suitable to be denied **21.9** (5.129) **na** no **bhūta-caitanyam** elemental (forms) – consciousness **pratyeka-ādṛṣṭeḥ** (abl. inferred from) individuals one by one – seeing **sāṁhatye** (loc. in) thrown together **api** certainly **ca** and (with na, "also not") **sāṁhatye api ca**

(The opponent:) **21.1 Of course, there is no rule that there is intellect belonging to the external (forms) of the fruit trees, shrubs, vines, annuals,**

forest trees, grasses, creepers, etc., their being the house of the enjoyer's enjoyment as (it was said) before (see 20.12), **21.2 and as it is known from the law texts (smṛti), 21.3 (but) competency for karma comes not from the bodies alone, for there is scripture on (their) being endowed with a distinguishing quality. 21.4 Of the three (forms of Brahman), the respective allotment (of such a quality) is threefold: the body for karma, the body for experience, and the body for both.**

(The author:) **21.5 It is not the case that one or another of these must belong to someone sustaining consequences. 21.6 Just as with fire (and the other gross elements), there is indeed no constancy of intellect and the rest in any such particular site** (see 21.4), **21.7 because indeed there is no establishing that there are sites (of intellect). 21.8 Instances of establishing by connection (yoga), however, like so establishing the herbs and the others (animals and people), need not be denied, 21.9 (but) there is no consciousness in those elemental forms to be inferred from seeing the individuals one by one, and certainly not in what is thrown together (from elements)** (see 11.13).

The opponent asserts his belief that the bodies and souls of others are not just made-up constructs, because he believes that scripture says each person has a certain competency for right action (or lack of it) based on inborn attributes earned by previous acts. He says that there are three kinds of bodies that souls can take, depending on their qualification through karma, the words "of the three" referring to the three forms of Brahman. The body for karma is associated with religious practice, the body for experience is the dull form where Brahman, as if sleeping, is not distinguished, and the body for both is that of the jīvanmukta.

He declared earlier his belief in souls advancing by means of a succession of bodily incarnations through planes of increasing purity and competency for Veda. His idea of particularity of sites, the endowment of individuals with one or another of the three bodies corresponding to the three forms of Brahman, is the basis of the belief system of spiritual advancement through reincarnation, and particular qualities of life earned through karma. The author refutes this by pointing to the fire and eye example already given.

In sutra 2.1 the opponent said that there has to be a yoga, a connection, between the eternal human being and nature, and in 2.2 the author agreed. There are forms representing life, to be seen in the varieties of human, animal, and plant bodies, and in the course of our active outward lives we don't go around denying that there is life in those other forms; but for the purpose of Veda, which is the private

inward-looking aspect that one doesn't normally discuss with other people, acknowledgment of consciousness must be restricted to what is actually seen and known first hand. Belief in a reality of many souls, all conscious individuals who are related in a subservient way to some higher power, is unprovable by first-hand knowledge and according to the author, insistence on such a belief system actually retards and obstructs the realization of liberation.

Again, as for the notion of supernatural magical "powers" (a wrong translation of "yoga-siddhayaḥ" in 21.8) on the part of an elite few enlightened people, some observations are in order. If you witness certain things like extraordinary intuition, or the regular occurrence of remarkable coincidences in your own experience or seemingly demonstrated in others, there is no reason to believe it is anything other than your own creation, a subtle demonstration of the principle of manifestation of the world from within, engendered by the growing power of Veda within you. On the other hand, if you hear stories of actual levitation, supernatural strength, invisibility, and so on, or things like divine healing, prophecy, or mind-reading performed by real people in the real physical world, surely you must know it is fiction. Both your inner experience and the physical universe you share with others can be called "real" in a way, but you should take care not to blur the demarcation between the two in daily worldly interactions. Whether in giving your own testimony or in accepting that of others, the mistake of allowing the fallacy of equivocation involving claims of "reality" for things that are physically impossible, or even worse, permitting it to descend into fraud or delusion, could be nothing but an obstacle to the accomplishment of your goal.

अस्त्यात्मा नास्तित्वसाधनाभावात्। देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽसौ वैचित्र्यात्। षष्ठीव्यपदेशादपि। न शिलापुत्रवद्धर्मिग्राहकमानबाधात्। अत्यन्तदुःखनिवृत्त्या कृतकृत्यता। यथा दुःखात्क्लेशः पुरुशस्य न तथा सुखादभिलाषः कुत्रापि कोऽपि सुखीति। तदपि दुःखशबलमिति दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिपन्ते विवेचकाः। सुखालाभाभावादपुरुषार्थत्वमिति चेन्न द्वैविध्यात्

21.10 (6.1) **asti** it exists **ātmā** individual soul **na-asti-tva-sādhanā-abhāvāt** (abl. because) non-existent – being – means of progress – absence **21.11** (6.2) **deha-ādi-vyatiriktaḥ** body – etc. – separated **asau** that **vaicitryāt** (abl. because) diversity **21.12** (6.3) **ṣaṣṭhī-vyapadeśāt** (abl. because) sixth – referring to **api** and **21.13** (6.4) **na** not **śilā-putra-vat** (vati like) the small stone, the pestle **dharmi-grāhaka-māna-bādhāt** (abl. just because) characterized by, having a particular

attribute – perceiver, subject – evidence – exclusion

21.14 (6.5) **atyanta-duḥkha-nivṛttyā** (inst. through) complete – suffering – cessation **kṛta-kṛtya-tā** done – to be done – that which is **21.15** (6.6) **yathā** as it is **duḥkhāt** (abl. from) suffering **kleśaḥ** affliction **puruṣasya** (gen. of) person **na** not **tathā** so much **sukhāt** (abl. because of) happiness **abhilāṣaḥ** desire **21.16** (6.7) **kutra** somewhere **api kaḥ** someone **api** indeed **sukhī** a happy person **iti** said to be (quotes) **21.17** (6.8) **tat api** actually **duḥkha-śabalam** suffering – mixed in **iti** saying **duḥkha-pakṣe** (loc. on) suffering – side **nikṣipante** they put it down **vivecakāḥ** the wise **21.18** (6.9) **sukha-lābha-a-bhāvāt** (abl. known from) happiness – finding – non-occurrence **a-puruṣa-artha-tvam** not a person's purpose **iti** said **cet** if **na** not so **dvaividhyāt** (abl. because) twofoldness

(The opponent:) **21.10 The individual soul must exist, because there would be the absence of any means of (spiritual) progress in its being non-existent. 21.11 It is separate from the body and the rest because of the diversity of (all) that 21.12 and because that is referred to by the sixth (genitive) case, 21.13 (but) it is not like the case of a pestle just because of exclusion of the evidence of the perceiver of what has the characteristics** (see 19.14)**.**

(The author:) **21.14 What is to be done (spiritual progress** 21.10**) is done through the ultimate cessation of suffering. 21.15 A person's desire (for it) is not so much because of the (anticipated) happiness as it is the affliction by suffering. 21.16 There is (always) someone somewhere who is said to be "happy", 21.17 (but) the wise** (Vaisheshikas, see VD 6.1-2, also YD 4.4-5) **put it on the suffering side, saying it is actually mixed in along with the suffering** (also see VD Chapters Six and Nine)**. 21.18 If you say that it is known from the absence of finding happiness that it (cessation of suffering) is not the purpose of a human being, it is not so, because of that twofoldness.**

This continues the thread from 20.14 about bodies possessing competency for karma. The opponent says that, bodies aside, at least there are individual souls, because if they don't exist, then why is there Vedic law prescribing liberation, and why do we hear people saying "my body" or "his body"? Whose bodies would those be? In the liberating view, however, the actual perceived body is created through the series beginning with mahat, whereas the notion of the body thrown together from atoms comes from a belief that is developed through inference and testimony alone. In the Vaisheshika 7.11-17 there is a discussion on this subject of individual souls, where that author refers back to his own illustration of self-motivated action through urge, versus the cause-and-effect kind of activity

observed in the environment, by the example of the intentional act of lifting a heavy stone pestle (the "smaller stone"), versus letting it drop and observing the resulting physical phenomenon of the husks being split from the grain in the larger mortar. The opponent does not care for that example or for the teaching of Vaisheshika in general, as we have seen.

As for spiritual progress, in the author's view it is solely for the purpose of the ultimate cessation of suffering, as opposed to a gradual advancement of the individual soul through the three planes of worldly life for the purpose of ultimate dissolution into Brahman. In sutra 21.15 the two terms "desire" and "affliction" are both in the nominative case, so he is saying that the desire is just the suffering itself, calling out for relief, and not so much the need to feel back-slapping hand-clapping happy about something. The opponent sees happiness as an objective feeling or sense that is desired and sought after as a reward for right behavior, whereas the author says it is a foundational state that is realized upon abandonment of the objective reality rooted in bondage and suffering.

In any case, as all the Darshanas teach, the notion that one might judge another person's state of consciousness based on whether or not he seems happy or virtuous or kind, or based on a question and answer session, or any other criterion, simply has no place in this higher knowledge. According to this teaching there is no enlightenment in any exalted master, nor is there ignorance in any lowly fool, nor is there anyone even capable of such things except for the one all-capable being that the yogin comes to know as himself. These texts are indeed all about liberation or enlightenment, but such words have unfortunately developed a meaning that invokes a certain awe and mystery, or a religious reverence, or maybe even a little fear. If I may for once remove the false overtones of myth and magic from this word, the "enlightenment" of these authors has nothing to do with supernatural powers or grand exalted states of consciousness. It is something completely apart from the common delusions of auras and blessings or heavenly qualities embodied in a venerable guru; completely unrelated to the glassy dreamy visage, or the saint-like demeanor. If devotion to a master is your heart's desire, then follow that path, but don't mistake rapture for enlightenment. No matter what the path, no one should ever claim to be enlightened because any such claiming could only be for the ears of others and enlightenment has nothing to do with others. If asked, simply deny, because affirmation would be false in that context anyway.

Likewise, you should disregard anyone else's claims to enlightenment or any claims on their behalf. Never mind the finger-wagging and fussing about who is entitled and who should shrink into humility. You alone are entitled, as the lone yogin, and that is all that matters.

The teachings of the Darshanas are not religious and they are not about devotion. They are about the path of knowledge, and a simple knowledge it is, gained by the yogin through simply allowing himself to see the true relationship between his native power of awareness and his world of experience. From that foundation of a knowledge-based enlightenment he knows life not as a passive bystander but as an active creator. From that foundation he may also explore and enjoy his creation, guided by the principles of these teachings as he goes along, having left by the wayside his addiction to suffering.

Chapter Twenty-Two

Dispelling the Bondage

निर्गुणत्वमात्मनोऽसङ्गत्वादिश्रुतेः। परधर्मत्वेऽपि तत्सिद्धिरविवेकात्। अनादिरविवेकोऽ-
न्यथा दोषद्वयप्रसक्तेः। न नित्यः स्यादात्मवदन्यथानुच्छित्तिः। प्रतिनियतकारणनाश्य-
त्वमस्य ध्वान्तवत्। अत्रापि प्रतिनियमोऽन्वयव्यतिरेकात्। प्रकारान्तरासम्भवादविवेक
एव बन्धः न मुक्तस्य पुनर्बन्धयोगोऽप्यनावृत्तिश्रुतेः। अपुरुषार्थत्वमन्यथा। अविशेषाप-
त्तिरुभयोः। मुक्तिरन्तरायध्वस्तेर्न परः

22.1 (6.10) **nir-guṇa-tvam** qualitiless – state **ātmanaḥ** (gen. of) individual soul **a-saṅga-tva-ādi-śruteḥ** (abl. because) unattached-being – etc. – scripture

22.2 (6.11) **para-dharmatve** (loc. as) in other(s) – duty – being **api** yet **tat-siddhiḥ** that – establishing **avivekāt** (abl. coming from) non-distinguishing **22.3** (6.12) **anādiḥ** *(see "an-ādau" 8.3)* without beginning, preexisting **avivekaḥ** non-discriminating **anyathā** otherwise **doṣa-dvaya-prasakteḥ** (abl. because) fault(s) – two – stuck with **22.4** (6.13) **na** no **nityaḥ** (masc.) an eternal one **syāt** it may be, perhaps, possible **ātmavat** (vatup having) individual soul(s) **anythā** otherwise **anucchittiḥ** no dispelling **22.5** (6.14) **prati-niyata-kāraṇa-nāśya-tvam** counter-checked – cause – destroyed – being **asya** (gen. of) this **dhvāntavat** (vati like) darkness (6.15) **atra** in this case **api** rather **prati-niyamaḥ** counter-checking **anvaya-vyatirekāt** (abl. by) affirming – negating **22.6** (6.16) **prakāra-antara-**

asambhavāt (abl. because of) way – other – impossibility **avivekaḥ** non-distinguishing **eva** just, nothing more than **bandhaḥ** bondage **22.7** (6.17) **na** no **muktasya** (gen. on the part of, for) liberated **punar-bandha-yogaḥ** further – bondage – connection **api** (strengthening sense) at all **an-āvṛtti-śruteḥ** (abl. for) non – recurrence – scripture **22.8** (6.18) **a-puruṣa-artha-tvam** lacking – soul – for the sake of – that which is **anyathā** otherwise (6.19) **aviśeṣa-āpattiḥ** no difference – implication **ubhayoḥ** (loc. between) the two **22.9** (6.20) **muktiḥ** liberation **antarāya-dhvasteḥ** (abl. coming from) obstacle – destruction **na paraḥ** none else

(The opponent:) **22.1 There is a qualitiless state of the individual soul, for there is scripture on its being unattached and the rest.**

(The author:) **22.2 Yet, establishing that (being unattached) as being the dharma of others, comes from non-distinguishing, 22.3 (and) the preexisting** (8.3), **non-distinguishing, because otherwise there is being stuck with the two faults** (8.2 and 8.3)**. 22.4 There is no possibility of an eternal being (Brahman) having individual souls. Otherwise there is no dispelling, 22.5 which in this case is rather a counter-checking, by affirming and by negating of this (non-distinguishing), being what is destroyed by the cause being counter-checked, like darkness. 22.6 Bondage is nothing more than non-distinguishing, because of the impossibility of any other way. 22.7 For the liberated one there is no further connection with bondage at all, for there is scripture on non-recurrence. 22.8 Otherwise it is lacking what is for the sake of the soul, the implication (being) that there is no difference between the two (states). 22.9 Liberation comes from destruction of the obstacle, nothing else.**

The opponent defends the belief in individual souls by saying that the bodiless state of souls is realized by non-attachment, but the author now begins to offer proofs to the contrary based on the impossibility of all the alternatives. He reminds the opponent that the belief in others having dharma and the belief in the existence of a preexisting world constitute the two faults mentioned in 8.2 and 8.3 regarding time and place. He rejects the belief in a multiplicity of individual souls because the path to liberation by dispelling of non-distinguishing only makes sense in terms of the subjective experience of the one conscious person, and he says again that the dispelling of bondage is by affirming and negating. Affirming refers to constant mindfulness of the progression of reality through the series of principles outlined in sutra 3.7-18, and excluding or negating refers to repeating the reminder "there is no …, there is no …" (na iti na iti) found in sutra 13.13. As for the possibility of recurrence of the bondage, one thing is certain, that upon realization

of the truth of this teaching there is no turning back. For the yogin who understands the teaching of the Darshanas, the half-knowledge of the old view will never again dominate in the wholeness of his enlightenment. If there is anything that could pass for permanence in all this, it would be that.

The author's view of final release differs from that of the opponent in that there is still non-distinguishing, which is life itself, but there is no bondage because freedom is always at hand. If there were recurrence of the bondage then the ultimate cessation spoken of in the very first sutra in this work would be lacking. Destruction of the obstacle to liberation means the same thing as counter-checking of the cause of bondage, which is non-distinguishing. In the next section he outlines the practical means for the destruction of the obstacle.

तत्राप्यविरोधः अधिकारित्रैविध्यान्न नियमः। दार्ढ्यार्थमुत्तरेषाम्। स्थिरस्सुखमासनमिति न नियमः। ध्यानं निर्विषयं मनः। उभयथाप्यविशेषश्चेन्नैवमुपरागनिरोधाद्विशेषः। निःस-ङ्गेऽप्युपरागोऽविवेकात्। जपास्फटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किं त्वभिमानः॥ (restored text)

भावनोपचयाच्छुद्धस्य सर्वं प्रकृतिवत्। रागोपहतिर्ध्यानम्। वृत्तिनिरोधात्तत्सिद्धिः। धारणासनस्वकर्मणा तत्सिद्धिः। निरोधश्छर्दिविधारणभ्याम्। स्थिरसुखमासनम्

22.10 (6.21) **tatra** (loc. there) **api** indeed **avirodhaḥ** no disagreement (6.22) **adhikāri-trai-vidhyāt** (abl. because) competent, qualified – threefold – division **na** no such **niyamaḥ** definition

22.11 (6.23) **dārḍhya-artham** solidity – meaning, referring to *(see many examples ifc MW)* **uttareṣām** (gen. of) subsequent **22.12** (6.24) **sthira-sukham** motionless – contentment **āsanam** sitting **iti** called **na** not **niyamaḥ** definition (6.25) **dhyānam** meditation **nir-viṣayam** without – sphere **manaḥ** mind **22.13** (6.26) **ubhayathā** either way **api** indeed **aviśeṣaḥ** non-difference **cet** if **na** no **evam** so **uparāga-nirodhāt** (abl. through) coloring – containment **viśeṣaḥ** difference **22.14** (6.27) **niḥsaṅge** (loc. when) non-attachment **api** even **uparāgaḥ** coloring **avivekāt** (abl. through) non-discriminating (6.28) **japā-sphaṭikayoḥ** (loc. in the case of) China rose – crystal **iva** like **na** no **uparāgaḥ** coloring **kim tu** but rather only **abhimānaḥ** imagining **22.15** (3.29) **bhāvanā** a mental notion **upacayāt** (abl. through) accumulation **śuddhasya** (gen. belonging to) the pure **sarvam** all of it **prakṛtivat** (vati appearing as) nature **22.16** (3.30) **rāga-upahatiḥ** interest – breaking apart **dhyānam** meditation **22.17** (3.31) **vṛtti-nirodhāt** (abl.

through) functioning – containment **tat-siddhiḥ** it – accomplishing **22.18** (3.32) **dhāraṇa-āsana-sva-karmaṇā** (inst. by means of) maintaining – sitting – self – duty **tat-siddhiḥ** that – accomplishment (3.33) **nirodhaḥ** containment **chardi-vidhāraṇābhyām** (inst. with, including) outflowing – holding apart (3.34) **sthira-sukham** motionless – contentment **āsanam** sitting

(The opponent:) **22.10 Indeed, there is no disagreement there, (but) there is no such** (22.5) **definition of it, for there is (instead) the threefold division regarding who is qualified (to seek liberation)** (see 20.14, 21.4)**.**

(The author:) **22.11 That refers to the solidity of what is subsequent. 22.12 Mind without the sphere** (see "contemplation" 20.14) **is "meditation", the motionless contentment** (compare with "sleep" 20.14) **is "posture", not that (your** 22.10**) definition. 22.13 Indeed, if you think there is no difference either way, … well, no, there <u>is</u> a difference, through containment of coloring, 22.14 but rather not coloring, only imagining, like a China rose and a crystal, coloring by non-discriminating, even when there is non-attachment** (see "liberation" 20.14)**. 22.15 It is (merely) a mental notion that it comes from accumulation, all of it belonging to a pure one (Brahman), (appearing) as nature. 22.16 Meditation is the breaking apart of such coloring. 22.17 The accomplishment of it is through containment of the ways** (YD 1.1)**, 22.18 which containment includes (both) the outflowing <u>and</u> the holding apart** (YD 6.15-18)**, the achievement of it by means of a self-imposed karma of sitting and maintaining, that posture being the motionless contentment (not sleep).**

Motionless contentment undefined by action is the subtle body without its functioning of exertion. It is the body for karma without solidity. Mind without the sphere of experienced objects, or without being "defined" by its functioning of colored perception, represents the body for experience, without solidity. Both subtle body and mind have an uncolored state. "Either way" means mind with or without the sphere, and body with or without activity. In the living liberated person there is a tinge even in the midst of non-attachment and this represents the body for both, without solidity. Meditation is the breaking apart of mental constructs, as opposed to the aggregation of them. Outside of meditation the awareness is colored with interest, and to some extent captured by its own creation. It can be dominated by many things, such as sensory impressions, personal thoughts, desires, emotions, passions: all the things that steal away one's interest from the pure self. "Rāga" most commonly means the latter of those things but more correctly in this context, it includes all the former ones as well.

Those interests have a grip on one's attention that can be broken down, dismantled, damaged, hurt, destroyed. "Upahati" most commonly means the latter of those things but more correctly here, the former. Translations that render these terms in their most common sense can be misleading; no one would spend his meditation time trying to fight off and destroy ardent passion.

"Chardi" normally means vomiting, but obviously it is used metaphorically here. The metaphor has been interpreted by other translators as "expulsion of breath" but in this context outflow and containment both refer to the stream of thoughts rather than breath, even though breathing is affected by posture and by meditation. During this process, in alternation with the settling of the mind, there occurs an uncontrolled outflow of unwanted thoughts, even when the intention is to slip out from under them to allow the unobscured presence of the witness. This tendency of the mind can be disturbing at first, which would be reason enough to invoke such a graphic metaphor. The metaphor also serves to represent the duality of experience in the living liberated person: being caught up in worldly thoughts and actions vs. awakening and distinguishing Brahman.

Chapter Twenty-Three

The Opponent's Summation

स्वकर्म स्वाश्रमविहितकर्मानुष्ठानम्। वैराग्यादभ्यासाच्च ॥ ध्यानधारणाभ्यासवैराग्यादिभि-स्तन्निरोधः। लयविक्षेपयोर्व्यावृत्त्येत्याचार्याः। न स्थाननियमश्चित्तप्रसादात्। प्रकृतेरा-द्योपादानतान्येषां कार्यत्वश्रुतेः। नित्यत्वेऽपि नात्मनो योग्यत्वाभावात्। श्रुतिविरोधान्न कुतर्कापसदस्यात्मलाभः। पारम्पर्येऽपि प्रधानानुवृत्तिरणुवत्। सर्वत्र कार्यदर्शनाद्वि-भुत्वम्। गतियोगेऽप्याद्यकारणताहानिरणुवत्। प्रसिद्धाधिक्यं प्रधानस्य न नियमः। सत्त्वादीनामतद्धर्मत्वं तद्रूपत्वात्। अनुपभोगेऽपि पुमर्थं सृष्टिः प्रधानस्योष्ट्रकुंकुमवहनवत्।

23.1 (3.35) **sva-karma** one's karma **sva-āśrama-vihita-karma-anuṣṭhānam** one's – stage in life – determined – course of action – undertaking (3.36) **vairāgyāt** (abl. through) dispassion **abhyāsāt** (abl. through) discipline **ca** and *[(6.29)* ***dhyāna-dhāraṇa-abhyāsa-vairāgya-ādibhiḥ*** *(inst. pl. by means of) meditation – holding – discipline – dispassion – etc.* ***tat-nirodhaḥ*** *it – restraint, control* ***The restraint of it is by means of meditation, holding, discipline,***

dispassion, etc.] *(I do not consider this sutra to be authentic. It recites a list of the Yoga terms found nearby and it occurs at the juncture where 3.29-36 had been mistakenly displaced; it disrupts the logical flow of the surrounding material, whether it is placed before 3.29, or placed here, where it is not consistent with the tone or the thesis of the opponent.)* (6.30) **laya-vikṣepayoḥ** (gen. of) lethargy – restlessness **vyāvṛttyā** (inst. by) turning away **iti** according to **ācāryāḥ** teachers **23.2** (6.31) **na** not **sthāna-niyamaḥ** station – defining **citta-prasādāt** (abl. by) thoughts – settled, settling (6.32) **prakṛteḥ** (gen. belonging to) nature **ādya-upādānatā** (fem.) primary – inclusiveness **anyeṣām** (gen. of) the others **kārya-tva-śruteḥ** (abl. known from) products – being – scripture **23.3** (6.33) **nityatve** (loc. w/api even though) constancy **api na** no **ātmanaḥ** (gen. belonging to) the individual **yogyatva-abhāvāt** (abl. because) qualification – doesn't exist, no such thing **23.4** (6.34) **śruti-virodhāt** (abl. because) scripture – misinterpretation **na** no **kutarka-apasadasya** (gen. in (belonging to)) bad reasoning, faulty speculation, nonsense – outcast, unorthodox *(metaphorically, an offspring of one of the six kinds of unfit marriage)* **ātma-lābhaḥ** individual soul – found **23.5** (6.35) **pāramparye** (loc. if) series **api** even **pradhāna-anuvṛttiḥ** following, subsequent to **aṇuvat** (vati as) atomic (6.36) **sarvatra-kārya-darśanāt** (abl. known by) everywhere – effect, product – seeing **vibhutvam** omnipresence **23.6** (6.37) **gati-yoge** (loc. in) motion, migration – connection **api** even **ādya-kāraṇa-tā-ahāniḥ** primary – cause – being – no rejecting *(I am following Pandit Shriram Sharma in writing ahāniḥ instead of hāniḥ.)* **aṇuvat** (vati appearing as) atomic **23.7** (6.38) **prasiddha-ādhikyam** well-known, celebrated – superiority **pradhānasya** (gen. for) principal **na** not **niyamaḥ** restriction **23.8** (6.39) **sattva-ādinām** (gen. belonging to) sattva – and the others **a-tat-dharma-tvam** no – of – that – role – being **tat-rūpatvāt** (abl. because of) that – the (very) form – their being

23.9 (6.40) **anupabhoge** (loc. though) no – enjoying **api** even **pum-artha-sṛṣṭiḥ** men – for the sake of – creation **pradhānasya** (gen. on the part of) principal **uṣṭra-kuṁkuma-vahanavat** (vati like) oxcart – saffron – carrying

(The opponent:) **23.1 According to (us) teachers, one's karma** (22.18) **is through the turning away of lethargy and restlessness by dispassion and by discipline, undertaking a course of action (karma) determined by one's stage in life. 23.2 Primary inclusiveness belongs to nature, for there is scripture on the others' being her products, not the defining of their stations through settling of thoughts. 23.3 Even though there is constancy (for nature), it does not belong to an individual soul, because he has no such qualification. 23.4**

Because of (your) misinterpretation of scripture, no individual soul is even found in this unorthodox nonsense. 23.5 By seeing the produced everywhere, its omnipresence as the atomic is known, even if it is as a series, (but) subsequent to the principal (nature). 23.6 Even in connection with (trans)migration, there is no rejecting of her being the primary cause, as the atomic. 23.7 For the principal, there is superiority to the well-known (guṇas of Vaisheshika (see Sinha, *The Samkhya Philosophy* 1915. p.541))**, not restriction to them. 23.8 Being the dharma of that (principal) does not belong to sattva and the others because of their being the very form of that.**

(The author:) **23.9 Creation for the sake of men, on the part of a principal, even though there is no enjoying, is like carrying saffron in an ox-cart** (see 12.18)**.**

The opponent again insists on the threefold division of the competent. Lethargy means dullness or sleepiness, and restlessness means hyperactivity of the mind, with the attention scattered in the sphere of objects. These two states represent tamas and rajas respectively, and the traditional teaching was that one must advance out of these lower ranks and into sattva, through many lifetimes of dispassion and discipline, dispassion being turning away from restlessness and discipline being turning away from lethargy. He continues to argue against inclusiveness or accepting creation unto one's self at the level of mahat. He believes that nature is eternal, but that the individual soul has a beginning, and that it ends by merging into Brahman when the cycle of karma is completed.

He says that there is no constancy to be found in a person and he still clings to his proof by the testimony of scripture alone. He now begins to use the author's words in his own way. In sutras 23.5 and 23.6 he repeats the word aṇuvat, affirming his atomic material cause and mimicking the author's repetition of lokavat, avasthāvat, and prakṛtivat. He uses the author's ādya (mahat) to mean his first, nature. In sutra 23.8 he disagrees with the author's statement in 6.16 about the nature of the guṇas, insisting that the principal doesn't have any dharma, excluded or not. His use of the "hā" derivative meaning "rejecting" (as in 1.4) mimics the author's "abandoning" or "letting go". He uses the feminine "upādānatā" (23.2) and "kāraṇatā" (23.6) when referring to his principal prakṛti, as opposed to the neuter "upādānatva" (4.13) and "jagat-upādāna-kāraṇam" (18.5) when he refers to the author's principal. He almost seems to be in a defensive old-guard position, reacting to the popularity of a "well-known" radicalism in various modern schools.

The word "atomic" refers to the products of nature being composed by aggregation of little pieces, and seeing these products everywhere may be the most compelling reason for the belief in a real physical world. It is the foundation for the nearly irresistible strength of the living view as opposed to the liberating view, but in his response, the author, having also just been accused of spouting nonsense, simply dismisses all of it by repeating the saffron and oxcart analogy.

कर्मवैचित्र्यात्सृष्टिवैचित्यम्। साम्यवैषम्याभ्यां कार्यद्वयम्। विमुक्तबोधान्न सृष्टिः प्रधानस्य लोकवत्। नान्योपसर्पणेऽपि मुक्तोपभोगो निमित्ताभावात्। पुरुषबहुत्वं व्यवस्थातः। उपाधिश्चेत्तत्सिद्धौ पुनर्द्वैतम्। द्वाभ्यामपि प्रमाणविरोधः। द्वाभ्यामप्यविरोधान्न पूर्वमुत्तरं च साधकाभावत्। प्रकाशतस्तत्सिद्धौ कर्मकर्तृविरोधः।

23.10 (6.41) **karma-vaicitryāt** (abl. from) karman – diversity **sṛṣṭi-vaicitryam** creation – diversity **23.11** (6.42) **sāmya-vaiṣamyābhyām** (abl. dual; known from) smoothness – roughness **kārya-dvayam** effect – twofold, two kinds of **23.12** (6.43) **vimukta-bodhāt** (abl. from, for) released – consciousness **na** no **sṛṣṭiḥ** creating **pradhānasya** (gen. on the part of) principal **lokavat** (vati like) world **23.13** (6.44) **na** no **anya-upasarpaṇe** (loc. when) others – approach **api** even **mukta-upabhogaḥ** liberated – experience **nimitta-abhāvāt** (abl. because) instrumental cause – absence **23.14** (6.45) **puruṣa-bahutvam** souls – multiplicity **vyavasthātaḥ** (tasil from) allotment **23.15** (6.46) **upādhiḥ** representation *(see 2.15)* **cet** if (you say) **tat-siddhau** (loc. in) that – establishing **punar** again, still **dvaitam** duality **23.16** (6.47) **dvābhyām** (inst. with) two **api** indeed **pramāṇa-virodhaḥ** proof – inconsistency **23.17** (6.48) **dvābhyām** (inst. dual; with) the two **api** indeed **avirodhāt** (abl. because) no disagreement **na** no **pūrvam** former **uttaram** latter **ca** and **sādhaka-abhāvāt** (abl. because) progress – absence

23.18 (6.49) **prakāśatas** (tasil through) light **tat-siddhau** (loc. in) it – accomplished **karma-kartṛ-virodhaḥ** karman – performer – disagreement

(The opponent:) **23.10 The diversity of creation comes from the diversity of karma, 23.11 whose two kinds of effect are known from smoothness and roughness (in life), 23.12 (but) for the consciousness of the released there is no creating on the part of the principal, (appearing) as the world. 23.13 Even when there is (her) approach in others, there is no enjoyment** (see 22.18) **for the liberated because of the absence of that instrumental cause (desire, karma). 23.14 Multiplicity of souls is known from the allotment of life**

circumstances. 23.15 Even if you say it is a (mere) representation (see 7.13-14), **in establishing <u>that</u>, there is still duality. 23.16 Indeed with those two (representations and mahat), there is inconsistency with the standard of proof, 23.17 because indeed with those two, because of the absence of (karmic) progress** (see 1.8, 21.10), **there can be no disagreement that they are not the former and the latter (effect and cause** see Chapter Two)**.**

(The author:) **23.18 In accomplishing that (progress) through the light, there <u>is</u> disagreement with (the doctrine of) karma and the performer.**

The author says there is no bondage and no suffering in the liberated, while the opponent says there is no creation and no experience whatsoever, because there is no more instrumental cause, which in his view is karma, the reason behind the allotment of smoothness and roughness (ease and difficulty) among the many individuals in the world.

He says that even the author's view of a representation and a container (7.13-14) would represent a duality of sorts, but in that scheme there could be no "effect and cause" relationship between the representations and a creator called mahat, because according to him that relationship should belong instead to one's life circumstances and karma, respectively (see Chapter Two). Otherwise there would be no reason behind the obvious diversity of life experiences. The author uses his allotment of one sutra to say, "Yes, from the viewpoint of the light of distinguishing there does indeed seem to be some disagreement with your religious doctrines."

Chapter Twenty-Four

A Review of the Two Views

जडव्यावृत्तो जडं प्रकाशयति चिद्रूपः। न श्रुतिविरोधो रागिणां वैराग्याय तत्सिद्धेः। जगत्सत्यत्वमदुष्टकारणजन्यत्वाद्बाधकाभावात्। प्रकारान्तरासम्भवात्सदुत्पत्तिः। अहंकारः कर्ता न पुरुषः चिदवसाना भुक्तिस्तत्कर्मार्जितत्वात्। चन्द्रादिलोकेऽप्यावृत्तिर्निमित्तसद्भावात्। लोकस्य नोपदेशात्सिद्धिः पूर्ववत्। पारम्पर्येण तत्सिद्धौ विमुक्तिश्रुतिः । गतिश्रुतेश्च व्यापकत्वेऽप्युपाधियोगाद्भोगदेशकाललाभो व्योमवत्।

24.1 (6.50) **jaḍa-vyāvṛttaḥ** dullness – rid **jaḍam** the dull **prakāśayati** he enlightens **cit-rūpaḥ** intellingence – paragon **24.2** (6.51) **na** no **śruti-virodhaḥ**

scripture – disagreeing **rāgiṇām** (gen.) impassioned ones **vairāgyāya** (dat. for the sake) dispassion **tat-siddheḥ** it – establishment **24.3** (6.52) **jagat-satyatvam** world – reality **aduṣṭa-kāraṇa-janya-tvāt** (abl. known through) innocence – cause – arising – state **bādhaka-abhāvāt** (abl. through) excluding – absence **24.4** (6.53) **prakāra-antara-asambhavāt** (abl. from) ways – other – impossibility **sat-utpattiḥ** true – emergence **24.5** (6.54) **ahaṁkāraḥ** personal identity **kartā** performer **na** not **puruṣaḥ** person (6.55) **cit-avasānā** intelligence – stopping point **bhuktiḥ** enjoyment **tat-karma-ārjitatvāt** (abl. coming from) its – (through) karman – earned – being **24.6** (6.56) **candra-ādi-loke** (loc. in) moon – etc. – world **api** even **āvṛttiḥ** return **nimitta-sat-bhāvāt** (abl. resulting from) instrumental cause – true – presence **24.7** (6.57) **lokasya** (gen. of) the world **na** not **upadesāt** (abl. by) instruction, lesson **siddhiḥ** establishment **pūrvavat** (vati as) before **24.8** (6.58) **pāram-paryeṇa** (inst. through) series **tat-siddhau** (loc. while) that – establishment **vimukti-śrutiḥ** release – scripture **24.9** (6.59) **gati-śruteḥ** (abl. known from) migration – scripture **ca** and **vyāpakatve** (loc. where) pervasiveness **api** even **upādhi-yogāt** (abl. because) representation – connection **bhoga-deśa-kāla-lābhaḥ** experience – place – time – acquiring **vyomavat** (vati like) sky, space

(The opponent:) **24.1 One who enlightens** (referring to "light" 23.18) **the dull is someone who has rid himself of dullness, a paragon of intelligence (a teacher). 24.2 There is no disagreeing with scripture, because the establishment of it is for the dispassion of those impassioned ones.**

(The author:) **24.3 The true reality of the world is known through the state arising from innocence of the cause (of bondage) through the absence of its excluding (Brahman). 24.4 The emergence of the true (way) arises from the impossibility of the other ways.**

(The opponent:) **24.5 The stopping point of intelligence is enjoyment, which comes from being earned through karma, the performer (being) the personal identity, not the human spirit. 24.6 His returning, even in the world of the moon, etc.** (Chandogya Upanishad V) **results from the presence of the true instrumental cause (karma).**

(The author:) **24.7 There is no establishment of such a world by that lesson, as (it was said) before. 24.8 That is scripture about release (even) while there is establishment of that (world) through the series. 24.9 And from that scripture on migration it is known that even while there is pervasiveness, because of his (mahat's) connection (yoga) with the representation, there is the acquisition of time, place, and experience, (but) he is like space (the ether).**

अनधिष्ठितस्य पूतिभावप्रसङ्गान्न तत्सिद्धिः। अदृष्टद्वारा चेदसम्बद्धस्य तदसम्भवाज्जलादि-
वदङ्कुरे। निर्गुणत्वात्तदसम्भवादहंकारधर्मा ह्येते। विशिष्टस्य जीवत्वमन्वयव्यतिरेकात्।
अहंकारकर्त्रधीना कार्यसिद्धिर्नेश्वराधीना प्रमाणाभावात्। अदृष्टोद्भूतिवत्समानत्वम्।
महतोऽन्यत्। कर्मनिमित्तः प्रकृतेः स्वस्वामिभावोऽप्यनादिर्बीजाङ्कुरवत्। अविवेकनि-
मित्तो वा पञ्चशिखः। लिङ्गशरीरनिमित्तक इति सनन्दनाचार्यः। यद्वा तद्वा तदुच्छित्तिः
पुरुषार्थस्तदुच्छित्तिः पुरुषार्थः

24.10 (6.60) **anadhiṣṭhitasya** (gen. on the part of) ungoverned, non-superintended **pūti-bhāva-prasaṅgāt** smelly – existence – stuck with **na tat-siddhiḥ** that – establishing **24.11** (6.61) **adṛṣṭa-dvārā** (inst. through) unseen, unknown – instrumentality **cet** if you think **asambaddhasya** (gen. belonging to) unrelated **tat-asambhavāt** (abl. arising from) their – impossible condition **jala-ādivat** (vati like) water – etc. **aṅkure** (loc. in the case of, concerning, with) sprout (6.62) **nirguṇatvāt** (abl. coming from) without – essential constituents – state **tat-asambhavāt** (abl. arising from) their – impossible condition **ahaṅkāra-dharmāḥ** personal identities – dharmas **hi** for **ete** these, all these **24.12** (6.63) **viśiṣṭasya** (gen. possessed of) distinction **jīva-tvam** living person – being **anvaya-vyatirekāt** (abl. through) affirirmation – negation **24.13** (6.64) **ahaṁkāra-kartṛ-adhīnā** personal identity – (as) performer – dependent on **kārya-siddhiḥ** effect(s) accomplishing **na** not **īśvara-adhīnā** supreme governor – dependent **pramāṇa-abhāvāt** proof – non-existence, absence **24.14** (6.65) **adṛṣṭa-udbhūtivat** (vatup having) unseen – coming forth **samāna-tvam** same – to be (6.66) **mahataḥ** (gen. belonging to) mahat, the comprehensive one **anyat** (declined like tat) the other thing **24.15** (6.67) **karma-nimittaḥ** karman – instrumental cause **prakṛteḥ** (gen. belonging to) nature **sva-svāmi-bhāvaḥ** own – master, owner – relation **api** indeed **anādiḥ** beginningless, preexisting **bīja-āṅkuravat** (vati like) seed – sprout **24.16** (6.68) **aviveka-nimittaḥ** non-discriminating – as instrumental cause **vā** the alternative **pañcaśikhaḥ** **24.17** (6.69) **liṅga-śarīra-nimittaka** indicator – body – instrumental cause **iti** according to **sanandana-ācāryaḥ** Sanandana – teacher **24.18** (6.70) **yadvā – tadvā** one way or the other **tat-ucchittiḥ** of it – cutting loose, breaking free **puruṣa-arthaḥ** person – desire, benefit, interest, purpose, aim **tat-ucchittiḥ puruṣa-arthaḥ**

(The opponent:) **24.10 That (yoga) is not accomplished on the part of something ungoverned** (by an external governor 20.12)**, because of being stuck with the existence of the smelly (body).**

(The author:) **24.11 If you think it is (accomplished) through the instrumentality of some unknown (governor** (see 2.5)**), then it would be like water, etc. with a sprout, for there would be all these dharmas of personal identities arising from the impossible condition of their coming from a state <u>without</u> the guṇas, arising from the impossible condition of their belonging to something unrelated. 24.12 Being a living person possessed of distinguishing, must be through the affirmation and negation.**

(The opponent:) **24.13 The accomplishing of effects <u>is</u> dependent on the personal identities (ahaṁkāra) as performers (of karma), not dependent on (your) supreme governor, because of the absence of proof.**

(The author:) **24.14 It is the other. It belongs to mahat to be that same (accomplisher of effects), having his manifestation arise from the unknown (potential).**

(The opponent:) **24.15 The own/owner relation belongs indeed to nature, karma (being) the instrumental cause. <u>That</u> is what is beginningless like the seed and sprout.**

(The author:) **24.16 It is the alternative of non-distinguishing as the instrumental cause, according to Pañcaśikha. 24.17 It is the indicator-body as the instrumental cause, according to the teacher Sanandana. 24.18 One way or the other, breaking free of it is the purpose of a human being.**

Everyone knows of right and wrong and that both have their inevitable consequences in the course of one's life, but the author is saying that, apart from that worldly sense, there can be no unseen threads that connect people's actions in one life with their consequences in another life, because this would be outside of or "unrelated" to nature, either as a producer of atoms or as a material substrate for mahat, in the way that water, soil, air, and sun would not be able to produce a sprout without a seed (which represents the guṇas in this analogy). Wrong acts like those involving greed, and deliberate hurtfulness or punishment, have their consequences in the immediate present. The consequence accompanies the act in that it diminishes the person directly and serves as an obstacle to the achievement of his highest goal in life. A sense of debt may persist in memory, which can be a very uncertain place, but finding the key to liberation, where there is a true

understanding of the nature of memory, provides relief from this imagined debt while at the same time it naturally precludes further wrong action.

In sutra 24.11, nearing the end of the work and mirroring the beginning, the author's two "impossibilities" mimic the opponent's two in 1.4. Because of the impossibility of the other way (sutra 24.4) and because of the impossibilities in 24.11, it is known that "yoga", which is being the jīvan-mukta, comes about not through the instrumentality of some unknown governor, but only through the author's stated means of affirmation, which is constant and repeated mindfulness of accepting through the series; and negation, which is constant abandoning of misapprehensions. The author uses the word "unknown" in two different ways. The governor is not unknown, but nature is unknown until it becomes manifest.

In the opponent's view, the role of master and owner belongs to nature, beginningless and self-perpetuating through the agency of karma, not to a human consciousness through the agency of mind. He has his own use for the seed-and-sprout analogy, as a metaphor for the endless perpetuation of karma, because seeds produce sprouts, and sprouts in turn mature into seed-producing plants.

The thesis of the author, Pañcaśikha, who is essentially a representation of the yogin at this very moment and in this very place, is that the instigation of creation is by not distinguishing the true relationship of the soul with nature. The counter-thesis held by the opponent, Sanandana, who might be considered a representation of Pañcaśikha expressing his living view, is that the body as an indicator of the individual soul is the accomplisher of effects through karma and reincarnation, subservient to God. Either way, liberation is the goal presented here in the Sankhya Darshana.

End of the Sankhya Darshana